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Abstract  
Fear of Aboriginal aggression was a reality for the early settlers of New South Wales and 
Van Diemen’s Land, but it only gained imaginative currency through the trope of white 
victimhood. This discursive emotional frame continues today, providing a means for many 
contemporary settler Australians to reconcile with a colonial legacy defined by frontier 
violence and dispossession. In engaging this dialectic between the past and the present, this 
thesis seeks to understand how fear and white victimhood gained such purchase upon the 
Australian settler imaginary.  
In their response to and coverage of frontier violence, colonial newspapers and 
administrators did much to validate the unsettled feelings of settlers and their servants as they 
consolidated the dispossession of Indigenous people. Despite the language of “amity and 
kindness” which guided the settlement of Australia, early governors were quick to deploy 
“terror” as a means of arresting Aboriginal resistance to European occupation. This provided 
settlers an immediate means through which they could channel their emotions and 
expectations of frontier policy as the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth. 
Terrorising Aboriginal people was framed as the most efficient means of consoling their 
anxieties over the tenuous nature of their lives and properties in this unfamiliar land. A direct 
relationship thus came to exist between the acknowledgment of settlers as victims and the 
“eliminationist logic” of settler colonialism.  
This thesis provides a critical commentary on the collective emotional experience of 
Europeans during the colonial era. It analyses the ways in which newspapers like the Sydney 
Gazette developed a narrative that juxtaposed the “unfeeling” disposition of Aboriginal 
people with the passive victimhood of settlers, facilitating the circulation of fear across 
geographical, although administratively porous, boundaries. It also explores how colonial 
elites cloaked their responsibility in this formation of settler subjectivity in the hope of 
maintaining a belief in their own humanity towards Indigenous people. Through a discourse 
of sympathy and compassion men like George Augustus Robinson increasingly sought to 
challenge the destructive impulses of settler colonialism, emphasising the depravity of 
convicts and frontiersmen. As this challenge became the central platform of humanitarian 
governance throughout the 1830s, however, it was less a vehicle for the representation of 
Indigenous rights as it was a means for colonial elites to retrieve their own sense of 
Britishness predicated upon the paradox of humane colonisation.  
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Introduction 
 
On 17 May 1997, Prime Minister John Howard addressed a community meeting in 
Longreach, Queensland, regarding the potential co-existence of Native Title and pastoral 
leases in the wake of the 1996 Wik decision. This was an early opportunity to outline the 
recently elected Coalition government’s 10-point plan to amend the “administrative 
nightmare” created by Wik and the Native Title Act more broadly. He consoled his audience: 
I can understand the fear in the community that people who have no connection at 
all with your land can come from a distant part of Australia and say, well years 
and years ago my relatives, or my ancestors, or my friends, or the other members 
of my tribe had a connection with this property, and therefore I've got some right 
to come onto your property and to exercise my traditional access rights. Well 
under the amendments that we are framing that can't happen. Unless somebody 
has a current physical connection with the land, I repeat that, unless somebody 
has a current physical connection with the land, than access rights cannot be 
obtained.1 
This rhetoric relayed anxieties regarding the security of European title across Australia 
that had been mounting since the Mabo decision in 1992. In leading the charge against Mabo 
in opposition, then leader of the Coalition John Hewson made the claim that Australians had 
“genuine concerns about their home, or their mine or their farm”.2 Even after Howard “put 
beyond any legal doubt” the threat Native Title posed to freehold title in 1997, which did 
nothing more than reiterate the Native Title Act’s provisions regarding “extinguishment”, 
                                                
1‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon. John Howard MP Address to Participants at the Longreach 
Community Meeting to Discuss the Wik 10 Point Plan Longreach, QLD’, Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet <https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-10361.> Accessed 9 June, 2016. 
2 The Guardian, 1 January 2017.  
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some members of his government continued to echo the precarity of non-Indigenous land 
title, alluding to Australian “backyards in peril.”3 Rivalling this heightened rhetoric was One 
Nation leader Pauline Hanson’s 1996 maiden speech to parliament, in which she proclaimed:  
I am fed up with being told ‘This is our land’. Well, where the hell do I go? I was 
born here, and so were my parents and children...I draw the line when told I must 
pay and continue paying for something that happened over 200 years ago. Like 
most Australians, I worked for my land; no-one gave it to me4  
 In examining the strong hold of victimological narratives upon the Australian 
imaginary, from pioneer legends to battles with the natural landscape, Ann Curthoys has 
detected both “practical and figurative resonance” in these words. At once Hanson voiced 
practical concerns already evinced by other parliamentarians at the state and federal level, but 
also the “fear of a symbolic loss, of the legitimacy and permanency of the non-Aboriginal 
Australian’s sense of home.”5 This dual concern poses a threat to the myth that settler 
Australians achieved their ownership of land through suffering and hardship, an implicit 
declaration of terra nullius in defiance of the historic precedent established by the Mabo 
decision and the Native Title Act.  
Through such emotive responses to Native Title, Curthoys identifies “a white 
Australian version of ressentiment”, Nietzche’s concept of the “triumph of the weak as 
weak”, otherwise exacerbated by forces which have deprived members of Western society a 
sense of social and economic agency in a globalized world. The clearest implication of the 
                                                
3 Sydney Morning Herald, 4 December 1997. 
4 Pauline Hanson cited in Ann Curthoys, ‘Explusion, exodus and exile in white Australian mythology’, Journal 
of Australian Studies, vol. 23, no. 61 (1999), pp. 17 – 18.  
5 Casting this meaning in biblical terms of ‘exile’, Curthoys’ analysis is complemented by Ian Mclean’s 
relegation of non-Aboriginal identity to a constant state of becoming, a necessarily tenuous sense of belonging. 
See Ian McLean, White Aborigines: Identity Politics in Australian Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998) p. 6.  
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prevalence of the growing self-identification with white victimhood for settler societies such 
as Australia is a form of historical blindness, an inability to recognise one’s role in the 
suffering of Indigenous people in particular.6  
 The recent revival of Hanson’s One Nation party and the 2016 election of Donald 
Trump to the American presidency indicate the growing purchase of political rhetoric which 
speaks to a class of people convinced that they have been left behind by globalization.7 This 
economic insecurity easily finds as its political scapegoat the difficulty of integrating people 
of diverse cultural backgrounds within an ostensibly white society. As it was with people of 
Asian heritage and Native Title with Hanson’s initial political platform 20 years ago, so it is 
with people of Islamic heritage today, a platform bolstered by the global insecurity of a post-
9/11 world. The rise of groups such as Islamic State is offered as evidence of the threat 
people from predominantly Muslim nations pose, in ignorance of the role Western powers 
have played in creating the regional instability from which such groups have emerged.8 A 
                                                
6 Curthoys, ‘Explusion, exodus and exile in white Australian mythology’ p. 18. A similar conception is Anthony 
Giddens’ “juggernaut of modernity”. “To live in the world produced by high modernity”, he writes, “has the 
feeling of riding a juggernaut. It is not just that more or less continuous and profound processes of change occur; 
rather change does not consistently conform either to human expectations or to human control.” Gloria Wekker 
provides similar insight in the context of Dutch society through the phrase “white innocence”, a construct 
referring to the inability of the Dutch psyche to confront its perpetration of colonial violence in places like 
Indonesia given the way the Netherlands suffered as a result of German occupation in World War II. This is one 
of several paradoxes Wekker describes at the heart of white Dutch self-representation allowing the nation to 
perceive itself as devoid of racial discrimination and colonial violence whilst perpetuating a culture of 
xenophobia and white dominance. Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 28; Gloria Wekker, White Innocence: Paradoxes of 
Colonialism and Race (London: Duke university Press, 2016), pp. 12 – 21. 
7 Although, as David Marr has recently argued, there is little evidence that Australians who voted for Hanson’s 
One Nation Party in the 2016 election did so on account of economic marginalistion as a result of globalisation . 
Rather, being “in work and middling prosperous” the main drive of One Nation voters is a nostalgic yearning for 
an Australian past untroubled by the contemporary politics of race. David Marr, ‘The White Queen: One Nation 
and the Politics of Race’, Quarterly Essay, no. 65 (2017), pp. 52 – 55.  
8 This risks simplifying the complex recent evolution of Islamic radicalism (Salafi jihadism) of which IS is but 
the most recent manifestation. However, on top of a broad ranging clerical and racial animus, a common 
denominator of this tradition is its preoccupation with undermining the hegemony of Western power in the 
Middle-East, hence the attacks upon New Your and Washington on 11 September 2001. Whether one 
interrogates the incoherent ethnic synthesis of Iraq as a result of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, or Shi’a 
exposure to Sunni extremism following instability in the country after it was invaded in 2003, America and its 
allies helped set the scene for a civil war which allowed the emergence of Islamic State. This is not to 
understate, however, the role of figures such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in targeting the general Shi’a population    
See Robert Manne, The Mind of the Islamic State (Carlton: Scharwtz Publishing, 2016), p. 16. 
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global constellation of historical and economic circumstances involving an array of anxieties 
expressed towards people of certain racial, ethnic and religious backgrounds must therefore 
be taken into account in explaining the prevalence of white victimhood in settler nations in 
particular, where non-Indigenous belonging is a necessarily fragile concept.  
The specific significance of Mabo and its consequent legislative implications lies in 
the ease with which it exposed this fragility, and clarity and penetration of its critique of the 
legitimacy of Australia as a nation state. This relationship between white victimhood and 
Indigenous political agency is otherwise more subtly present in recent Australian history. The 
retirement of Sydney Swans Indigenous AFL player Adam Goodes at the end of 2015 is a 
clear example. During the 2015 season, AFL crowds began to boo Goodes whenever he 
touched the ball. This behavior increased in intensity from the Indigenous Round in May, 
during which Goodes had confronted booing Carlton (the opposition) supporters with a war 
cry, climaxing in what appeared to be the throwing of a spear.  
As I was able to glean from attending a match in July 2015, rather than targeting 
Goodes on the grounds of race, a consensus seemed to be emerging that he had long been 
booed given his tendency to unfairly manipulated umpires into awarding him penalties. For 
journalists such as Miranda Devine and Paul Sheehan, the genesis of the booing (to which 
Goodes partly attributed his retirement from the game) could in fact be traced back to the 
star’s ‘outing’ of a 13-year-old girl who called him an ape during a game against 
Collingwood in May 2013 (the girl was subsequently ejected from the ground). Failing to 
recognise his many other achievements on and off the field, Devine went as far as to surmise 
that Goodes was awarded Australian of the Year in 2014 principally for targeting “a 
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powerless little girl”.9 “The Adam Goodes Fire”, as Sheehan coined it, a moment laden with 
political and historical meaning, thus came to focus upon “the self-chosen white victim”. 
Instead of reflection, by throwing his imaginative spear Goodes only managed to evoke “fear 
of illegitimacy”, a characteristic inability to recognise the harm done to others, to allow a 
more inclusive and coherent national narrative to emerge.10 
Such moments sharply evoke what W.E.H Stanner referred to in 1968 as “a cult of 
forgetfulness practiced on a national scale”, a structural deficiency in the national historical 
consciousness throughout the twentieth century regarding Aboriginal people and their 
views.11 As Mark McKenna has observed, this willful blindness remains relevant to settler 
histories despite attempts to address Stanner’s call to end the “Great Australian Silence” and 
acknowledge Australia’s history of frontier violence.12 McKenna makes this point with 
specific reference to the relationship between history and memory in places marginal to the 
broader national frontier narrative. Having long internalised this sense of marginalisation, 
extending to neglect at the hands of successive governments, communities such as Eden on 
the New South Wales far south coast naturally adopt the status of victims in the face of being 
challenged on the grounds of colonial dispossession.13 Like Curthoys McKenna also more 
broadly frames the overall reaction of Australian conservatives to the post-Stanner focus 
upon narratives of Aboriginal dispossession, murder and forced family removal in terms of 
                                                
9 Miranda Devine, ‘Adam Goodes Isn’t Booed for the Colour of His Skin. He is Booed for Acting Like a 
Pillock’, The Daily Telegraph, 30 July 2015. Paul Sheehan, ‘The Adam Goodes Fire was Lit by His Conduct, 
Not His Race’, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 July 2015. See also Georgia Mantle, What’s Next for Adam 
Goodes?’, Honisoit, 13 October 2015. 
10 Curthoys, ‘Explusion, exodus and exile in white Australian mythology’ p. 18. 
11 W.E.H. Stanner, The Dreaming and Other Essays (Collingwood: Black Inc., 2010[1968]), p. 189.  
12Mark McKenna, Looking For Blackfellas’ Point: An Australian History of Place (Sydney: UNSW Press, 
2003), pp. 63 – 64. Pioneering examples of which include: Henry Reynolds, The Other Side of the Frontier: 
Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia (Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1982)’; Lyndall Ryan, 
The Aboriginal Tasmanians (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1981).   
13 McKenna, Looking For Blackfellas’ Point, pp. 138 – 154.  
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national moral legitimacy.14 Captured by objections to Australian history drifting too far 
towards a “black armband” view of the past, led by historians such as Geoffrey Blainey and 
Howard’s role as prime minister, Australian conservatives rallied around the argument that 
despite occasional “blemishes” the “Australian story is a story of heroic achievement in the 
face of extraordinary odds.”15  
According to McKenna, this reaction has clothed the disenfranchisement of 
Indigenous political and legal agency in the language of historical methodology, hence 
attacks upon historians such as Henry Reynolds. In so doing it has also jeopardised the 
understanding of Australia’s past by channeling it through contemporary political discourse, 
“a new myth concerning Australian history” McKenna aims to disrupt by focusing on regions 
that have received little historical attention.16 In striving to achieve the historical complexity 
inherent to this approach, if not its methodology of place, this thesis first and foremost aims 
to illuminate how white victimhood gained such strong purchase upon the settler imaginary, 
and the role of emotion more broadly in forming colonial subjectivities in the first fifty years 
of Australian settlement.  
* 
 The violence of the frontier wars, which punctuated the European invasion of 
Australia across the nineteenth century, elicited far more literal expressions of fear than the 
existential concerns over belonging which marked the twentieth. Fear frequently bound 
settler communities threatened by violence, transcending class boundaries as it coalesced in 
the broader expression of white suffering. As hutkeepers deserted their posts rather than 
suffer at the hands of Aboriginal warriors, this translated to the anxiety settlers and 
                                                
14 McKenna, Looking For Blackfellas’ Point, p. 31.  
15 McKenna, Looking For Blackfellas’ Point, p. 31.  
16 McKenna, Looking For Blackfellas’ Point, p. 32.  
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landholders felt regarding the security of their property. When memorials arrived on the desk 
of colonial administrators requesting military protection, they did so in stark racial terms, 
clearly delineating the contours of white victimhood.  
But the political valence of whiteness only went so far, given colonial elites 
misgivings regarding the role played by convicts and frontiersmen in initiating frontier 
violence. After all, despite the hardening of racial hierarchies which marked British 
imperialism between 1780 and 1820, it was with “amity and kindness” that Arthur Phillip 
was tasked in engaging Aboriginal people in the establishment of New South Wales in 
1788.17 As will be emphasised in chapter 1, however, this instruction was little more than a 
token of elite chivalry, what Deidre Coleman has described as “the velvet glove which makes 
the iron fist of colonisation and dispossession in New Holland more palatable, a type of 
gestural diplomacy masking dominion as kindness, gallantry and good intentions whilst 
bolstering the intruders’ sense of their own superiority.”18  
Against a backdrop of good intentions, the administration of settler colonialism was in 
this way characterised by a certain emotional ambivalence towards frontier violence from the 
beginning of European occupation in Australia. By introducing the language of “terror” in 
explaining the coercive measures that they took to pacify Aboriginal resistance so early in the 
governance of New South Wales, early governors achieved little by way of “amity and 
kindness”. In the hope of maintaining a belief in their own chivalry, they implicitly 
                                                
17 See Christoher Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780 – 1830 (London: 
Longman, 1989), p. 7; Kate Fullagar, The Savage Visit: New World People and Popular Imperial Culture in 
Britain, 1710 – 1795 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), pp. 190 – 192.  
18 Deidre Coleman, Romantic Colonisation and British Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
p. 165.  
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recognised white victimhood, establishing the expectation that “terror” was the only way to 
calm the fears that grew with every new movement of the frontier.19  
Through the prism of victimhood, emotion was thus involved in the fashioning of 
starkly different colonial subjectivities, framing the politics of recognition that would in time 
shape the history of settler society and the broader course of British imperialism. With the 
Imperial humanitarian movement diverting its attention away from slavery by the 1830s, the 
destructive consequences of colonisation upon Aboriginal people became even more central 
to the negotiation of British identity, what Alan Lester has described in terms of a “rupture 
between bourgeois metropolitan Britishness and colonial Britishness”.20  
In seeking to draw this “rupture” further into the realm of settler emotional life, this 
thesis will draw specifically upon the importance Lester places on the colonial press. By way 
of Benedict Anderson’s broader insight regarding the relationship between print media and 
the modern emergence of nationalism, Lester writes, 
nineteenth-century newspapers did not simply give expression to the united ‘we’ 
of their readership, they actively helped to forge such a collective identity. In the 
colonies, settler-edited newspapers allowed their readers to envisage the actions 
of thousands of other settlers, apparently similar in attitudes and backgrounds to 
                                                
19 This approach also needs to take into account the tacit acceptance of Indigenous law in conjunction with 
settler sovereignty that Lisa Ford has assigned to New South Wales throughout the first decades of European 
settlement. Rather than outright lawlessness, as Ford argues, the New South Wales frontier was initially more 
reflective of “jurisdictional pluralism”. Acknowledging the existence of Indigenous jurisdiction, and the 
principle of retaliation this entailed, New South Wales officials at once allowed the frontier to be managed 
according to the jurisdictional discretion of local magistrates. But to the extent that this recognised Aboriginal 
agency in the sorting out of frontier disputes, it also excluded them from British law thus making them “objects 
as well as perpetrators of unrestrained intercultural violence.”  It was not until a string of court cases in the 
1830s featuring a number of criminal convictions against Aboriginal men, that the colonial centre acted directly 
upon the perceived imperative of imposing a form of territorial sovereignty which undermined both Indigenous 
and peripheral jurisdiction. Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and 
Australia, 1788 – 1836 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 43 – 44, 178 – 202. 
20 Alan Lester, ‘British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire’, History Workshop Journal vol. 54 
(Autumn, 2002), p. 44.  
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themselves, engaged in the concurrent endeavour of carving out new lives on 
remote and inhospitable frontiers. They encouraged individual settlers, in 
Anderson’s phraseology, to imagine themselves part of ‘a sociological organism’ 
engaged in the arduous process of civilising hostile landscapes and their ‘native’ 
inhabitants.21   
From 1803 with the emergence of the Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser, the 
colonial press was crucial to the circulation of emotive, even “demonic”, representations of 
Aboriginal people. This imaginative currency flowed both within and between New South 
Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, allowing a form emotional communion during heightened 
periods of frontier conflict which transcended relatively distinct administrative boundaries. 
This discourse was also a trans-imperial phenomenon, accessing what Lester refers to as the 
“circuits of empire” that bound British colonies across the globe. Settlers across the empire 
could learn of the inherent “savagery” of their counterparts’ respective frontier foes, a flow of 
information which equally facilitated humanitarian discourse into the 1830s.  
This circuitry also encompassed the broader Anglophone world, with many 
newspapers describing the difficulties, and successes, experienced by settlers in regions such 
as North America. The mid-Atlantic region during the struggle for American independence 
has in fact been the focus of particularly penetrating analysis regarding settler society and the 
salience of white victimhood. Peter Silver, for instance, highlights the depth and breadth of 
fear which developed across rural communities under British rule in the context of the Seven 
Years War, describing the emergence of an “anti-Indian sublime” in American public 
                                                
21 Lester, ‘British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire’, p. 30. See also Bendict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006[1983]), p. 35; Anna 
Johnston, The Paper War: Morality, Print Culture and Power in Colonial New South Wales (Crawley: UWA 
Publishing, 2011), p. 10.  
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discourse.22 Silver demonstrates how frontier communities comprising people of various 
European religions and ethnic backgrounds gained social coherence under the political 
exploitation of this discourse in line with an ever-growing fear of Native people. The “anti-
Indian sublime” offered frontiersmen a means of marginalizing groups such as the Quakers, 
who through their concern for the safety of Indians, failed to properly address the growing 
political imperative of white victimhood.23 At the same time the rhetoric of fear was a crucial 
component of a revolutionary milieu and progression of the idea of a sovereign people, a 
social agenda built upon the ideal of social tolerance and inclusion, even if it was premised 
upon the exclusion of Native Americans.24 The westward movement of settlers from the mid–
Atlantic region beginning with the Ohio Valley from American independence was largely 
predicated upon this “exclusive inclusion”.25  
 Nicole Eustace has similarly underlined the political valence of emotion during this 
era of American history, pointing to the way in which “expressions of emotion inevitably 
served as the vector of social communication...never simply for the outer realisation of inner 
consciousness.”26  Emotion not only featured in the negotiation of individual settler 
subjectivity but also played an inter-subjective role, one which was, moreover, porous to 
discursive influence both domestically and from the metropole. As Eustace demonstrates, this 
relationship between emotion, colonial authority and the role of metropolitan discourse was 
particularly important in terms of how British colonists negotiated the fallout from frontier 
killings of Native American people.  
                                                
22 Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbours: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 2008), p.xx.  
23 Silver, Our Savage Neighbours, pp. xxii and 114.  
24 Silver, Our Savage Neighbours, p. xxiii, 301 
25 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998). 
26Nicole Eustace, Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power and the Coming of the American Revolution (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), p. 12. 
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 The main example of emotion facilitating this negotiation of settler identity in 
Eustace's study of colonial Pennsylvania focuses on the fallout from the 1764 Paxton 
massacre at Conestoga, where a group of armed backcountry settlers murdered a number of 
unarmed Indians, including women and children.27 In detailing the emotional responses to 
this incident, Eustace develops an image of the Pennsylvanian frontier in which metropolitan 
humanitarian discourse vied with the ideal of masculinity, as embodied by anger, within the 
imagination of governing elites as they wrestled with their emotions in reconciling the 
paradox inherent to the prospect of humanely expanding the colonial frontier.  
 As knowledge of events at Conestoga circulated, writes Eustace, “[m]embers of the 
colonial elite [including Governor John Penn] agreed that events had exposed the frontier 
settlers as being beneath the level of humanity.”28 This was a view that owed considerably to 
the emotional standards set by metropolitan humanitarian discourse, in conjunction with the 
pacific influence of a Quaker dominated Pennsylvanian Assembly, which juxtaposed the 
maintenance of civility and compassion with the expression of anger and violence. As 
Eustace observes, “critics reserved their strongest condemnation for frontiersman’s anger, 
arguing that in its extremity lay the chief source of their inhumanity”, a characterisation 
which equated them as people “more savage than the Indians”.29 Along these lines the 
governing elite derided the possibility of frontiersmen being directly involved in the civilised 
governance of the colony. 
                                                
27While Passion is the Gale covers this moment in detail Eustace also provides insight to this controversy in the 
form of an in-depth monograph: Nicole Eustace, 'The Sentimental Paradox: Humanity and Violence on the 
Pennsylvania Frontier', The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, vol. 65, no. 1 (January, 2008), p. 29 – 
64.    
28Eustace, Passion is the Gale, p. 35. 
29Eustace, Passion is the Gale, pp. 38, 40; As Eustace observes, while the elites were in a sense representing the 
interests of the Indian victims of the massacre, much of their rhetoric was predicated on the idea that civility and 
its accompanying moral sentiments did not naturally extend itself to Native Americans.  
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 Far from simply explaining their actions in terms of anger, however, those responsible 
for the killings characterised themselves as victims of relentless Indian violence. They 
portrayed their actions as those of necessity. Anger was an emotion that came only as a last 
resort following their grief at having long suffered at the hands of Indian aggression. What 
particularly bothered the Paxton representatives was the questioning of their humanity when 
the governing elite made no effort to recognise the grief of backcountry settlers, nor take 
action to protect their communities from Indian violence, thus compromising their own claim 
to humanity.30 Compounding this sense of victimhood was the governing elite's own ongoing 
lack of emotion and condolence in view of European fatalities resulting from Indian violence, 
something they were all too ready to express when it came to the deaths of Indians.31   
The turning point in this crisis came when instead of allowing anger to be represented 
as a negative emotion, the Paxton rebels pointed to its virtue as an essential element of 
masculinity, portraying the elite as emasculated and timid in the face of Indian aggression. 
This line of argument eventually led to a significant turnaround in the attitude of the 
governing elite towards the frontier killings of Native American people. In a stark 
demonstration of the political capital of emotion in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania, Penn's 
growing opposition with the Quaker dominated Assembly led him to a far more sympathetic 
and opportunistic understanding of the frontiersman's plight.32 The end result of this change 
of heart being a stark transition from the Assembly's initial denunciation of settler violence to 
a renewed appreciation of masculine aggression and its role in the governance of the colony, 
which of course did little to bolster the rights and security of Native Americans. Nor did this 
change of heart entail any recognition of the rights of lower order frontiersmen to govern. As 
Eustace writes, “[i]nstead British American men in power undertook ever more complex 
                                                
30Eustace, Passion is the Gale, p. 40. 
31Eustace, Passion is the Gale, p. 49. 
32Eustace, Passion is the Gale, p. 51.  
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tasks of emotional calibration in the quest to validate continuing colonial conquest”, thus 
allowing a reconciliation between aggression and civility.33 
Elite chivalric discourse, and the British Imperial humanitarian movement in the 
1830s in particular, can be understood in much the same vein of “emotional calibration”. 
Emotions such as compassion and sympathy, when they were directed towards Aboriginal 
people across the British Imperial world, were as much as anything a means of navigating the 
paradox of humane colonisation. In attributing the destructiveness of settler colonialism to 
depraved Britons, at no stage did the delineation of suffering suggested by such rhetoric 
indicate a willingness of colonial administrators to part with the overarching causes of 
frontier violence. The brute fact of dispossession was elided in the hope of reorienting British 
imperialism on a trajectory more in accordance with the “virtues” of Western civilisation. 
Moreover, in maintaining that Aboriginal people were the victims, colonial elites only 
exacerbated the sense of white victimhood growing between settlers and their servants. As 
with Pennsylvania, this increased the likelihood of settler protection rivalling the safety of 
Aboriginal people as the foremost political contingency in the administration of the New 
South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land frontiers.  
A further more theoretical means of understanding this reprioritisation of suffering is 
also offered by Barbara Rosenwein’s theory of “emotional communities”, a framework for 
analysing how certain emotional discourses came into existence and gained favor according 
to time and context.34 William Reddy has similarly described emotional expression in terms 
of discourse, or  “overlearned cognitive habits”, a realm of culture porous to the operation of 
power. Reddy thus attributes emotion with the highest political importance, positioning its 
                                                
33Eustace, Passion is the Gale, p. 57.  
34 Barbara Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), p. 197.  
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management through a normative framework in terms of an “emotional regime” as being 
essential to the endurance of any political structure.35 The “emotional suffering” this 
inevitably entails, results in the emergence of “emotional refuges”, styles of emotional 
expression which allow for the individual pursuit of “emotional liberty”.36    
Hoping to escape the binary of “emotional regime” and “emotional refuge” with her 
theory of “emotional communities”, Rosenwein asks us to rather  
Imagine…a large circle within which are smaller circles, none entirely concentric 
but rather distributed unevenly with the given space. The large circle is the 
overarching emotional community, tied together by fundamental assumptions, 
values, goals, feeling rules, and accepted modes of expression. The smaller 
circles represent subordinate emotional communities, partaking in the larger one 
and revealing its possibilities and its limitations.37 
                                                
35 William Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 124 – 125, 47, 94. This only explains half of the theoretical potential 
inherent to Reddy’s theory of emotion, which argues that emotions are inherently and exclusively part of the self 
but at the same time only able to be expressed through language and are thus inevitably moulded by culture.    
36 Herein lies the potential of emotion to function as a means of understanding historical change. In the realm of 
“emotives” through which an “emotional regime” gains its purchase, according to Reddy, “emotional suffering” 
is an inevitable result. This is the case owing to the potential incongruence between the goals inherent to 
individual emotional experience and expression and the expectations around emotional expression imposed by 
an “emotional regime”. However, rather than simply according with the normative strictures of this regime, 
those experiencing emotional suffering are able to gain solace through an “emotional refuge”. For Reddy the 
protection offered by such refuges at once provides the possibility to pursue “emotional liberty”, the central 
means of “challenging the high-level goals currently guiding emotional management”, which also allows the 
development of “new forms of sociability”.   The key example Reddy provides to demonstrate the emergence of 
an emotional refuge and how it can lead to social change is the French Revolution, namely the flowering of 
sentimentalism as a reaction to the stifling standards of emotional expression promulgated in Louis XIV’s 
aristocratic honour code and the role it played in the eventual overthrow of that monarch.  But as Reddy is keen 
to point out it is equally important to consider how such an elevation of a emotional refuge can easily amount to 
another form of emotional management and cause further emotional suffering, a phenomenon all too clearly 
embodied by “The Terror” which followed in the French Revolution’s wake. Although this pursuit of 
“emotional liberty” seems all too elusive, Reddy’s theory nonetheless offers a compelling means of involving 
emotion in the coherence of historical events, “a partial answer to the question why.” Reddy, The Navigation of 
Feeling, pp. 126, 129, 145, 209, 328. See also Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages, p. 
17. 
37 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages, p. 24.  
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In offering this framework Rosenwein is quick to emphasise the discrete nature of such 
communities, that rather than being coterminous as in “a crowded street” an “emotional 
community is a group in which people have a common stake, interests, values and goals.”38 
Taken as an “overarching emotional community” settler colonialism appears 
emotionally agnostic, its “fundamental assumptions” of conquest and land acquisition 
limiting the possibility a common sense of humanity and feeling emerging between 
Europeans and Aboriginal people. This limitation formed the basis of humanitarian discourse, 
its status as a “subordinate emotional community” consisting in a willingness to extend 
compassion across the frontier. With their common denominators of fear and victimhood, 
settler communities such as New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land were subordinate 
only insofar as they offered an emotional response to Aboriginal people at all.39 Although 
each community took their bearing from a common sense of Britishness, the inherent 
compatibility of white victimhood with the overarching goals of settler colonialism rendered 
humanitarianism toothless.  
 Up and above the emotional protests of humanitarians, settler subjectivity defined 
through the prism of white victimhood in this sense accorded more directly with Patrick 
Wolfe’s identification of settler colonialism’s “eliminationist logic”.40 Rather than 
understanding dispossession in piecemeal fashion, however gradually it took place, this logic 
demands that settler colonialism be analysed “as a structure rather than an event”, a 
recognition of colonisation’s manifestation in the present as much as the past. No matter what 
                                                
38 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages, p. 24.  
39 For a Hobbesian analysis of the ways in which fear can become a “touchstone of a people’s commonality”, 
see Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 11, 28, 32, 
33 35, 37, 43 – 44. 
40 Patrick Wolfe, ‘Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time, and the Question of Genocide’, in A. Dirk 
Moses, eds., Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History 
(New York: Bergan Books, 2008), pp. 104. See also Patrick Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of 
the Native’, Journal of Genocide Research vol. 8 (December, 2006), pp. 387 – 409.  
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humanitarians felt in their hearts, the economic imperative of land acquisition and Indigenous 
dispossession that drove settler colonialism aligned more clearly with the racist beliefs and 
exterminatory agenda of settlers substantiated by their self-identification as white victims. As 
the subjectively held humanitarian beliefs of colonial decision-makers became subordinate to 
these beliefs, the paradox of humane colonial governance was exposed.  
This capitulation has led Dirk Moses to ask important questions of genocide and 
settler society: “how did authorities respond when Aborigines did not “melt away”, and put 
sufficient resistance to pastoralists and pastoralism – a key sector of the economy – such as to 
threaten the viability of one of the colonies?”  
The answer is that governments in the metropolis came under intense pressure 
from the frontier periphery, and sometimes were prepared to entertain “final 
solutions” to the “Aboriginal problem”. Instead of arguing statistically that the 
colonisation of Australia was tout court genocidal, or insisting truculently that it 
was essentially benevolent and progressive, it is analytically more productive to 
view it as a dynamic process with genocidal potential that could be released in 
circumstances of crisis. The place to look for genocidal intentions, then, is not in 
explicit, prior statements of settlers or governments, but in the gradual evolution 
of European attitudes and policies as they were pushed in an exterminatory 
direction by the confluence of their underlying ideological assumptions, the acute 
fear of Aboriginal attack, the demands of the colonial and international economy, 
their plans for the land, and the resistance to these plans by Indigenous people.41 
                                                
41 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History’, in A. Dirk Moses, eds., Genocide and 
Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History (New York: Berghan 
Books, 2004), pp. 32 – 33. See also Raymond Evans, ‘”Crime Without a Name”: Colonialism and the Case for 
“Indigenocide”’, in A. Dirk Moses, eds., Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern 
Resistance in World History (New York: Bergan Books, 2008), p. 141. 
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Recourse to victimhood, and its relationship to colonialism, likewise features in Moses’ 
analysis of the Holocaust in which he outlines four colonial logics at the heart of the Nazi 
fantasy in Eastern Europe: the planned liquidation and enslavement of Slavic peoples in 
Ukraine and Poland through the Hunger Plan associated with Lebensraum; the racist 
nationalist drive which imagined Germans as an Indigenous people under threat from World 
Jewry, equating Jewish extermination with subaltern genocide; the accompanying mythology 
which justified Jewish persecution on the grounds of their alleged responsibility for the 
German defeat in 1918; and the representation of Jewish people in terms of the “traditional 
colonial Other: dirty, lazy, stateless, uncivilized”.42  
In his conceptualization of the “settler archive”, the “repertoire of images, notions, 
concepts, narratives, stereotypes” mobilized in the practice of settler colonialism, Lorenzo 
Veracini likewise envisages a discursive collapse between the Holocaust and colonialism. He 
points to the synchrony of two realms of racial difference in the European imagination, 
attitudes to Indigenous peoples and anti-Semitism, and how “their respective archives have 
grown side by side”, citing their common origins in 1492.43 In both cases a form of 
victimhood presents the central narrative which justifies the extermination of a whole 
people.44  
                                                
42 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History’, in A. Dirk Moses, 
eds., Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New York: 
Bergan Books, 2008), pp. 37 – 40. As Andrew Fitzmaurice has shown, a long running Western concern for the 
treatment of Indigenous people by various European colonial powers was a central thread of Raphael Lemkin’s 
formulation of genocide in 1948. However, Fitzmaurice ultimately renders the term genocide anachronistic in 
the frame of Australian colonial history on account of it not being an expression familiar to any time prior to 
1948. Andrew Fitzmaurice, ‘Anticolonialism in Western Political Thought: The Colonial Origins of the Concept 
of Genocide’, in A. Dirk Moses, eds., Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern 
Resistance in World History (New York: Bergan Books, 2008), pp. 55 – 80. 
43 Lorenzo Veracini, ‘Colonialism and Genocides: Notes for the Analysis of a Settler Archive’, in A. Dirk 
Moses, eds., Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History 
(New York: Bergan Books, 2008), pp. 153. See also Timothy D. Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler 
and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Timothy D. Snyder, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and 
Warning (New York: Penguin Random House, 2015). 
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Don Watson’s recent description of settler colonialism’s rapid northern progress 
during the second half the nineteenth century as “Lebensraum for sheepmen” remains 
nonetheless provocative in view of these arguments.45 Its clash of settler “dreams of 
grandeur” and existential crises risks relegating Indigenous people to the status of victims – a 
deprivation of agency that many Australian historians have sought to address.46 As James 
Boyce reminds us, however, although this “well-intentioned” research has enriched our 
understanding of the nuances of frontier history, it tends “to give a distorted sense of the 
experiences of the overwhelming majority of Aborigines in the immediate aftermath of 
conquest.” 47As this thesis aims to demonstrate, the inverse of this also holds true. 
Triumphalist narratives of Australian history, particularly ones that emphasise the ingenuity 
of settler Australians in the face of hardship, can only be asserted through the recognition of 
white victimhood.  
A question the history of emotions can assist in answering is how much of a 
relationship the history of this trope shares with the reluctance of non-Indigenous Australians 
in the present to offer a more empathic response to the history of Indigenous dispossession 
and its ongoing consequences. Inga Clendinnen warns that we should be unwilling to 
“impose our conveniently simplified alphabet of emotions – ‘fear’, ‘pity’, ‘anger’” in our 
pursuit to understand the experiences of historical actors.48 The sheer distance which exists 
between our “physical security” in the present and the realities of the past renders historical 
empathy an impossibility: “[t]wo hundred years ago people were more familiar with death 
                                                
45 Don Watson, The Bush: Travels in the heart of Australia (Melbourne: Penguin Books, 2014), pp. 328 – 329.  
Maybe footnote Raymond Evans about Queensland  
46 A notable recent example of which is Robert Kenny The Lamb Enters the Dreaming, which traces the life of 
the Wotjobalik man Nathaniel Pepper as he adapts to the post-frontier of the Wimmera pastoral district of 
Victoria. Rather than having Christiainity imposed upon him, Kenny weaves a narrative whereby Pepper’s 
negotiation of modernity and relationship with God is driven largely by his own volition. Robert Kenny, The 
Lamb enters the Dreaming: Nathaniel Pepper and the Ruptured World (Melbourne: Scribe, 2007).  
47 James Boyce, 1835: The Founding of Melbourne and the Conquest of Australia (Collingwood: Black Inc., 
2008), p. 192 
48 Inga Clendinnen, ‘The History Question: Who Owns the Past?’, Quarterly Essay, vol. 23 (2006), p. 23.  
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than we are. Death, pain and violence were always at the elbow.”49 Contemporary Australians 
should, therefore, not misconstrue their shared language with British colonists as providing 
both the necessary and sufficient cultural literacy to understand how they felt.50 
But the clarity of this point need not preclude the possibility of emotion functioning as 
an important mediator between the past and the present. Alan Atkinson is critical of historical 
scholarship which doesn’t pay heed to the key Enlightenment tenant of common humanity, 
and is particularly scathing Carol and Peter Stearns’ hope of delineating between emotions 
which are “durable” or biological and those which are “transient” or culturally caused.51 
“Historians who fail to register the importance of feeling, whether explicitly or not,” he 
writes, “cut themselves off from the roots of their discipline”.52 Excluding historians such as 
Henry Reynolds from this category, Atkinson makes a particular point of Aboriginal history 
being written with feeling in mind, “its usual purpose [being] to make an emotional point, or 
rather to make an intellectual point sharpened and coloured by emotion.”53 The problem with 
the “pitilessness” of historians such is Keith Windschuttle is that by eliding their own “self” 
in their interpretation of the past, they remove themselves from the discipline.54 For Bain 
Attwood as well, the feelings engendered by questions arising out of Aboriginal history have 
become an important vehicle by which historians can understand how they are embedded in 
the past they hope to interpret, rather than accord with an “epistemological tradition” which 
demands historical distance.55 
                                                
49 Clendinnen, ‘The History Question’, p. 26 
50 Clendinnen, ‘The History Question’, p. 23 
51 Alan Atkinson, ‘Do Good Historians Have Feelings?’ in Stuart Macintyre eds., The Historian’s Conscience: 
Australian Historians and the Ethics of History (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004), p. 24 
52 Atkinson, ‘Do Good Historians Have Feelings?’, p. 23. 
53 Alan Atkinson, ‘Do Good Historians Have Feelings?’, p. 25    
54 Alan Atkinson, ‘Do Good Historians Have Feelings?’, pp. 23 – 24.  
55 Bain Attwood, Telling the Truth About Aboriginal History (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2005), pp. 168 – 
169.  
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 The ongoing prevalence of anxiety regarding the latent political potential of 
Indigenous claims to sovereignty such as Mabo demands frontier history be pursued as such a 
“dialogic enterprise” between the past and the present.56 In detailing how and why fear and 
victimhood gave settlers a sense of “imagined community”, this thesis makes no case for any 
direct relationship existing between the emotions of past and present settler Australians. It is 
disingenuous for settler Australians to claim they fear Indigenous Australians as they once 
did. Rather, it is beholden upon them to accept the nature of settler colonialism as “a structure 
rather than an event”; that past injustices will be maintained and perpetuated in the present so 
long as they cleave to the myth of white victimhood. It is equally important that non-
Indigenous Australians inversely understand that in seeking to more empathically come to 
terms with the legacies of frontier violence, they do so in accordance with their own hopes of 
fashioning a more legitimate Australian identity.   
 In presenting how this emotional dialectic has come to shape the interpretation of 
Australia’s colonial history, this thesis is driven geographically as much as it is 
chronologically. Beginning with the settlement of Port Jackson and the Sydney hinterland, 
chapter 1 explains the contradiction of “terror” emerging as a clear performative emotional 
strategy for colonial administrators given the overarching imperial ethos of “amity and 
kindness” which arrived with Arthur Phillip in 1788. The expectation that force was the only 
way of ameliorating frontier unrest was soon provided more imaginative ballast by the 
establishment of the colonial press in 1803; the Sydney Gazette was the first of many papers 
which provided a central narrative through which settlers could cultivate their collective fears 
and inherent right to official protection. The fact that when settlers challenged this narrative 
they maintained their anonymity through pseudonyms such as A Settler and Philanthropus 
                                                
56 Bain Attwood, Telling the Truth About Aboriginal History, p. 169.  
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indicates the difficulty of contending emotional expression outside the normativity of fear 
and white suffering.  
 Just as colonists carried their cultural cache of newspapers and racial hierarchies over 
the Blue Mountains in 1815, they brought their emotional baggage too, mobilising the 
violence of the New South Wales frontier westwards across the Bathurst Plains, and to the 
Hunter Region in the North. It is with reference to this momentum that Deborah Bird Rose 
has coined the phrase “a rolling Year Zero” – the idea that colonial expansion can be 
understood in terms of an incremental transfiguration of Aboriginal life in accordance with 
the rolling moment of European contact. Taking this logic further Grace Karskens suggests 
that, 
[w]e might think of this great wheel of colonisation…in terms of frontier violence 
too: rolling relentlessly into “new” country, its heavy freight of dispossession, 
abduction and loss of food sources setting off new cycles of bloody attacks, 
which in turn triggered “rituals of terror” from the Europeans.57  
The responses of settlers in both regions to the increasing Aboriginal aggression which came 
as an inevitable response to the colonial juggernaut indicates how thoroughly they had 
internalised the political platform offered by the expression of fear and victimhood, how 
easily it could be construed to prompt official anxiety regarding the economic viability of the 
colony.58  
                                                
57 Grace Karskens, The Colony: A History of Early Sydney (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2009), p. 456. 
58 In adapting Giddens idea of the “juggernaut of modernity” David Smith has coined the “juggernaut of 
colonialism” to describe how British imperialism rode “roughshod over the Oriental reality”, demeaning the 
existence of colonial subjects by equating them with objects whose essential physical and temporal differences 
to Europeans relegated them to either the zoo or the museum. David Smith, Hinduism and Modernity (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 25 – 26. See also Tom Griffiths, Hunters and Collectors: The Antiquarian 
Imagination in Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 25. 
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 As will be shown in chapter 3, the validation of settler emotions in New South Wales 
throughout the 1820s pastoral expansion in the form of mounted police, but more specifically 
martial law, set equally clear parameters for the administration of the frontier in Van 
Diemen’s Land. In the case of Van Diemen’s Land in particular, settler colonialism’s 
“eliminationist logic”, and how it could be activated by settler emotion, would become 
particularly clear following Lieutenant Governor George Arthur’s declaration of martial law 
in 1826 along with subsequent measures such as the “Black Line”.  
Ultimately, however it is the ostensibly humane policy embodied in George Augustus 
Robinson’s Friendly Mission and its object to conciliate the Aboriginal people of Van 
Diemen’s Land which ironically exposes Australian history to the claim of genocide. In 
otherwise presenting the complexity of settler emotional experience, in the form of an 
emotional biography of Robinson during his Friendly Mission, chapter 4 argues that in 
securing the safety of Aboriginal people Arthur and Robinson were more than anything 
responding to settler hopes of achieving a “native free” Van Diemen’s Land. 
Highlighting the paradox of humane colonisation even further, the emotional means 
through which colonial administrators sought redress for settler colonialism’s destructive 
impact upon Aboriginal people across the British world in the 1830s will be the central focus 
of chapter 5. Their horror at events on the Liverpool Plains frontier such as the Myall Creek 
massacre in 1838 allowed humanitarians in both Sydney and London to juxtapose their 
emotional style with the increasingly shrill emotions of settlers, aided by the colonial press, 
as they became more and more aware of the important role they played in maintaining the 
imperative of dispossession at the heart of colonial prosperity. In challenging settlers on the 
ground of victimhood, colonial administrators in fact only made their job even harder, their 
status as saviours of Aboriginal people more and more obscure. As will be offered in 
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conclusion, in shaping a new paradigm of settler colonialism which emphasised the rights of 
Aboriginal people, humanitarian elites did little to trammel the “juggernaut of colonialism”, 
being as likely as “inhumane” settlers to exploit the frontier for their own discursive 
emotional ends.   
  
24 
Chapter 1: ‘When the Moon shall become as large as the Sun’: Unfeeling Enemies and 
the Hope of Striking Terror, Sydney 1788 – 1816.  
On 4 June 1814 the Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser1 reported that a 
rumour had taken hold of the Cowpastures settlement outside present-day Camden. 
According to the Gazette, the local Dharawal people had “coalesced” with Aboriginal people 
from Jervis Bay declaring, “that when the Moon shall become as large as the Sun, they 
[would] commence a work of desolation, and kill all the whites before them.” And although 
“no depredations on the cornfields” had taken place, in accordance with this declaration 
settlers resolved to keep watch over their farms in preparation for the imminent attack. The 
full moon of 3 June 1814 came and went without bloodshed.2 Nonetheless, it seemed that fear 
had truly come to unsettle the beginning of winter 1814 for the settlers of Western Sydney.  
 The literary tone of this ultimately unfulfilled prophecy, the sense of impending 
doom it evokes, gives us some insight to Kate Grenville’s metaphor of settler huts as 
“compressed cubes of fear” on the nearby Hawkesbury river at the same point in New South 
Wales history.3 Both of these areas of remote Sydney out-settlement exposed Europeans to 
the dangerous consequences of dispossessing Aboriginal people of their land, a process that 
inevitably created conflict over land-use. This contingency was often exacerbated by the 
disregard many Europeans extended not only to the land rights of Aboriginal people, but 
often their right to life itself. From the early stages of New South Wales, there was a growing 
belief that the contingency of violence on the frontier was driven by atrocities committed by 
convicts, an elite discourse which obscured the brute fact of dispossession itself. However it 
transpired, as the anecdote from the Cowpastures demands, there is a need to understand how 
fear and anxiety functioned within settler communities and the role they played in fuelling 
                                                
1 Hereafter referred to as the Gazette. 
2 Sydney Gazette, Saturday 4 June 1814. [emphasis in original] 
3 Kate Grenville, The Secret River (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2005), p. 241. 
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violence. In particular, how did the press and colonial administrators assist the growing sense 
of white victimhood associated with these emotions?    
 Henry Reynolds has recently observed of the Australian frontier across the nineteenth 
century,  “[f]ear was contagious, fanned by every story of atrocity, which swept through the 
frontier districts like a communal fire.”4 It is in this realm of fear’s discursive potential that 
the Gazette’s coverage of settler anxieties on the Cowpastures in 1814 is so illuminating, 
rendering believable the possibility of such a geographically remote and hostile coalition of 
Aboriginal people. The paper did not provide just a representation of events, but a means by 
which settler communities could imagine themselves as such: communities under threat of 
imminent violence, haunted by a common savage enemy. This representation at once allowed 
a space for empathy between colonial centre and periphery, a connection between those 
physically consolidating the dispossession of Aboriginal people and those potentially with a 
vested interest in this process.5  
In tracing how the Gazette gave clear expression to this grievance, encouraging 
settlers to “imagine themselves part of ‘a sociological organism’ engaged in the arduous 
process of civilising hostile landscapes and their ‘native’ inhabitants” to borrow Alan Lester’s 
words, this chapter will outline the relationship between fear and white victimhood and how 
it came to shape settler subjectivity from the early stages of New South Wales Settlement.6 
The Gazette also played an important role in the complex relationship between this 
negotiation of subjectivity and the evolution of frontier policy under successive early New 
South Wales governors. As the first colonial newspaper established in 1803, it often 
                                                
4 Henry Reynolds, Forgotten War (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2013), p. 92. 
5 The system of absentee land-holding characteristic of the early settlement of New South Wales, however, 
meant that this emotional coherence across class boundaries was less driven by genuine empathy, as it was self-
preservation. 
6 Alan Lester, ‘British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire’, History Workshop Journal vol. 54 
(Autumn, 2002), p. 30.  
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functioned as the mouthpiece of the colonial administration. It was not until October 1824, 
with the first publication of the Australian, that the paper ceased to be the subject of official 
censorship. By this stage much of the violence between settlers and local Aboriginal groups 
around Sydney had subsided, only to reignite as the frontier spread elsewhere. Along with the 
Gazette’s first editor George Howe, successive governors of early New South Wales were 
thus complicit in the cultivation of settler victimhood through their authorisation of negative 
and fearful representations of Aboriginal people.  
Compounding this argument is the fact that, despite their chivalric leanings clothed in 
humanitarian sentiment, many early governors explicitly deployed ‘terror’ as a means of 
arresting Aboriginal aggression. Well before the establishment of the Gazette, early colonial 
administrators were quick to establish the instrumentality of fear in maintaining the 
legitimacy of colonial power in the hope of strengthening law and order on frontiers 
otherwise taking shape under the guise of jurisdictional pluralism. What began as a 
performance of military strength, coupled with the vain hope of maintaining an adherence to 
chivalric discourse, in time became a conduit for the expectation that ‘terror’ was the only 
language that would appease settler anxieties while at once taming ‘unruly savages’. 
Decisions of early New South Wales governors couched in the language of ‘terror’ must 
therefore be considered in tandem with the emotive language of the Gazette in helping to 
understand how New South Wales settlers developed a consciousness paradoxically drawn 
between Aboriginal subjugation and white victimhood. 
* 
The official use of ‘terror’ against Aboriginal people featured so strongly in the early 
development of New South Wales is in stark opposition to the instructions which 
accompanied Governor Arthur Phillip in 1788. With respect to Aboriginal people, Phillip was 
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instructed “to conciliate their affections, enjoining all [British] subjects to live in amity and 
kindness with them.”7 Writing to colonial secretary Lord Sydney in July 1788, Phillip felt 
comfortable to claim, “I have the honour of informing your Lordship that the natives have 
ever been treated with the greatest humanity and attention, and every precaution that was 
possible has been taken to prevent their receiving any insults.”8 While violence did indeed 
become a salient feature of the relationship between British settlers and Aboriginal people as 
the colony expanded, it was less characteristic of early more amicable encounters.9 As Grace 
Karskens explains, when violence did occur it was “often contingent, dependent on place and 
season and the webs of relationships settlers and Aboriginal people had made with one 
another.”10 This contingency came to the fore when it became obvious that the various 
Aboriginal groups of the Sydney region would have to accommodate the settler presence and 
the exploitation of their natural resources.11  
In ensuring Lord Sydney of his accordance with the obligation of kindly treating the 
native inhabitants of the colony, Phillip also imparted the news that two convicts had been 
murdered in May while out cutting rushes in the vicinity of Darling Harbour.12 Prior to this 
incident, there were also reports of convicts returning from the outskirts of the settlement 
with signs they had been in violent encounters.13 Unable “to observe a single trace of the 
natives” at the site of the violence involving the two convicts, yet still eager to register his 
displeasure with those responsible, Phillip and a party including Surgeon-General John White 
marched toward Botany Bay where they quickly found themselves surrounded by 200 armed 
                                                
7 Governor Phillip’s Instructions, HRA, series 1, vol. 1, p. 13 – 14.  
8 Governor Phillip to Lord Sydney, 10th July 1788, HRA, series 1, vol. 1, p. 65  
9 See Inga Clendinnen, Dancing with Strangers: Europeans and Australians at First Contact (Cambridge: 
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Aboriginal men.14 According to Phillip, the two groups managed to part company on 
“friendly terms” despite what was a highly volatile situation.15 This in itself speaks to 
Phillip’s intentions to uphold the instructions with which he was issued. He was also 
convinced that the Eora people with whom he had mostly dealt were in no way inherently 
hostile to their new neighbours.  
Following this event, despite his initial displeasure, reconciling Aboriginal aggression 
seemed a simple matter for Phillip. It was not that the Eora and other Sydney Aboriginal 
groups were reacting expressly against the presence of the invaders, but rather that their 
inherent magnanimity was pushed to the limit by convict indiscretions. Writing again to 
London in 1790, Phillip explained attacks on such “stragglers” by the “natives” as natural 
given the former’s intent to steal spears and other Aboriginal possessions.16 In his account of 
events leading to the discovery of the two bodies in May, deputy Judge Advocate David 
Collins reported that the victims had “a few days previous to their being found, taken away 
and detained a canoe belonging to the natives; for which act of violence and injustice they 
repaid with their lives.”17  
John White, having the unenviable task of examining the bodies of the deceased 
convicts, William Okey and Samuel Davis, was similarly “inclined to think that [the 
perpetrators] must have been provoked and injured by the convicts”. This White deduced 
“from the civility shewn on all occasions to the officers by the natives." It seems apt to 
mention that in White’s opinion “fear, united with cold and wet, in a great degree contributed 
to [Davis’] death” given he “had only some trifling marks of violence about him.” Okey on 
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the other hand had sustained far more violent head injuries.18 As Collins would add in August 
following similar convict indiscretions, “every misfortune of the kind might fairly be 
attributed, not to the disposition of the natives, but to the obstinacy of their visitors.”19  
How terror became a feature of colonial policy at first seems difficult to reconcile 
given the tenor of such explanations which position neither Aboriginal people nor colonial 
officials, but convicts as, as the instigators of violence. To do so requires examining how 
British understandings of the operation of law and the structures of class became manifest in 
a colonial context such as New South Wales. Rather than framing the early difficulties of 
maintaining law and order in early New South Wales in terms of lawlessness, Lisa Ford 
argues that early colonial administrators allowed a form of legal pluralism to develop which 
implicitly included a form of Indigenous jurisdiction to evolve by way of the principle of 
retaliation. By the same token, as New South Wales expanded, officials allowed the frontier 
to be managed according to the jurisdictional discretion of local magistrates. But to the extent 
that this recognised Aboriginal agency in the sorting out of frontier disputes, Ford crucially 
points out, it also excluded them from British law thus making them “objects as well as 
perpetrators of unrestrained intercultural violence.”20 It was not until a string of court cases in 
the 1830s, featuring a number of criminal convictions against Aboriginal men, that the 
colonial centre acted directly upon the perceived imperative of imposing a form of “perfect 
settler sovereignty” which undermined Indigenous and peripheral jurisdiction.21  
Without necessarily contesting Ford’s claim of jurisdictional pluralism, it is important 
to consider the possibility that when the language of terror featured in the rhetoric of early 
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governors it embodied a latent anxiety to engender a more stable jurisdictional platform upon 
which the colony could develop. “Perfect settler sovereignty” this was not, but a 
demonstration of how emotions such as fear can play an important role in political scenarios 
in which uncertainty exists with respect to the rule of law. In early New South Wales this was 
both a factor of cross-cultural interaction but also the difficulty of governing a convict based 
society.   
This helps explain how reflexively colonial elites qualified the incidence of frontier 
violence by way of convict indiscretion, insulating the integrity of their humane approach to 
colonisation. While it may have held in the earliest cases of frontier violence, this integrity is 
far more difficult to defend in view of the establishment of more permanent zones of 
settlement such as the public farm at Parramatta in November 1788. Karskens characterises 
such moves as “undisguised invasion”, which in no way considered Aboriginal rights to land 
or the integrity of their food sources.22 Ultimately it was such developments in the 
relationship between settlers and Aboriginal people which would lead to the ideal of “amity 
and kindness” coming undone, an unravelling which increased with the granting of land on 
the more fertile Cumberland Plain and along the Hawkesbury River. Phillip’s conciliatory 
stance becomes vacant of all meaning when considering his evolving response to the 
Aboriginal aggression precipitated by this usurpation of land and other circumstances, 
however it may have been driven by the need to establish the colony’s ability to feed itself.  
This tension is described well by Deidre Coleman, who argues that whatever chivalry 
and ‘softness’ historians have detected in Phillip’s position on early race relations in New 
South Wales diminishes in view of the punitive measures he took in response to Aboriginal 
aggression in the early 1790s which went hand in hand with dispossession. Phillip’s policy of 
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kidnapping Eora men under the pretext of diplomacy, first Arabanoo, then Coleby and 
Bennelong, seem equally hard to reconcile in the context of rhetorical chivalry. However it is 
detected, in Coleman’s words “chivalric discourse is the velvet glove which makes the iron 
fist of colonisation and dispossession in New Holland more palatable, a type of gestural 
diplomacy masking dominion as kindness, gallantry and good intentions whilst bolstering the 
intruders’ sense of their own superiority.”23 Not only superiority over Aboriginal people but 
also “uneducated Europeans”, who are left to explain the hatred which “gradually became the 
prevailing sentiment between Black and White”, eliding elite culpability.24 But to expand 
Coleman’s point, this culpability cannot go unaccounted for in view of the open use of force 
which became a fixed feature of frontier policy from very early in Australia’s history. It 
makes little sense to attribute the violence of the frontier to a blind and mindless animus, 
however it is clothed in the language of chivalry.  
In the same letter despatched to W.W. Grenville in 1790, Phillip expressed his lack of 
concern regarding the prospect of attack from Aboriginal people upon buildings within the 
colony. This was not on account of their lacking bravery, wrote Phillip, but their awareness 
“of the great superiority of our arms.”25 Writing towards the end of January 1788 White was 
already “well convinced that they know and dread” this fact.26 This observation 
notwithstanding, following further attacks upon convicts around Botany Bay in 1789, and 
adding to the erosion of his humane agenda, Phillip ensured that the “natives” were made 
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aware of their deficiency in weaponry by sending out armed parties. No level of intimidation 
would prevent the British moving where they wished.27  
The most notable instance of this occurred following the spearing of Phillip’s 
gamekeeper John McIntyre in December 1790 by the Bidjigal man Pemulwuy. In an action 
marking the beginning of over a decade of resistance, Pemulwuy became the central target of 
an armed party sent out by Phillip with a directive to “either destroy or make prisoners”.28 
Although less explicit in official despatches, Watkin Tench’s journal reveals that in line with 
securing a martial superiority over the people of Botany Bay Phillip’s aim in this expedition 
was “to infuse an universal terror” amongst the Bidjigal given his belief that they had become 
the principle aggressors.29 Ten men were to be “destroyed” and their heads brought back to 
the settlement.30 On hand for McIntyre’s final moments, Tench was doubtful of the man’s 
death-bed claim “that he had never fired but once on a native, and then had not killed” given 
“his general character, and other circumstances.”31 Tench, too, was a participant in the early 
narrative which retrieved colonial elites from any responsibility in the breaking down of 
cross-cultural relations. But his sympathies with those on the other side of the frontier were 
otherwise genuine; following his protestations six prisoners as opposed to ten heads were 
deemed a sufficient display of force in response to McIntyre’s murder.    
Superiority of arms or no, Phillip did hold concerns about the security of the young 
colony’s already precarious means of subsistence. “Setting fire to the corn I feared most,” he 
wrote to Grenville, “but which they never have attempted.”32 Indeed, while these concerns 
didn’t materialise for Phillip until the final year of his tenure, for proceeding governors 
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contending with Aboriginal crop raids on top of physical violence was a significant source of 
anxiety. On 18 May 1792 an Aboriginal group confirmed suspicions that corn was being 
stolen from settlements outside of Parramatta when they were sighted conducting a raid from 
a settler’s hut. What followed from this event established a train of events both familiar to 
what Phillip had already anticipated, that Aboriginal groups would only respond with 
violence by way of retaliation, yet more tragic in scale and demanding of an official response.  
The shots fired at this particular raiding party were presumed to have at least had 
some affect as shortly after a convict had been found murdered in the vicinity, purportedly 
with 30 spear wounds and his teeth knocked in. Collins surmised that this was an act of 
revenge for shots fired by the settlers during the raid.33 There is little indication that Phillip 
sought to respond directly to this incident by way of military force, nor is there any official 
report of similar events occurring prior to his departure from the colony in December 1792.  
Military caution on this occasion aside, Henry Reynolds rightly attributes New South 
Wales’ first governor with the initial desire to infuse Aboriginal people with terror, a strategy 
“echoed again and again by his successors” and strongly impacting the settler imaginary long 
into the nineteenth century.34 Indeed, from 1793 the explicit use of ‘terror’ was frequently 
being resorted to as a means of dispersing and intimidating Aboriginal groups identified as 
being “troublesome” throughout newly settled areas. Around this time there were growing 
reports of convicts being assaulted and accosted of any goods they possessed as they travelled 
between settlements.  In June 1793 Collins recorded the sending out of small armed parties 
“to throw a few shot amongst” such groups but with explicit commands not to cause any 
fatalities.35 But the growing incidence of Aboriginal raids upon the ripening corn growing on 
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public and private farms, particularly at Toongabbie and the Hawkesbury River region, 
framed a whole new contingency upon which the need to preserve life became less and less 
of a priority. In March of 1794 watchmen at Toongabbie were responsible for the deaths of at 
least three Aboriginal men, an encounter resulting in one Aboriginal man’s head being taken 
back to Sydney.36  
It is a telling paradox that as similar violence and cruelty was perpetrated by frontier 
settlers upon Aboriginal people along the Hawkesbury River, the response from colonial 
administrators was at once admonishing yet similarly callous. In August 1794 at least seven 
Aboriginal men were killed as they attacked a settler’s hut. According to Collins, “[t]his 
mode of treating them had become absolutely necessary, from the frequency and evils of their 
visits”.37 Yet, echoing Phillip’s sentiment, Collins was equally convinced that the incidence 
of such violence could only spawn from European misconduct: “there was not a doubt that 
many natives had been wantonly fired upon.”38 In October Collins was able to corroborate 
this opinion from evidence that the attack upon the settlers in August had been in response to 
the horrible murder of an Aboriginal boy. In his account “some [settlers] had seized a native 
boy [whom they suspected of spying], and, after tying him hand and foot, had dragged him 
several times through a fire, until his back was dreadfully burnt, and in that state had thrown 
him into the river, where they shot at and killed him.”39 
Given this reservation on the part the Sydney elite regarding the cause of Aboriginal 
aggression, Phillip’s interim successor Captain William Paterson’s response to the situation 
on the Hawkesbury as it devolved into a state of “open war” in April 1795 is a further 
example of the jarring realities of early New South Wales history. In response to the 
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eagerness with which the Dharug people conducted their “depredations” upon the 
Hawkesbury cornfields, and following the death of a settler named Thomas Webb, a 
detachment of soldiers was despatched by Paterson from Parramatta with a directive “to 
destroy as many as they could find of the wood tribe”. 40  Death not equating to a sufficient 
deterrent against further incursions on the cornfields, it was ordered that victims be left 
dangling from gibbets “in the hope of striking terror” among any survivors. Although it was 
reported that several killings took place, in consequence of their bodies not being found the 
grotesque intensity of this use of force did not reach its intended heights. Either way the 
severity of these orders are explained well by John Connor, who in describing the 
Hawkesbury as “the first front in Australia’s frontier” at once underlines the impossibility of 
Europeans and the Dharug coexisting on account of their respective uses of the land for 
growing corn and yams. Paterson was well aware of the danger the Dharug crop raids posed, 
threatening the abandonment of what he considered “the most fertile spot which had yet been 
discovered in the colony.”41   
In an act of retaliation, a settler and his son were soon after killed on a farm at 
Richmond Hill as the soldiers returned to Parramatta. Some of these soldiers were likely 
among those sent out to confront this renewed hostility, upon which occasion they were 
reported to have seen little of their enemy. Hanging bodies or no, it seems that a point may 
have been made. So went one cycle of British terror. As Collins remarked, in accordance with 
what now seemed a permanent duty under Governor John Hunter “soldiers were distributed 
among the settlers for their protection”, not that he necessarily felt such a provision was 
deserved.42 Whatever Collins’ feelings on the matter this scenario provides clear evidence of 
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the state of fear that had developed in such areas of out-settlement and the growing 
imperative to preserve the lives of settlers up and above those of Aboriginal people. 
What can be made of the incongruence between the nature of such officially 
orchestrated violence and the rhetoric which qualified its necessity in view of elite opinion as 
to the true instigators of frontier unrest? Collins in particular reads as being deeply 
ambivalent about the administration of justice in regions of the colony such as the 
Hawkesbury where conflict was frequent. Such ambivalence on the part of the Sydney elite 
speaks to a broader confusion as to who were the victims, and who the instigators, of the 
violence spiralling out of control across the various out-settlements.  
This is in part explained by the tacit acceptance of jurisdictional pluralism. But 
outside the principle of retaliation, at no stage does it appear that this took shape in terms of 
an administrative consensus which allowed a thorough reflection upon the correlation 
between violence and dispossession. Despite the obvious consequences of settling on 
Aboriginal land, as settlement expanded to the north Aboriginal resistance only intensified.43 
This was despite the severe toll that introduced diseases such as smallpox were beginning to 
take upon local communities, suggesting that Aboriginal people were able to maintain a close 
association with their land in spite of significant demographic trauma.44 So long as such 
resilience prompted the use of force by colonial administrators, the pretence of colonial 
chivalry only became clearer. 
In December 1795, three months after Governor Hunter’s arrival in the colony, four 
Dharug men and one woman were killed, one child badly wounded and four men taken 
prisoner as an armed party countered further Aboriginal attacks on settlers in the Hawkesbury 
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region.45 That such measures persisted well beyond Paterson’s raid of terror in May speaks to 
the futility of such an approach. In recognising this Collins offered the explanation that 
Aboriginal people couldn’t help but allow passion to override reason, a trope which would 
eventually gain currency in the pages of the Gazette. Following the punitive expedition in 
December 1795 he remarked, “[i]t might have been supposed, that these 
punishments…would have taught the natives to keep of a greater distance; but nothing 
seemed to deter them from prosecuting the revenge which they had vowed against the settlers 
for the injuries that they had received at their hands.”46 In March 1796 further reports of 
Aboriginal hostility were reported from Portland Head at the main branch of the Hawkesbury 
River and at the beginning of 1797 an area along the river had to be evacuated owing to 
Aboriginal attacks.47 Unrest also spread closer to Sydney. In March 1797, resistance 
orchestrated by Aboriginal leaders such as Pemulwuy upon the settlers around Lane Cove 
sparked armed retaliation, albeit only as a means to disperse and not kill assailants.48 By 
escaping confinement in Parramatta in the same month, Pemulwuy was elemental in further 
disrupting the settlement of areas under increasing levels of cultivation by way of raids on 
cornfields, fires and assaults. By 1798 this activity had expanded into Pemulwuy’s own 
country on the George’s River.49 
The attribution of violence and general disruption throughout Sydney’s settlements to 
key Aboriginal figures, Pemulwuy in particular, eventually led to an alternative 
administrative approach. However, in the initial period defined by Pemulwuy’s instigation of 
unrest the use of terror remained a key strategy. In a testimony given at the trial of five 
settlers alleged to have murdered two Aboriginal boys held on 14 October 1799, 
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Commanding Officer of the Hawkesbury Lieutenant Thomas Hobby indicated that Governor 
Hunter essentially gave him permission to act in accordance with his own judgement when 
responding to attacks by Aboriginal groups. According to Hobby, he had elicited this 
permission after already signifying to the Governor his intention “to send out a party of the 
military to kill five or six of them wherever they were to be found”.50 At his own discretion 
Hunter also asserted that he would resort to previous methods of punishment and intimidation 
in the face of growing hostilities, namely the gibbeting of offenders in the event of their 
capture.51  
It was not until Phillip Gidley King came to be Governor from September 1800 that a 
new approach emerged which sought to undermine Aboriginal resistance by alienating key 
figures such as Pemulwuy rather than use what was in essence indiscriminate force. Initially, 
however, King’s attempt to address attacks upon settlers in May 1801 actually strayed little 
from those of his predecessors. In fact, by extending the legitimate use of force against 
Aboriginal people to settlers King made further pretence of the policy of amity and kindness. 
On 1 May 1801 he issued the order that all Aboriginal people in the specific areas where their 
“hostile menaces” were being felt the most, at that point the districts of Parramatta, George’s 
river and Prospect Hill, “be driven back from the settler’s habitations by firing at them.”52 
Whether this expansion of the franchise in terror resulted in more deaths of Aboriginal people 
is not easy to infer. What can be deduced is that it was ineffective in undermining the activity 
of perceived instigators, such as Pemulwuy, and that King adjusted his strategy accordingly 
by outlawing such individuals and offering a reward for their capture.  
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Curiously, King’s issuing of a public order along these lines on 17 November 1801 
did not mention Pemulwuy but rather identified three British men, William Knight, Thomas 
Thrush and someone listed as TB “known to associate and commit violent acts of depredation 
in conjunction with the natives, whom they excite to the most diabolical and outrageous 
offences on the public.”53 It was only a week later that King issued a second public order 
which listed Pemulwuy as among those wanted dead or alive as “promoters of the outrageous 
acts that have been lately committed by the natives”.54  
The perception that the agency that drove Aboriginal resistance to British settlement 
equally belonged to certain non-Aboriginal belligerents adds an interesting aspect to the 
expression of elite ambivalence around the issue of frontier violence. In lamenting the threats 
posed to the lives of settlers, as well as the security of crops and livestock, throughout the 
colony to the colonial secretary in September 1798, Governor Hunter identified his concern 
as emerging from a coalition of “idle” convicts and certain Aboriginal groups. According to 
Hunter, in joining “large bodys [sic] of natives” such miscreants “taught them how to annoy 
and distress the settlers.”55 In essence this attitude was the inverse of earlier elite perceptions 
that the initiation of frontier violence was a matter of certain Aboriginal groups retaliating to 
the aggression of convict ‘stragglers’ as they teased the edges of the settlement. As Hunter 
and King’s respective concerns demonstrate, by the beginning of the nineteenth-century elite 
sentiment had, at least temporarily, shifted to focus less upon the conflict between convicts 
and Aboriginal people as their alliance. 
This was a task which not only required spreading terror amongst Aboriginal people, 
but also punishing “lawless” convicts and ex-convicts that alternated their violent disposition 
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either against or in alliance with Aboriginal people. This coincided with colonial 
administrators turning their attention away from instances of violence perpetrated by specific 
individuals, despite the success of this approach. In October 1802 King could write to Lord 
Hobart and report that Pemulwuy had been shot, his severed head carried into Sydney as 
proof of him being killed.56The key point regarding the way King handled this particular 
moment is how he framed it as the basis of friendly relations with Aboriginal people, in 
essence to maintain order throughout the colonies and perhaps further British sovereignty 
over Aboriginal people. According to King, Pemulwuy’s head accompanied those responsible 
for his death into Sydney to inform the Governor at the behest of certain Aboriginal parties 
who had become disillusioned with the warrior’s ongoing quest of resistance and wished to 
exist alongside the British on friendlier terms. As King wrote to Lord Hobart, “as 
[Pemulwuy] was the cause of all that had happened, and all anger being dropped on their part, 
they hoped I would allow them to return to Parramatta.”57 King granted this request by 
repealing his public order of 1 May 1801 which forbade any Aboriginal presence within the 
zones of settlement subject to Pemulwuy’s campaign.  
What is more, in the proclamation of 30 June 1802 through which King made this 
announcement, he also strictly forbade any further ill-treatment of Aboriginal people. In a 
further departure from the status quo of jurisdictional pluralism, King proclaimed that any 
mistreatment of the “Natives” was forbidden “on pain of being dealt with in the same manner 
as if such act of Injustice or wanton Cruelty should be committed against the Persons and 
Estates of any of His Majesty’s Subjects”.58 In what appears to be an attempt to reinstate the 
policy of amity and kindness, King also made the qualification that settlers should also not be 
subject to attacks from Aboriginal people and urged them “to use effectual, but at the same 
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time the most humane, means of resisting such attacks.”59 As King saw it this approach was 
the best way “to continue the present good Understanding that exists”, and as he would later 
explain to Lord Hobart, on hearing that they were no longer so limited in their movements 
across various settlements “the natives expressed much joy and are now on more friendly 
terms than ever.” 60 
In the same spirit, King came some way in acknowledging the basic consequences of 
dispossession for Aboriginal people and the reservations they subsequently developed toward 
further European settlement. In correspondence with Lord Hobart, King offered the following 
insight gleaned from three Dharug men in 1803:  
On questioning the cause of their disagreement with the new settlers they very 
ingenuously answered that they did not like to be driven from the few places that 
were left on the banks of the [Nepean?]river, where alone they could procure 
food; that they had gone down the river as the white men took possession of the 
banks; if they went across men’s grounds the settlers fired upon them and were 
angry; that if they could retain some places on the lower part of the river they 
should be satisfied and would not trouble the white men.61       
All of this followed from King’s wish to discover why a Hawkesbury settler found it 
necessary to fabricate a memorial requesting that he and other settlers be allowed to shoot 
“the natives frequenting their grounds”.62 Its shaky credibility aside, this petition marked the 
first of many such documents addressed to colonial administrators in the first fifty years of 
Australian settlement, emblems of the burning sense of victimhood growing among settlers 
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and their right to official protection. In forging the signatures of a number of other settlers 
this man sought to conflate their feelings toward Aboriginal people with his own with a 
particular political end in mind. On account of this “imposition” the bogus memorialist was 
sentenced to a month in jail but served only a few days given the likelihood of his property to 
suffer in his absence. Where the more genuine appeal of the Aboriginal men was concerned, 
finding their request “so just and so equitable”, King assured them that “no more settlements 
should be made lower down the river”, bringing some reconciliation to the long period of 
corn raids. 63 In a further reflection upon the impact of colonisation, King described the New 
South Wales frontier’s progress in 1804, with some melancholy, as a “line of blood”.64  
* 
When the Gazette was established in March 1803 it did not seem share to the optimism 
that accompanied the seemingly more constructive approach to frontier policy at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Despite King’s hopes of convincing London otherwise, 
the pages of the colony’s first paper reflected far more volatile frontier feelings. As with its 
coverage of events at the Cowpastures in 1814, from its early days the Gazette largely 
represented Aboriginal people in terms of their belligerence towards settlers, emphasising 
their “unfeeling” natures. Quite categorically it was Aboriginal people who committed 
“outrages” and “depredations” upon settlers. Not only did this circulate an expectation that 
Aboriginal people should be feared and that settlers were the essential victims of the frontier, 
it ultimately spoke to the notion of an emotional dichotomy along racial lines. As suggested 
earlier by remarks made by certain colonial elites, the inferiority of Aboriginal people as 
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human beings in this sense was a matter of their emotional insensibility, a belief that further 
cloaked the real outrage of Europeans violently taking possessing of their land. 
However, this political tone is not reflected in the paper’s pragmatic initial objectives. 
Rather than heralding the emergence of an independent public voice in the colony, the 
establishment of the Gazette under the editorship of the ex-convict Howe spoke more of 
career opportunism than any motivation to address political grievance or free speech. 
Sentenced to transportation for life in 1799, subsequent to the commuting of his death penalty 
for robbery, Howe took to his role as editor of the Gazette under no pretence respecting the 
paper’s political goals.65 As he put it in the Gazette’s first issue on 5 March 1803, “[w]e open 
no channel to Political Discussion. Information is our only purpose”, while this and every 
subsequent issue read under the banner ‘Published by Authority’.66 Underlining the utility of 
the colony’s first newspaper in terms of a government mouthpiece, Governor King wrote to 
Lord Hobart in May 1803 that while he had given Howe permission to collect material to be 
published, all proofs of which were “being inspected by an officer”.67 This level of 
government license often extended to the direct involvement of the governor himself.68 In 
King’s case this is an interesting point in and of itself given that this amounted to him 
authorising views which did not wholly accord with the more nuanced understanding he was 
beginning to develop with respect to frontier relations. Following the death of George Howe 
in 1821, in October 1824 this government mandate was rescinded by Governor Brisbane 
following the request of Robert Howe, partly in response to the emergence of the Australian 
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as the first colonial free press.69 But for its first twenty years at least, the Gazette was for all 
intents and purposes a government publication.  
 In this capacity the Gazette played an important role in communicating ‘government 
and general orders’. As frontier violence escalated at various points in the early part of the 
nineteenth century, this provided the government front-page space to proclaim the official 
actions it intended to take, or had already taken, against particular acts of Aboriginal 
aggression. As Victoria Goff points out the paper was equally well known, and on occasion 
ridiculed, for its broad “coverage of fires, boating accidents, murders, robberies, rapes, 
convict escapes, trials, and executions”.70 As it fell into several of these categories, the 
Gazette keenly provided a running commentary of frontier violence as it occurred across the 
various settlements of the colony. What is more, it offered what it thought to be key insights 
regarding the nature of Aboriginal society and culture through observations and stories about 
groups and individuals in and around Sydney as well as further afield. 71 Given that New 
South Wales began as strongly “literate culture”, with about one half of men being able to 
read, the Gazette thus spoke directly to an already anxious settler community increasingly 
convinced of the threat posed by Aboriginal people. 
Sparked by an eruption of violence between settlers and Aboriginal people around 
Sydney beginning in 1804, the Gazette immediately began to consolidate such a narrative. 
Even before this spike in hostility it held Aboriginal people under a particularly dim light. 
Little sympathy could be extended towards a people whose sorry fate was attributable to 
“barbarous customs” and an overall lack of “human feeling”. In what was a frequent 
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occurrence in and around Sydney, the paper reported on a moment of tribal justice which saw 
one Aboriginal man speared through the calf in punishment for having murdered two other 
men. Commenting on this event the Gazette proclaimed, perhaps with some unease with 
respect to the prevalence of jurisdictional pluralism, that “the exercise of merciless barbarity 
on this and similar occasions strongly characterises this wretched race of men, who but for 
the barbarous and irreconcilable usages in cases of homicide, would wholly extirpate their 
already thin and scattered handfuls.”72 While such an observation places some awareness of 
how such practice equated with justice, it paid little attention to how such “thin and scattered 
handfuls” may have come about owing to settler violence and introduced diseases as opposed 
to the innate barbarity of Aboriginal people. Concern regarding this normative violent and 
“unfeeling” disposition of Aboriginal people could also be expressed in what could only ever 
be considered thinly linked circumstances. In reporting on the execution of a convict named 
James Bevan for murder on 27 May 1804, the Gazette attributed the criminal’s evident lack 
of anxiety to a “long reference to the society and extraordinary habit of intimacy with the 
natives”, via which, “he seemed to have imbibed their natural depravity of inclination and 
total want of human feeling.”73  
 This is a stark reminder of long-running colonial elite concerns regarding the prospect 
of civilisation failing to prevail in new territories populated by ‘savages’, an anxiety that 
Europeans could be just as depraved in their behaviour as Aboriginal people. As Penny 
Russell has argued, the early experience of British settlement in Australia led colonists to 
confirm preconceived qualities and habits attributable to the idea of the ‘savage’, attaching 
itself to the hardening classification of race.74 But just as Aboriginal people provided a foil 
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for civilisation, as suggested above by the Gazette, this assurance was accompanied by the 
notion that “the ‘savage’ was latent in every civilized being”.75  
Feelings had long played a role in this hovering spectre of savagery in the thinking of 
colonial elites such as David Collins, who developed deep reservations about Aboriginal 
people and their emotions. In March 1796 Collins related the story of a young Aboriginal girl 
who had been punished in revenge for her perceived involvement in the murder of an 
Aboriginal man, a punishment for which there was no physical evidence to justify. “Savage 
indeed must be the custom and the feelings” wrote Collins, “which could arm the hand 
against the unoffending child’s life.”76 In a similar circumstance later in the same year, 
Collins wrote of the complementing factor to this hardness of Aboriginal feeling:  
It was observed with regret, that the savage inhabitants of the country, instead of 
losing any part of their native ferocity of manners by an intercourse with the 
Europeans among whom they dwelt, seemed rather to delight in exhibiting 
themselves as monsters of the greatest cruelty, devoid of reason, and guided 
solely by the impulse of the worst passions.77 
Tragic as it was, and however Collins wished to reconcile it, this particular triumph of savage 
passion over civilised feeling, which resulted in the young girl’s death, spiralled from a 
moment of gubernatorial terror. On account of her parents being involved in “so many 
depredations upon the settlers at the Hawkesbury”, they were among those who fell under the 
fire of an armed party sent out in pursuit.78 Surviving this encounter, the young girl 
accompanied the armed party back to Parramatta where “she soon became a great favourite at 
                                                
75 Russell, Savage or Civilised?, p. 43.  
76 Collins, Account, p. 321. 
77 Collins, Account, pp. 341 – 342.  
78 Collins, Account, pp. 341 – 342 
  
47 
Government-House”. But the moment of “the worst of passions” was yet to come. According 
to Collins, the girl’s favoured status at Government House in addition to her being from a 
different Aboriginal territory, “excited the jealousy of some natives who lived at and about 
Sydney, which manifested itself in their putting her to death in the most cruel manner. The 
body was found in the woods, speared in several places, and with arms cut off”.79 
 Convicts also came under the scrutiny of Collins’ measure of human feeling. In 1798 
a group of convicts stole away on a boat from Port Jackson with the hope of claiming booty 
from the wreck of the “Sydney Cove”, one half of whom were left marooned on an Island by 
the other. Collins’ concern regarding this escapade revolved less around its initial motive but 
rather the moment of desertion. “One ray of manly feeling,” according to Collins, “would 
have forbid the dooming of the wretched companions of their guilt to perish by the hands of 
savages, or by the more lingering pangs of hunger.”80 In the same year Collins similarly 
condemned the emotional comportment of the convicts responsible for burning down the 
public jail, proclaiming that “[f]eeling for each other was never imputed to these 
miscreants.”81 While this language of failures in feeling is a reminder of the joint concern 
Aboriginal people and convicts posed to the civility of the colony in the minds of colonial 
elites, at least in Collins’ case, it was by and large an understanding brought to mind with 
respect to the former. This is particularly evident in the case of the murder of the young girl. 
It was not the fact that the she became an orphan as a result of her parents being killed by the 
armed party which drew Collins’ label of “unfeeling”, but rather her subsequent murder by 
Aboriginal people, irrevocably subject to the “worst of passions”. Outside of the odd atrocity 
committed by convicts, it was as if the expression of such passion was beyond colonists. 
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 It was this “unfeeling” nature of Aboriginal people which featured in the Gazette’s 
coverage of frontier conflict which began to escalate in 1804. Towards the end of May that 
year, “acts of abominable outrage” were localised around Portland Head on the Hawkesbury 
River resulting in the spearing of the settlers Matthew Everingham and John Howe. Although 
neither man died from their injuries, this particular act and other related instances of 
Aboriginal people stealing clothing, stock and grain prompted Governor King to order the 
magistrate at Hawkesbury, T. Arndell, “to adopt such measures as the exigency required”.82 
Arndell subsequently dispatched fourteen settlers to Portland Head where they came upon a 
party of “forty or fifty of the hostile savages” whom they pursued until they were among a 
group of around 300.83 
According to the Gazette, acting on instruction the party of settlers then attempted to 
establish the motive behind the recent acts of violence and robbery, a line of interrogation 
which led to an “ironical declaration” from those being questioned “that they wanted and 
would have corn, wearing apparel and whatever the settlers had”.84 It was as clear an answer 
as could have been expected; yet the subsequent flurry of spears was met with gunfire. 
Although no fatalities were recorded on this occasion, in concluding this particular report the 
Gazette noted that more recent violence at the Green Hills district resulted in the deaths of 
two Aboriginal men after they were shot by a military detachment, whose names later reports 
suggest were ‘Major White’ and ‘Nabbin’.85 As was the case with Portland Head such a 
military presence was granted for “the relief of the settlers, whose self preservation requires 
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that they should ever be on the alert to counteract the mischievous designs of the savage and 
unfeeling enemy.”86  
 Time and time again the words ‘unfeeling’, ‘savage’ and ‘wretch’ appeared in the 
same sentence as the Gazette evolved a narrative that juxtaposed the unstable emotions of 
Aboriginal people with the passive victimhood and justified self-preservation of British 
settlers. Nor was such language localised to central regions of conflict like the Hawkesbury. 
On 10 June the Gazette reported the return of James Field on the ‘Resonance’, a convict who 
along with some companions had earlier stolen a boat from Port Jackson in the hope of being 
taken on board an American vessel leaving Port Stephens. Despite making it to their 
destination the group failed to realise their grander design, and “after a series of unspeakable 
hardships they were assaulted by a body of natives, who showered spears upon them with a 
barbarity only to be conceived by those that have witnessed the brutal ferocity of these 
unfeeling savages.” Conversely, Field’s safe return from Port Stephens upon the ‘Resonance’, 
the sole survivor of this ordeal, reflected “honour to the feelings of the Gentlemen in 
Command.” 87  
It was by way of such encounters that the Gazette could contribute to an 
understanding that certain Aboriginal groups along the eastern coast of Australia were 
particularly hostile, particularly the ‘natives’ of Jervis Bay, Port Stephens and Twofold Bay. 
The belief that a group of people from Jervis Bay posed a threat to settlers at the Cowpastures 
in 1814 was built upon years of negative maritime accounts. On 27 October 1805, the Gazette 
noted the return of a whale boat which passed by Jervis Bay under the command of Joseph 
Murrel with the remark that the “account given by these people is as follows: That 
everywhere along the coast the natives wore a menacing appearance, and manifested a wish 
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to attack them.”88 Similarly, news of an Aboriginal attack at Port Stephens on 3 November 
was accompanied with a description “of the fury of the natives” and on 6 April 1806 the 
Gazette reported that “[d]isagreeable accounts were last week received by the Venus private 
colonial vessel of the inimical disposition of the natives at Twofold Bay.”89  
Mark McKenna’s account of those who survived the wreck of the Sydney Cove, as 
they marched from Preservation Island to just south of Sydney in 1797 led by William Clark, 
sheds much needed light on the history that led to such negative representations of Aboriginal 
people beyond the limits of settlement. Despite the many amicable encounters that 
punctuated this epic journey, McKenna writes that by “the early 1800s, some of the first 
settler oral histories of cross-cultural encounters outside Sydney were laced with…bizarre 
tales of ‘native savagery’ and cannibalism, stories of lost white men wandering half-starved 
through Aboriginal coastal lands seeking redemption.”90 By the time the Gazette began 
printing there was thus an already well-established understanding that Aboriginal people of 
the New South Wales were particularly inimical to Europeans. Initially spread by word of 
mouth, with the Gazette this belief gained a far more potent imaginative currency. 
In the Sydney region itself the Gazette’s frequent coverage of frontier encounters also 
shaped negative impressions of Aboriginal people with a certain geographical specificity. On 
1 July 1804, it was “happy to state that the Natives in and about Hawkesbury have 
relinquished their mischievous behaviour, and that a good understanding is happily restored 
between them and the settlers”. 91 In the immediate months which followed, the activity of the 
“unfeeling wretches” was reported in the vicinity of George’s River and Lane Cove.92 In a 
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rare moment of praise an elderly Aboriginal man named ‘Grewin’ of Mullet Island (now 
known as Dangar Island) on the Hawkesbury River was lauded for warning a passing boat of 
the risk posed by local “banditti”, thus distinguishing his conduct against “the manners of a 
race so strongly characterised by the want of common feeling, and the brutal indulgence of a 
sanguinary disposition.”93  
But with the resumption of violence around Portland Head and the Green Hills in 
April 1805, the Hawkesbury once again became the key site of settler anxieties. This new 
bout of aggression was attributed to a Dharug group which became known as the ‘Branch 
Natives’ on account of their territory lying near the Colo, or Branch, River adjoining the 
Hawkesbury River from the north near Portland Head.94 On 21 April the Gazette lamented “a 
series of barbarities lately practiced by a banditti” on a farm in this region owned by John 
Llewllyn, purportedly led by a Dharug man named ‘Branch Jack’.95  
Owing to this and other attacks upon settlers in regions around Prospect Hill and the 
Cowpastures, King once again sought recourse to the military. In a similar vein to previous 
announcements which justified military force against Aboriginal people, a General Order was 
published in the Gazette on 28 April proclaiming that “the Governor has judged it necessary, 
for the preservation of lives and Properties of the Out Settlers and Stockmen, to distribute 
Detachments from the New South Wales Corp among the Out-settlements, for their 
protection against the uncivilised Insurgents.”96 In addition, King ordered settlers “to assist 
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each other in repelling” Aboriginal raids and once again resorted to the principle of exclusion 
by disallowing the presence of any Aboriginal person upon settled lands.97  
A day prior to this announcement even being made a large group of settlers led by 
Andrew Thompson, with the assistance of an Aboriginal man named Yaragowby, had already 
successfully located and forced at least seven of the ‘Branch Natives’ at Richmond Hill, 
including a principal target named ‘Charley’, off a precipice to their deaths.98 On 12 May the 
Gazette was outraged to mention the “treachery” of Yaragowby, who in going ahead to warn 
his people of the approaching armed party found himself among those killed. What may have 
been a “decisive” assault was thus merely deemed a success owing to this lost opportunity of 
surprise.  
The Gazette was at ease to report that subsequent to this event “little molestation has 
since been felt about the Hawkesbury.” 99 But this hope was short-lived with King re-instating 
his order of 28 April in the Gazette on 9 June, in particular targeting an Eora man named 
‘Mosquito’. His eventual capture was particularly remarkable given whom it set free.100 On 4 
August the Gazette wrote, “Young Tedbury was set at liberty yesterday se’nnignt, at the 
intreaty [sic] of the friendly natives who assisted in the capture of Mosquito”.101 Almost two 
months prior Tedbury, the son of Pemulwuy, had been captured at Pennant Hills following a 
joint effort by settlers from Baulkham Hills and some constables from Parramatta to 
“disperse” Aboriginal people living in the area. According to later reports in the Gazette, 
                                                
97 Sydney Gazette, 28 April 1805. 
98 Sydney Gazette, 5 May 1805. 
99 Sydney Gazette, 12 May 1805.  
100 Sydney Gazette, 9 June 1805.  
101 Sydney Gazette, 4 August 1805. 
  
53 
Tedbury remained a concern for settlers throughout Sydney, particularly around Georges 
River in the period immediately prior to his death in 1810.102  
The Gazette was equally convinced that certain members of the ‘Branch Natives’, 
‘Branch Jack’ in particular, were responsible for settler anxieties in the period following 
King’s General Order at the end of April 1805. Even despite the reported deaths of ‘Branch 
Jack’ and another man named ‘Wogionigh’ following a botched raid on a boat travelling 
along the Hawkesbury at the beginning of September, the ‘Branch Natives’ were portrayed 
by the Gazette as a particularly potent source of settler dread.103 A week following ‘Branch 
Jack’s’ death the Gazette darkly observed,  
[that] the death of one of the most noxious and rancorous pests of that part of the 
river Hawkesbury…may open a prospect of security is much to be hoped, but the 
survivors of their impetuous and daring tribe [are] equally to be dreaded. To be 
vigilantly prepared and well guarded must therefore constitute the hope of future 
safety.104 
Adding to this sense of insecurity and menace, at the beginning of harvest in December that 
the “implacable spirit of the Branch natives suffers no opportunity of mischief to escape” 
seemed a sad reality.105 
* 
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As much as it was becoming a forum for settler discontent, it is also important to 
recognise the significant column space the Gazette dedicated to the expression of more 
pacific thoughts and feelings towards Aboriginal people. For certain settlers the matter of 
securing a more peaceful understanding across the frontier became a pressing concern given 
the unease that pervaded the beginning of the nineteenth century. In October 1808 the 
Gazette was still inclined to loathingly observe the Aboriginal inclination towards “mischief”, 
warning that “[f]rom their friendship we can gain nothing; but from their enmity we have 
much to apprehend.”106 It even appeared that Aboriginal people had infiltrated the emotions 
of livestock, their very appearance purportedly “immediately operating on the terrors” of a 
bullock passing through the Hawkesbury in December of the same year.107 Although 
livestock were indeed targets, what more bizarre anecdote could be conveyed to the Gazette’s 
readers to associate fear with Aboriginal people? Otherwise, during 1808 and the years 
immediately prior the Gazette provided minimal coverage of Aboriginal resistance. Between 
30 August 1807 and 15 May 1808 it was in fact impossible for the paper to cover any news at 
all, having ceased operations owing to the Rum Rebellion.108   
It was shortly after the Gazette resumed publication following this tumultuous period 
that it conducted a conversation among settlers as to how Aboriginal people could benefit 
from civilisation. Seeking to assess the needs of Aboriginal people, this series of letters are 
more than anything telling for what they reveal about settler anxieties regarding the progress 
of civilisation in the midst of “heathens”. On the 21 August 1808 the Gazette published a 
letter addressed to Howe from a settler named A. Woodman outlining the apparent 
incorrigibility of Aboriginal people in the midst of ‘civilisation’. As Woodman saw it, 
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The civilised adventurer and the uncultivated barbarian discover in each other 
perhaps a universal difference, save only in the human shape…The natives of this 
country appear to have benefitted as little as could possibly have been expected 
from their acquaintance with European customs…Truly they may be said to have 
inherited an unconquerable attachment to a state of nature, an insurmountable 
aversion to innovation, notwithstanding the flattering possibility of advantage 
from the change.109 
By 1810 correspondence to the Gazette held out a more optimistic, though perhaps no less 
cynical, prospect for the place of Aboriginal people in New South Wales society. A letter 
which appeared in the Gazette on 7 July 1810 from ‘Philanthropus’ asked the following 
question: “What plan can be adapted, what means used, or what steps taken, whereby we may 
most speedily or effectively civilise and evangelise the natives of New South Wales?” In 
stark contrast to Woodman’s resignation, ‘Philanthropus’ prefaced his query with the belief 
that on account of the “great Creator having made One Blood all nations of the Earth” it 
could be taken “for granted that the Natives of New South Wales are capable of instruction 
and civilisation”.110 Underlining Russell’s argument, the answers to the question posed by 
‘Philanthropus’ were couched in anxious terms reflecting the long running elite concern that 
it wasn’t so much that Aboriginal people were incapable of being civilised, but rather the 
inverse propensity of Europeans to turn to ‘savagery’. 
‘A FRIEND TO CIVILISATION’ replied to ‘Philanthropus’ with the initial 
observation that Aboriginal people “appear to possess every quality that can tend to 
discourage their ever becoming civilised beings after they reach an adult state.” It followed 
that as many children as possible should be taken from their parents. At the same time, this 
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writer was aware that Aboriginal people had every reason to reconsider whatever “good 
opinion” they had of Europeans on account of the ill-treatment they had many times received. 
Europeans, too, deserved the pejorative ‘uncivilised’: “there are numbers in our own 
Community, who affect to despise the character of a heathen, and are yet too faulty in 
themselves to attend to the duties that characterise the Christian.” 111 A similar concern about 
Christian bad faith within settler society was expressed by ‘AMICUS’, who in response to 
both ‘Philanthropus’ and ‘A FRIEND TO CIVILISATION’ was wary of any success that 
could be expected from bringing Aboriginal children directly into settlement. “I consider”, 
Amicus wrote, “that by keeping them in a small society formed of their own body, be it great 
or small, they would avoid a great evil which it would be difficult to amend than in the first 
instance to provide against.” 112 Put simply, the key to success was placing Aboriginal 
children in dedicated institutions—a prefiguring of the stolen generation of the twentieth 
century, and of Governor Lachlan Macquarie’s actions in 1813.  
From 1813 it was indeed this approach of institutionalising children which 
characterised Governor Macquarie’s policy regarding Aboriginal people in New South 
Wales. Like this clutch of worldly settlers, Macquarie filled with humanitarian zeal when he 
arrived in Sydney as the third Governor of New South Wales at the end of 1809. A spirit of 
amicability toward Aboriginal people was a central theme of his very first speech to the 
colony on 30 December 1809, when he proclaimed, 
I need not, I hope, express my wish that the Natives of this Country, when they 
have come in the Way in a peaceable Manner, may not be molested in their 
Persons or Property by anyone; but that on the contrary, they may always be 
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treated with Kindness and attention, so as to conciliate them as much as possible 
to our Government and Manners.113  
However, as was the case for his predecessors, the eruption of violence across the out-
settlements from 1813 proved difficult to reconcile through a humane agenda.  
As with the years immediately prior to his arrival, the Gazette spoke little of frontier 
violence being a marked feature of Macquarie’s initial period as governor. In July 1811 the 
paper made a passing mention of the ‘Branch Natives’ attacking livestock at the Hawkesbury 
and the same group was blamed for the murder of a settler at Portland Head in the beginning 
of 1813.114 It was not until May 1814, providing some context to the watchful night of the 
full moon on the Cowpastures, that violence in the out-settlements again erupted. “Our public 
duty once more lays us under the painful necessity,” wrote a mournful Gazette on 14 May 
1814, “of reporting violence between the natives and ourselves, which for the tranquillity and 
good understanding that for the last five or six years has subsisted we had entertained the 
flattering expectation were not again likely to occur.” Having expanded well beyond Dharug 
territory, the Dharawal and Gandangara people now equally posed themselves as threats.115 
The chain of events which so shattered the Gazette’s hopes eventuated when three army 
privates shot at a group of Dharawal people as they conducted a corn raid at Appin. This was 
followed by the deaths of an Aboriginal boy and a settler named Isaac Eustace in retaliation. 
In the trading of vengeance that followed, an Aboriginal woman and two children were killed 
by an armed party of settlers which set out in pursuit, which in turn led to the murder of two 
settlers working at a stock-keepers hut owned by Elizabeth McArthur.116  
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The Gazette’s commentary of this particular sequence of events provides some 
indication that it intended to accord with the more peaceful and impartial rhetoric inherent to 
Macquarie’s first speech. The paper stuck with its obligation not to offer an “opinion to 
which side the first act of aggression may justly be attributed”, instead leaving it to the 
colonial administration to uncover the facts. But this did not stop the paper from hoping that 
whatever measures were to be taken would put a “speedy termination to the evils to which the 
lonely settler is exposed from the predatory incursion of an enemy whose hearts are 
inaccessible, distant, and unknown, and who by surprise or stratagem accomplish every 
project they devise in a wild temperament of fury natural to the savage state of Man.”117  
The Gazette’s continuous line of negativity regarding Aboriginal people was in stark 
contrast to a General Order issued by Macquarie on 18 June, in which he admonished “the 
Settlers from taking the Law into their own Hands for the future, and to beware wanton Acts 
of Oppression and Cruelty against the Natives, who are, in like Manner with themselves 
under, and entitled to the Protection of the British Laws.”118 Both settlers and Aboriginal 
people would therefore be subject to punishment in the event of transgressing these laws. At 
the same time Macquarie provided a justification as to why neither of these two parties would 
be prone to breach such an agreement claiming that “it must be evident that no deep rooted 
Prejudice exists in their Minds against British subjects or White Man”. He then proceeded to 
claim that a “free and kindly Intercourse [had] subsisted between them from the Foundation 
of the Colony to the present Time, with the Exception of a few slight Interruptions”, of which 
the present circumstance was an example. In such a circumstance it was “highly becoming 
[of] British Settlers to exercise their Patience and Forbearance, and therein to show the 
Superiority they possess over those unenlightened natives by adopting a conciliatory Line of 
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Conduct Towards them.” Where Aboriginal people themselves were concerned, Macquarie 
also remarked that he had been given “Assurances” from groups at the Cowpastures and 
elsewhere that they would not retaliate in the event that they were attacked by settlers. 119  
Such a rhetorical deviation from the negativity of the Gazette may seem welcome if it 
was not simply an attempt to clothe the violence of the frontier in the language of diplomacy. 
In conjunction with this conciliatory platform, in December 1814 Macquarie announced his 
determination to establish a “School for the Education of the Native Children” at Parramatta 
with the “Hope of producing such an improvement in their condition as may eventually 
contribute to render them not only more happy in themselves, but also in some degree useful 
to the Community”.120 The humanitarian optimism inherent to this policy seemed to quickly 
disperse with the continuation of conflict at the out-settlements. On 5 August 1815 the 
Gazette reported the murder of a settler at Bringelly, whose labourers were kept in a 
“constant state of terror” as a number of items were stolen.121 Several settlers were also 
murdered in the same district in March 1816, purportedly in association with a crop raid.122 
The Gazette also reported in the same month that stock keeper at the Cowpastures was 
speared by at least three Aboriginal men similarly concentrated on acquiring the ripening 
corn and a woman was decapitated on a farm at Nepean, “the furious wretches afterwards 
plundered the house, and wantonly speared a number of pigs.”123  
Convinced of Macquarie’s inherent “liberality”, in a letter of 29 December 1815 John 
Blaxland brought to the governor’s attention the plight of three of his servants left “in a most 
dilapidated state” as a result of their huts being raided by a “considerable body of Natives 
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amounting to about 150” in an attack upon his property at Stony Range. This coincided with 
violence already reported in the Gazette in the vicinity of Bringelly. Only with great 
difficulty did Blaxland’s servants escape. In response to learning of this “outrageous attack”, 
Macquarie’s immediate response to Blaxland was that “the unfortunate sufferers” would each 
be issued a “Suit of Slops and a Colonial Blanket ”.124 
 This magnanimity was eventually followed with far more aggressive measures, 
Blaxland’s property being the first port of call for a contingent of the 46th regiment led by 
Sergeant Robert Broadfoot with orders to reign in the “hostile natives” on 10 April 1816.125 
Captain James Wallis was likewise sent to the Cowpastures with instructions from Macquarie 
to take prisoner those purported to be involved in violence and theft, firing upon those who 
resisted. “Such adult males that may be killed”, Macquarie grimly ordered, “you are to cause 
to be hanged on trees in conspicuous parts of the country they fall in.” Women and children, 
although hopefully spared from violence, were to be “interned where they may happen to 
fall.” 126 
  Three weeks later Macquarie issued a proclamation which explained these “coercive 
and strong Measures”. While aware of the danger posed to innocent members of the various 
Aboriginal communities targeted by this use of military force, Macquarie expressed an 
earnest hope “that this unavoidable Result, and the Severity which has attended it, will 
eventually strike Terror amongst the surviving tribes, and deter them from the further 
Commission of such sanguinary Outrages and Barbarities”.127 The lasting impact of this 
manoeuvre was undoubtedly felt by the Dharawal people whom it targeted, with a group of 
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14 including two women and three children plunging to their deaths at Cataract Gorge near 
Appin on 17 April when Wallis’ party routed them.128 In his report of this event Wallis 
indicated his accordance with Macquarie’s most grisly order, noting that he had “detached 
Lieut Parker with the bodies of Durelle and Kumnabaygal to be hanged on a conspicuous part 
of a range of hills.” Wallis otherwise expressed regret at overseeing the death of so many 
women and children.129 In noting the death of “one of the most hostile of the natives” in 
Durelle, with its inimitable eye for the suffering settler, the Gazette was hopeful that the 
government’s actions would abate the “recurrence of [the] barbarities which the natives have 
of late so frequently committed on the unprotected settlers and their Families.”130 
Without dismissing its significance in New South Wales frontier history, Karskens 
underlines the importance of not inflating the strategic significance of this mass killing. 
Ultimately, it failed to remove a majority of the main instigators of Aboriginal resistance. The 
Cumberland Plain War as she calls it did not end in autumn of 1816 but rather as a result of 
Macquarie’s proclamation of 4 May which banished Aboriginal people from gathering near 
settlement in numbers of six or more and completely forbid any one individual from 
approaching within one mile of any farm while armed. Perhaps even more effective was the 
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proclamation of 20 July which sought to outlaw key Aboriginal offenders, who in this case 
numbered 10 men: Murrah, Myles, Wallahalias Warren, Carbone Jack (alias Kaningy), 
Narrang Jack, Bunduck, Kongate, Woottan, Rachel and Yallaman. In so condemning these 
men to a “State of Outlawry”, Macquarie compelled all “His Majesty’s Subjects…to deliver 
them up to the nearest Magistrate to be dealt with according to Justice.” Failing this official 
course of justice, settlers were authorised “to kill and utterly destroy them as Outlaws and 
Murderers.”131  
Recognising its continuity with previous attempts on the part of colonial 
administrators to sanction violence as a means of subduing Aboriginal resistance in early 
New South Wales, Lisa Ford stresses the difference of Macquarie’s proclamation to the 
extent that it was the first time the issue of how to deal with Aboriginal violence was at least 
clothed in “the language of law”. But Ford is once again clear on the ephemerality of any 
shift away from jurisdictional pluralism, explaining that at this stage of New South Wales 
history  “the colonial executive of New South Wales rarely defined indigenous violence as a 
crime”. Overall Macquarie’s 1816 proclamation was a “feeble” deployment of territoriality, 
the corollary of which was the ongoing juridical independence of Indigenous people in New 
South Wales, at least until 1824 when they were fully included by legal discourse in the 
courts.132 For Ford the banishment of an Aboriginal man named Duall from the colony in July 
1816 was nonetheless a significant event in terms of the extension of British sovereignty in 
New South Wales.133 As with previous military attempts to control the frontier, Macquarie’s 
proclamation in 1816 thus need to be evaluated in view of the broad ranging anxiety 
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expressed by early colonial administrators regarding the integrity of law and order through 
British sovereignty, which went hand in hand with a more general concern regarding the 
challenges “savagery” posed to “civilisation”.  
With a number of other outlaws captured by 3 August the Gazette felt assured that 
“there can be little doubt that the hostile tribes must shortly retire, and that such as prefer a 
friendly intercourse with us will find a peaceable deportment the most conducive to their 
comfort.”134 Despite this hope, on 19 October Macquarie received a letter from a group of 
settlers on the Hawkesbury River requesting his assistance to assuage their collective “dread 
of the natives”. This fear of Aboriginal hostility was such that these particular settlers were 
“Compelled to reside and work alternately on each other’s Farm having no Men for [their] 
protection and assistance.”135 At all events Macquarie issued a further proclamation at the 
beginning of the following month ordering “all hostile Operations, military or other, against 
the said Native tribes [to] cease and determine” while offering an amnesty to any Aboriginal 
instigators still at large, thus repealing the proclamation of 20 July.136 In the same General 
Order, appearing in the Gazette on 2 November, Macquarie outlined his open invitation to 
Aboriginal people throughout the colony to meet at Parramatta on 28 December at which he 
intended to “confer and advise with them on the Plan of Life they may be inclined to adopt 
for their own comfort and happiness.”137  
If the inauguration of his Meeting of the Natives at Parramatta in 1816 was an attempt 
to reinstate his otherwise diplomatic stance towards Aboriginal people following the tragedy 
at Appin, it stands in stark contrast to the actions and rhetoric leading to this event, which, 
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along with the Gazette, aided in projecting them as “savage and unfeeling enemies”. 
According to the Gazette a total of 179 Aboriginal people attended this friendly event, at 
which time 15 children were now also in attendance at the Native Institution.138 Whether 
attributable to the apparent good-will of this occasion or the spate of terror to which the 
various Aboriginal groups of the out-settlements were subjected, by March 1817 the only 
instance of frontier violence around Sydney the Gazette could report needed to be qualified 
by the fact that it “had its origin in the DREAM of a Sydney native, who narrated his vision 
so critically with regard to circumstance as to impose belief that he was recounting truth 
instead of fable.”139 As much as the rumour of an Aboriginal attack on the Cowpastures 
emanating from Jervis Bay on the full moon of May 1814, and despite the apparent 
subsidence of aggression it suggests, such a spectral incarnation of frontier violence is a stark 
demonstration of the Gazette’s facilitation of the growing fears within the settler imaginary. 
Fear of Aboriginal aggression was a reality on the frontier, but it was given imaginative 
currency through the trope of white victimhood in the pages of the Gazette and rhetorical 
validity by a succession of early colonial administrators. Caught within this emotional 
dialectic, New South Wales would embark upon an astonishing pastoral expansion 
throughout the 1820s.  
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Chapter 2: ‘only solicit to obtain’: Martial Law and the Mounted Police, Bathurst and 
the Hunter 1815 – 1827. 
Foul weather, a fluctuating sick list, hard rock, rugged terrain, injured horses and 
doubts over the next source of supply. These concerns dogged Lieutenant William Cox as he 
supervised the construction of the first road across the Blue Mountains west of Sydney, 
tracing the Aboriginal path “discovered” by William Lawson, Gregory Blaxland and William 
Charles Wentworth two years prior. The road was completed in January 1815, and in May of 
the same year the plains which lay beyond this interminable barrier became the site of lonely 
Bathurst. Along with the European push to open up the Australian landscape, to transform 
seemingly inhospitable wilderness into prosperous pastures, there was a fear of who might be 
at the edge of the trees. Cox regularly recorded his concern about the threat of “parties of 
natives” to the road builders, requesting that his blacksmith make pikes for “self defence”.1 
Almost a decade later, now a substantial land owner in the plains around Bathurst, 
Cox would reiterate this fear more strongly, albeit vicariously, in adding his signature to a 
memorial to Governor Thomas Brisbane in June 1824. With other prominent settlers of the 
Bathurst district, including Reverend Samuel Marsden, the memorial declared the “feelings 
of horror and consternation” which followed from learning that “no fewer than seven” 
servants had been “barbarously murdered” by Wiradjuri warriors.2 In conveying both the 
fears of the shepherds and stockmen who survived these attacks as well as the more economic 
concerns of landholders, the memorial informed Brisbane that “as a natural consequence” the 
properties concerned had been abandoned. 
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Suggesting an understanding of the force deployed by previous governors to 
neutralise Aboriginal resistance, Cox and his fellow memorialists felt confident they had 
“only to solicit to attain” such assistance. Mapping a moment in the rapid expansion of 
British settlement, this particular document is at once a clear expression of the emotional 
dialectic that had come to exist between settlers and colonial administrators. As will be 
shown, in both the Bathurst and Hunter regions throughout the 1820s governors and their 
fellow officials validated settler fears in consistently resorting to military force against 
Aboriginal resistance. In conjunction with a largely hostile, albeit diversifying press, this tacit 
recognition of settler emotional suffering led to the consolidation of white victimhood as the 
dispossession of Aboriginal people was gaining pace with the expansion of pastoralism 
across New South Wales.    
* 
While fear was a central feature of colonial emotional life as the New South Wales 
frontier expanded, it did not entirely undermine the more optimistic outlook seemingly 
unoccupied landscapes could evoke. Leading the first official party to travel Cox’s Road in 
April 1815, the sublime potential of the Bathurst Plains rather than fear preoccupied 
Governor Lachlan Macquarie: 
It is impossible to behold this grand scene without a feeling of admiration and 
surprise, whilst the silence and solitude which reign in a space of such extent and 
beauty as seems designed by Nature for the occupancy and comfort of Man, 
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create a degree of melancholy in the mind which may be more easily imagined 
than described.3   
This was a clear expression of the European desire to occupy the colonial landscape. 
On 7 May the site for the town of Bathurst was fixed and “year zero” dawned for the 
Wiradjuri. A quick survey of the local wildlife was remarkable for the variety it revealed 
from Kangaroos and emus to pigeons and platypi, or “paradox”. But Aboriginal people 
received no mention in the proclamation that established the first town outside the bounds of 
Sydney settlement. While absent in Macquarie’s account of the journey, three days prior, one 
of his travelling partners, Major Henry Colden Antill, observed that during an encounter with 
“several natives of this new country” fear was “cast off” following an initial period of alarm 
at the European reception. Antill remarked further “they appeared to be a harmless and 
inoffensive race, with nothing forbidding or ferocious in their countenances”  and “one 
degree more advanced toward civilisation than our old [Sydney] friends” on account of their 
use of garments.4  
 Before leaving the site of the intended township Macquarie instructed those who 
remained behind to “keep the friendly intercourse”, a degree of friendliness elsewhere 
strongly apparent to Antill’s understanding of this initial encounter.5 A sad consensus was 
nonetheless struck among the party the day after their departure from Bathurst on 12 May 
following the discovery that one of their number was missing and not to be found, 
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presumably fallen “sacrifice” to the “natives” with whom he was last seen, and, by all 
accounts, taken with the idea of becoming the first settler in the “new country”.6    
The fragility that could exist between any perceptions of friendship on the part of 
Europeans toward Aboriginal people is here on full display. Notwithstanding the level of 
agreeable interaction that took place at the founding of Bathurst, the fact that no sign of the 
would-be-settler could be found was easily accounted for by an almost reflexive belief that he 
had fallen victim to the local inhabitants. There is no direct evidence to suggest this had been 
his fate. But with settler beliefs in the inherent savagery of Aboriginal people consolidating 
as they were, that the man may have fallen foul of the Wiradjuri would have been a 
compelling explanation.  
William Lawson expressed a similar anxiety of Aboriginal aggression when travelling 
to Bathurst in 1819 in the company of three members of Louis de Freycinet’s south sea 
expedition. In their joint account Jene Rene Quoy, Charles Gaudichaud and Alphonse Pellion 
write that  
Sometimes, when hunting, the natives rove in these lonely mountains, and more 
than one traveller has been victim of their murderous spears. We even happened 
to arouse Mr Lawson’s anxiety in this respect when, enticed by the beauty of the 
situation or desire to pursue some curious animal, we dismounted, leaving the 
main road to hunt or to botanise.7   
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  The preponderance of fear in the settler imaginary asks important questions of how 
settlement continued at all. As Macquarie’s sentiment illustrates, working alongside the racial 
animus which had come to characterise the British occupation of Aboriginal land was a sense 
of entitlement to this very landscape, the expression of which could at times take on a certain 
emotional quality itself. As with Macquarie’s melancholic reflection upon his first vision of 
the Bathurst plains, the colonial landscape inspired the passions of British arrivals; less fear 
than pleasure at the prospect of a land gradually filling with the prime signifiers of 
civilisation: flocks and herds. Revisiting Bathurst in 1817 during the early stages of his 
western explorations following his initial travels with Macquarie in 1815, Surveyor General 
John Oxley remarked that “[t]he mind dwelt with pleasure on the idea that at no very distant 
period these secluded plains would be covered with flocks bearing the richest fleeces, and 
contribute in no small degree to the prosperity of the eastern settlements.”8 Julia Horne’s 
observation that Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful accompanied Oxley as he surveyed the New South Wales landscape 
helps explains the excited anticipation of such prose.9 
As Penny Russell has made so clear, the violence that followed the realisation of these 
daydreams of dispossession was increasingly justified on moral grounds by the European 
conviction that “civilisation” rightly supplanted “savagery” no matter the cost.10 More 
suggestive of Richard Waterhouse’s description of the European “acquisitive impulse”, 
Oxley’s sentiment is a clear expression of the economic imperatives which directed the 
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British dispossession of Aboriginal land.11 At the same time it cuts to the heart of the feelings 
which the Australian landscape could evoke during the early phase of settlement. It is in such 
expressions that we find fear contending with desire in the settler imaginary.  
To be sure, such passions were at times confounded by the barrenness of the 
Australian landscape. As Oxley ventured further west of Bathurst (in the vicinity of present 
day Parkes) on the same journey, he lamented, “[i]t is impossible to imagine a more desolate 
region; and the uncertainty we are in, whilst traversing it, of finding water, adds to the 
melancholy feelings which the silence and the solitude of such wastes is calculated to 
inspire.”12 Similarly, in country further west around present day Condobolin, Oxley would 
complain that “[n]othing can be more melancholy and irksome than travelling over wilds, 
which nature seems to have condemned to perpetual loneliness and desolation...The naming 
of things was often the only pleasure within our reach”13 But up and above the dreariness 
evoked by the desolated landscape further west, the European “acquisitive impulse” 
ultimately reigned on the Bathurst Plains.  
However, this expansion of the frontier did not take place immediately. Macquarie’s 
consolidation of land grants in the Cumberland Plain meant that by the final year of his tenure 
in 1821 the large extent of British occupation in New South Wales was kept in the close 
vicinity of Sydney.14 In line with this policy, access to land around the Bathurst Plains was 
heavily proscribed. As noted by Waterhouse, outside of Judge Barron Field’s description of 
the Bathurst Plains as “the promised land of Australia”, few free settlers entertained with 
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much excitement the long term pastoral and agricultural prospects of the new territory.15 This 
all began to change following the release of the Bigge report in 1822-23, which advocated a 
more large-scale and wide ranging approach to agriculture and pastoralism, incorporating the 
redistribution of convict labour from towns to the countryside.16 For the time being the 
appetite for land needed to be matched by the requisite legal means of acquiring it.  
As they were enacted under the stewardship of Thomas Brisbane in the course of the 
1820s, Bigge’s recommendations allowed pastoralists to expand the limits of settlement into 
more remote locations within the colony. While a reasonably well-contained policy in more 
fertile regions such as the Hunter Valley, Tickets of Occupation proved much harder to 
administer on the Bathurst Plains. To overcome issues of arability and access in the region 
pastoralists sought more fertile land beyond Brisbane’s anticipated new boundaries of 
settlement, adapting the new system of land grants and primarily establishing Bathurst as a 
sheep-grazing district.17 Much the same circumstances also led “squatters” to illegally expand 
beyond the Hunter Valley into the Liverpool Plains and as far as the Darling Downs as the 
1820s were drawing to a close.18 Testing the patience of colonial administrators, by 1836 
squatters could establish stations under licenses “to depasture Crown Lands beyond the 
Limits of Location”. “Squatting”, writes Eric Rolls, “had become respectable.”19 
Given the mythology that had come to develop around Aboriginal people, the 
remoteness of sparse settlement in regions such as Bathurst took an emotional toll on servants 
and stock keepers as they pushed further into potentially hostile Aboriginal country. But this 
unease only gained real dimensions once frontier violence erupted once again. As early as 
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April 1816 the government provision depot along with the stock and servants of private 
settlers located upon Cox’s River were considered in grave enough danger from “hostile 
natives” to merit military protection. In command of the 46th regiment Sergeant Murphy was 
charged with the protection of this location and given Macquarie’s permission to fire upon 
any armed natives who approached within sixty yards. As with similar military expeditions 
under Macquarie’s governance, failing this use of force, Murphy’s orders were to take as 
many prisoners as possible. 20 
But it was not until the close of 1823 that settlers and their servants brought the scale 
of violence to government attention with any urgency. On 2 September the commandant at 
Bathurst Major James Morisset wrote to Brisbane informing him of an inquest into the 
murder of a servant of Mr. Lee at Clear Creek Station 15 kilometres from town. The evidence 
before the jury in this case, which included a statement from an Aboriginal man and evidence 
from an examination report left “no doubt that of the deed having been committed by four 
native blacks who have lately done much mischief”. “I think it my duty”, concluded 
Morisset, “to state to you that the circumstances of this man’s death appears to have excited 
in the minds of the settlers at Bathurst a strong hostile feeling against the Native Blacks.”21  
 Galvanising settler feelings as Morisset suggests, such incidents also played into the 
growing sense of vulnerability felt by lonely stockkeepers. This anxiety may have been 
ironically enhanced by the intimacy that existed between stockmen and the Wiradjuri. 
According to Rolls, “when a shepherd in a lonely hut was speared, if he saw the man who 
threw it, he knew him by name. And, when stockmen rode out to shoot Aborigines in 
retaliation, they counted the dead by name.”22 The principle of retaliation did not, however, 
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prevent calls for government protection. Writing to Brisbane on 26 November of the 
abandonment of the government station at Swallow Creek just outside Bathurst, 
superintendent of government stock John Maxwell warned “stockmen are so intimidated 
since the murder of two stockmen at [Samuel] Marsden’s Station last week that they dare not 
stop at their stations without protection.” Given the scarcity of such protection it was 
Maxwell’s serious “hope that immediate assistance will be given to enable me to maintain the 
Swallow Creek and take up the Malelong Stations.”23 Referring to the same incident, Judge 
Advocate John Wylde (also a settler in the Bathurst district) alerted Brisbane to the two 
stockmen who had “fallen victim to the furious present feelings of the natives.” On the behalf 
of Marsden and other fellow stockholders at King’s Plains, Wylde warned of the “very 
serious destruction of life [and] private property” if such hostile feelings and “unhappy 
differences” were not “immediately extinguished”.24 In one of what would become many 
suggestions aimed at achieving this aim Wylde wrote to Brisbane once again to canvass  
whether it would not be admissible to offer some such reward for the 
apprehension of the particular native…known by the name…of Saturday 
[Windradyne] as would induce some of the natives of a different tribe to seek the 
same, as the Instances have not been infrequent here of the natives very readily 
lending themselves to such a purpose against others not of their own immediate 
tribe.25 
As Peter Read remarks, Windradyne “towers over the events” which rocked the Bathurst 
community between 1823 and 1824. Perhaps following Wylde’s suggestion, in September 
1824 the Gazette published this government notice: “FIVE HUNDRED ACRES OF LAND 
                                                
23 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Maxwell to Brisbane, 26 November 1823, Reel 6065, pp. 315 – 317.   
24 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Wylde to Brisbane, 20 November 1823, Reel 6065, pp. 327 – 331.   
25 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Wylde to Brisbane, 1 December 1823, Reel 6065, pp. 335 – 336. 
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will be given to any Individual, who will apprehend or give over to any of the Civil 
Authorities, SATURDAY, a Black Native, and who is supposed to have been a principal 
Actor in the late Murders committed on the White People, at Bathurst.”26 
Swallow Creek station was not without servants long, as on 20 March 1824 two 
Wiradjuri men were killed and three detained by the military in the act of robbing the station. 
Correspondence between Morisset and Brisbane indicates that two of the men detained were 
sent to “His Majesty’s Gaol” in Sydney while one managed to escape.27 In a statement 
regarding the incident a government stockmen named Peter Ryan indicated that those either 
captured or killed were part of a much larger group of “about one hundred and fifty” who had 
dispersed his cattle, stripped him naked and chased him to a servants hut on the evening of 
Friday 19 March. Ryan’s fellow stockmen, Michael McKenna and John Anderson then 
managed to raise the alarm with the military by running to the Wylde’s nearby station.28 
According to a statement provided by two of the privates arriving at the scene at 2am the 
following day, John Softly and John Epstein, the two deaths occurred out of self-defence 
when they attempted to enter the besieged hut, and those that were not arrested managed to 
escape.29  
In another more urgent appeal to Brisbane, Wylde conveyed his concern regarding the 
welfare of his cattle after receiving reports from his overseer Andrew Dunn they had come 
under attack. The integrity of the colony’s economic prosperity was clearly at stake. He asked 
                                                
26 Sydney Gazette, 2 September 1824. 
27 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Morisset to Brisbane, 2 April 1824, Reel 6065, p. 29.  Part of the mythology that 
has come to surround Windradyne suggests that he was arrested during an attack on as station in 1823 and was 
released. It is possible he was in fact the prisoner who on this occasion who was not released but later escaped. 
See Peter Read, A Hundred Years War: The Wiradjuri People and the State (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1988), p. 8. 
28 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Patrick Ryan deposing before Major Morisset, 22 March 1824, Reel 6065, p. 31 – 
32.   
29 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, John Softly and John Epstein deposing before Major Morisset, 22 March 1824, 
Reel 6065. See also SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, John Anderson and Michael McKenna deposing before Major 
Morisset, 22 March 1824, Reel 6065.  
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“whether it is fitting, upon any principle of humanity, that large herds of stock in that district 
should remain exposed to savages of such a nature”. Suggesting his awareness of previous 
frontier polices, as with his earlier idea of outlawing key Aboriginal warriors, Wylde vaguely 
referred to information he had received asserting that military intervention was the only way 
to ensure that Aboriginal people would “abstain from acts of violence”.30 In making this 
suggestion Wylde went out of his way to emphasise that only the military’s “appearance” 
was requisite to his demands, allowing him to spuriously ground his claim for assistance on 
the principle of humanity. Dispossessing people of land held for millennia then enforcing it 
through might of arms was one thing, but destroying a cow brought by the invaders was 
another thing entirely.   
In June of the same year Wylde further put his case for military intervention arguing 
that efforts to do so by way of conciliation had proved insufficient.31 This followed reports he 
had received from Samuel Marsden, regarding more attacks on cattle at Kings Plains. Aware 
of claims that Wiradjuri aggression amounted to revenge or retaliation for offences against 
them, Wylde counterpointed with “the certain facts that the natives dress and eat the animal 
they have succeeded in killing.”32  
European animals obviously offered an easily attainable source of food for 
communities whose traditional sources of sustenance were becoming compromised due to 
changes in the local ecosystem, one beast potentially serving the needs of many. The 
certainty with which Wylde sought to establish the motives of the Wiradjuri was likely drawn 
from the information his overseer Andrew Dunn provided to an investigation conducted by 
                                                
30 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Wylde to Brisbane, 12 February 1824, Reel 6065. 
31 By this stage Wylde had resigned from his role as deputy judge advocate in relation to criticism of his various 
public capacities contained in a letter between Commissioner John Bigge and colonial secretary Henry Bathurst 
in 1822. Wylde remained in the colony until 1825. R.J. McKay, Wylde, Sir John, (1781 – 1859), 
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/wylde-sir-john-2822, accessed online 22 January 2015.  
32  SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Wylde to Brisbane, 22 June 1824, Reel 6065. 
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William Lawson as justice of the peace in October 1823. Specifying the details of attacks 
upon Wylde’s stock and that of George Palmer in September, Dunn and two other servants 
named Charles Booth and Henry Allsop provided evidence suggesting that such attacks were 
motivated by a desire for meat. Furthermore, Dunn supposed “that the Judge Advocate and 
Mr. George Palmer [would] suffer materially by the natives driving the cattle about, from a 
great loss of calves, and a most serious injury done on the stock.”33 
At a meeting on 16 July 1824 overseen by Attorney-General Saxe Bannister, this 
rationale gained another airing as Brisbane sought the advice of Bathurst magistrates, 
including Wylde and Lawson, as to measures to “repress those disturbances, which have 
lately occurred in the neighbourhood of Bathurst”. Among the submissions this gathering 
made to the governor was an understanding that rather than being justified by an 
“ascertainable” cause the purpose of the attacks made by the Wiradjuri was “to kill sheep and 
cattle for provision of meat supply.”34  
As indicated by the earliest attacks carried out by the Wiradjuri at the Swallow Creek 
and Clear Creek stations respectively, the violence with which they were carried out provides 
little to suggest that theft was the sole aim. Such opportunism would hardly be surprising 
given that their traditional hunting grounds had been so severely compromised by European 
occupation. As with earlier corn-raids at government farms at Toongabbie and settlements on 
the Hawkesbury River, such moments could provide the central contingency from which 
cycles of violence spiralled. And it was the willingness to desert a conciliatory approach such 
                                                
33 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Charles Booth, Henry Allsop and Andrew Dunn deposing before William 
Lawson, 9 October 1823, Reel 6065. Following this inquiry Dunn received the following instructions from 
Lawson: “You will proceed with four soldiers and a party of prisoners in pursuit of the hostile black natives and 
in the event of your falling in with Jingler’s tribe, you are not to fire upon them, only in case of actual necessity 
in self defence, but to secure as many of them as possible and to bring them before me to be dealt with 
according to law, and you are to be very particular not to offer any violence to the Native Women, or destroy 
them or their children.” SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, William Lawson’s instructions to Andrew Dunn, overseer 
to John Wylde, 12 October 1823, Reel 6065. 
34 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, William Lawson et.al. to Brisbane, 16 July 1824, Reel 6065. 
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as that proposed by Wylde that could exacerbate cultural misunderstandings. However, the 
categorical assertion that Aboriginal resistance was solely motivated the need to acquire food 
in the absence of any retaliatory drive, however it may have preoccupied settler’s concern 
with property, obscures the broader contingency around which conflict took place.35 Yet the 
gathering on 16 July considered the broader “unhappy cause” upon which the Wiradjuri 
mounted their depredations to be “unascertainable”.  
Other evidence suggests a far less nebulous catalyst for violence. In a concise 
explanation of the commencement of violence around Bathurst published in 1887, William 
Suttor, son of early Bathurst settler George Suttor, wrote that in 1824 
a foreigner named Antonio had cultivated a patch of land on the Macquarie, 
opposite the town of Bathurst. Among other things he grew some potatoes. One 
day, as a large number of the black tribe of the place came by, Antonio, moved by 
a spirit of good nature, gave some of his tubers to these people. Next day, they 
having appreciated the gift, appeared at the potato patch and commenced to help 
themselves. This was not to Antonio’s liking, who roused the people of the 
settlement in [sic] his behalf. They rushed down and attacked the blacks, some of 
whom were killed and others maimed. After this, the blacks commenced general 
depredations, killing solitary shepherds, destroying large numbers of sheep, and 
they actually got possession of seven stand of arms and ammunition. In the course 
                                                
35 As Henry Reynolds has shown in the broader spread of pastoralism across Australia throughout the nineteenth 
century, Aboriginal people were driven by subsistence as well as more strategic motives in targeting European 
livestock. This involved either employing methods that emulated pastoral methods of containing and “cutting-
out” sheep to attacks on properties and livestock with the sole aim of devastation, although Reynolds is less 
clear on what circumstances distinguished the development of either practice. See Henry Reynolds, The Other 
Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia (Sydney: UNSW Press, 
2006[1981]), pp 159 – 175.   
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of a short time, hostile contests having taken place, several aborigines, as well as 
Europeans were killed.36 
With added clarity, situating this event at Kelso, involving Windradyne and resulting in the 
death of three Wiradjuri, Peter Read likewise characterises it as a salient representation of the 
misunderstandings and overreactions which escalated violence between Europeans and the 
Wiradjuri. Arguing that events “came to a head” in May 1824 with the deaths of three white 
men and similar numbers of stock, Read provides clear evidence that these acts of violence 
owed significantly to provocation. 37 Far from being “counteracted” by the certain awareness 
that the Wiradjuri “dress and eat the animals they have succeeded in killing”, however 
inconvenient it may have been for settlers, revenge and retaliation were easily attainable 
explanations for the escalation of violence.  
As the details of May’s violent events contained in a large collection of depositions 
sworn before Bathurst commandant James Morisset towards the end of May indicate, the 
Wiradjuri were driven by much more than a need to acquire meat. Particularly suggestive of 
the ferocity of these attacks, taking place on the properties Samuel Terry, John Tindall and 
Richard Lewis respectively, are the remarks of surgeon Stephen Wilks. In his examination of 
Terry’s servants John Donnelly, Joseph Rose and David Brown, Wilks found “a spectacle 
from which nature revolts [their] eyes picked out from the orbits, and the soft parts from the 
orbits; the entrails, belly and all the flesh of the lower extremities devoured, the bones 
remained a shocking skeleton.” These injuries were partly attributable to scavenging birds 
and dogs, but Wilks quickly established “murderous violence” as the cause of each man’s 
                                                
36 William Suttor, Australian Stories Retold, and, Sketches of Country Life (Bathurst: Glyndwr Whalan, 1887), 
pp. 44 – 45. 
37 Read, A Hundred Years War, p. 9.  
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death. Wilks was in “no doubt” that the various skull fractures, chest and throat punctures on 
each victim “were made by the spears peculiar to the Black Natives”.38  
 Wilks reached a similar conclusion in his examination of Lewis’ servant Richard 
Taylor, deducing that a weapon “such as a tomahawk or an axe”, most likely a waddy, was 
“the sole cause of the death of the deceased.”39 Regarding the attack upon John Tindall’s 
‘Wattle Flat’ station, approximately 40 kilometres from Bathurst, Wilks wrote that “two of 
the corpses, [John Dowder and James Floid] presented a spectacle at which humanity 
shudders [being] so incinerated, that their form and their features were shockingly 
disfigured.” The third victim in this case, James Buckley, on the other hand escaped the fiery 
fate of his fellow servants who perished inside their hut only to be run down roughly 50 
metres away. Wearing “the marks of murderous violence”, Wilks surmised Buckley’s cause 
of death as resulting from “several distinct [head] wounds by some blunt cutting instruments, 
precisely such as those some of the well know weapons of the aboriginal natives might 
inflict.” 40 Other depositions suggest that the very “burnsticks” used to inflame the servants’ 
hut were then used to kill Buckley, “broken and besmeared with blood and hair” as they were 
when found near his body.41    
  This is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Wiradjuri were driven in their attacks 
upon settlers by far more than their need for sustenance. The ferocity with which they were 
conducted in particular suggests that Wiradjuri warriors were acting in retaliation to some 
                                                
38 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Acting surgeon Stephen Wilks deposing before Major Morisset, 31 May 1824, 
Reel 6065. 
39 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Acting surgeon Stephen Wilks deposing before Major Morisset, 27 May 1824, 
Reel 6065. 
40 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Acting surgeon Stephen Wilks deposing before Major Morisset, 29 May 1824, 
Reel 6065. 
41 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, John Softly and John Epstein deposing before Major Morisset, 22 May 1824, 
Reel 6065. See also SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Richard Lewis deposing before Major Morisset, 29 May 1824, 
Reel 6065 and SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, John Tindall deposing before Major Morisset, 29 May 1824, Reel 
6065.  
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form of provocation. In the case of the attacks upon Samuel Terry’s ‘Milla Murra’ station 
near Sofala, Read points out its position “on a bora-ground [burial ground] from which the 
Wiradjuri had been debarred” and speculates that poisoned bread had been laid in the area.42 
At once the scale of the servants’ injuries suggest a hope of making a distinct emotional 
impression upon the settler community. Just as much as the gibbeting of warriors from trees 
hoped to strike terror in the hearts of the Dharug, Aboriginal resistance equally had a 
performative aim in contesting colonial space.  
 But such tactics did little to slow the scale of frontier reprisal. May also saw a group 
of servants take matters into their own hands, killing at least three Wiradjuri women in 
reprisal for the spearing of one of their fellow servants at O’Connell plains. The five 
assailants, John Johnston, William Clark, John Nicholson, Henry Castles and John Crear 
were arraigned before the Supreme Court on the charge of manslaughter for one of these 
women, who Castles purportedly gave “a prick with his sword” after they fell in with a party 
of 30 Wiradjuri warriors. As John Connor has highlighted, Saxe Bannister revealed his 
humanitarian concerns in speculating whether the men were under attack at all given that 
their victim were women.43 Such reservations were evidently lost on the jury, which found 
the men not guilty.44 That vigilantism of this kind was becoming a reality is supported by 
Read, who cites the shooting of three Wiradjuri men and one boy near Milla-Murra .45 All of 
this is to suggest that in their attacks upon settlers the Wiradjuri were driven by far more than 
their need for sustenance. By the same token, for lonely stockmen and hutkeepers acting in 
turn was the most direct means of calming their own fears.  
                                                
42 Read, A Hundred Years War, p. 8. 
43 John Connor, ‘The Frontier War that Never Was’, pp. 21 – 22 (10 – 28)  
44 Sydney Gazette, 12 August 1824. 
45 Read, A Hundred Years War, p. 8. 
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Underlining the paradox of white victimhood, self-preservation was likewise the rationale 
which prompted Cox and other settlers at the beginning of June to rally their “feelings of 
horror and consternation” in calling upon Brisbane for official protection. Proclaiming 
martial law a week later in all settled districts to the west of Mount York, Brisbane gave 
drastic recognition to these anxieties, along with the fears of stock keepers. Reflecting the 
path which previous colonial administrators had taken in similar circumstances, the need for 
such summary justice was premised on long experience that “Bloodshed may be stopped by 
the Use of Arms against the Natives”. This was the best way to stop the “lawless Objects of 
Terror” which threatened “tranquility” across the Bathurst districts. 
Brisbane didnot make this decision alone. In illuminating Brisbane’s declaration as a 
moment in the expansion of British territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction over Aboriginal 
people of New South Wales, Lisa Ford emphasises the recently arrived attorney-general Saxe 
Bannister’ influence upon the governor. Whereas similar proclamations in the past had been 
tantamount to declarations of war against soverign enemies, Bannister problematised ongoing 
jurisdictional pluralism by convincing Brisbane that “British territorial soverienty in New 
South Wales required state retaliation against Aborigines to be grounded in an act of law.46 
Implicit in the declaration of 12 August was the argument that the powers possessed by local 
magistrates had been insufficient in the protection of settlers in their property. But, according 
to Ford, insofar as martial law asserted a more singular governmental jurisdiction over 
Aboriginal people as British subjects it did not reflect the broader consensus on this state of 
affairs throughout the colony nor the metropole but rather Bannister’s “particular bent”.47  
                                                
46 Ford, Settler Sovereignty, p. 173. 
47 Ford, Settler Sovereignty, p. 173. Ford traces the conception of “perfect settler sovereignty”, the development 
of more a controlled British jurisdcition over Aborignal people in New South Wales into the 1830s. 
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This “particular bent” went much further than influencing the situation at Bathurst. 
Bannister took his concern for the legal status of Aboriginal people all the way to the 
metropole, placing their mistreatment directly at the feet of the colonial office. Although his 
elevation of Aboriginal legal status was not to last, he thus sits squarely amongst those 
increasingly concerned with the violent consequences of colonisation. As Andrew 
Fitzmaurice points out Bannister “argued consistently against the dispossession of Indigenous 
people.”48 The tragic irony of this resolve was that ouside of making representations to the 
colonial office, as will shortly be discussed, Bannister’s humanitarianism ultimately placed 
Aboriginal people in as much danger as they had been at the hands of pastoral servants. 
Present at a meeting held at Government House on 16 July 1824 at which Brisbane sought 
advice from various Bathurst magistrates as to how to “most effectually repress” the 
Wiradjuri and bring them to a “a state of due Subjection”, Bannister was well aware of settler 
anxieties and the measures they proposed to quieten Aboriginal aggression.49 He must of 
suspected how these intentions would play out with the suspension of civil law.   
Whatever the legal language in which it was couched, Brisbane’s retaliatory measures 
once again demonstrated the pliability of colonial administrators to settler demands. Cox and 
his fellow memorialists were right to think that they needed “only to solicit to obtain” the 
protection of the government, an expectation built around the expression of their emotional 
suffering. By asserting the “indiscriminate” nature of the Wiradjuri’s attacks on stock 
stations, “putting some of the Keepers to cruel Deaths, wounding Others; and dispersing and 
plundering the Flocks and Herds”, Brisbane spoke directly to a settler community already 
gathering under the banner of white victimhood. Frontier violence was increasingly being 
                                                
48 Fitzmaurice, Andrew, ‘Anticolonialism in Western Political Thought: The Colonial Origins of the Concept of 
Genocide’, in A. Dirk Moses, eds., Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance 
in World History (New York: Bergan Books, 2008), p. 69.  
49 SR NSW: CSP, 1788-1825, Meeting of Bathurst magistrates at Government House, 16 July 1824, Reel 6065. 
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understood for its purely racial animus. Explaining this hostility by way of class was 
diminishing as a factor of the growing number of absentee landholders with a vested interest 
in the consolidation of Aboriginal dispossession. But as Bannister’s postion suggests, this did 
not mean a complete relaxation of concern for Aboriginal welfare.  
This ambivalence was once again reflected in the Sydney Gazette. First and foremost, its 
representation of suffering frontiersmen provided a forum to contemplate the best way to 
ensure the protection of whites against a savage enemy, amplifying the “clamour” for some 
form of military assistance against the Wiradjuri. In its opening reflections upon reports from 
Bathurst in 1824, the Gazette explained “that the natives have been very troublesome in that 
country” on account of their hunting grounds being so compromised, purporting the 
Wiradjuri as saying that they “must now have beef!” While open to the circumstances under 
which the Wiradjuri would kill cattle, the Gazette nonetheless professed the understanding 
that they would elide guilt on such occasions by affecting “a hole in the front of the skull with 
a spear, about the size of a musket-ball” so as to suggest that they had been killed by white 
men. Such observation of Wiradjuri cunning were accompanied with amazement at their 
physical strength, particularly well exhibited in the arrest of Windradyne which purportedly 
required the efforts of six men. With the declaration of martial law, the Gazette was hopeful 
that the “degree of traceableness” otherwise exhibited by some Wiradjuri “will no doubt 
become diffused throughout the various surrounding tribes, in the same proportion as that 
which now manifests itself around the settlements on the sea-shore.”50 
Hope “mingled” with fear, also guided a letter from ‘Philanthropus’ who was concerned 
that his query of 7 July 1810 had not “yet been satisfactorily answered.” Urged to once again 
draw attention to the sufferings of “our sable bretheren”, despite “this period of Missionary 
                                                
50 Sydney Gazette, 8 January 1824. 
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zeal”, ‘Philanthropus’ lamented that “no individual has been found sufficient…to accomplish 
the great work of evangelizing all the scattered tribes of New Holland.” Outlining the 
importance of this task, as well as the constitution of any likely candidate – their willingness 
to suffer for the sake of “our needy and helpless fellow-creatures” – ‘Philanthropus’ asked 
settlers to observe their own religious and emotional obligations: 
What heart now, endued with sympathy so as to “feel another's woe," will not 
piously reflect and seriously resolve – these poor, destitute, and  wretched 
Aborigines, are the people whose land I have taken, and whom I, with others, 
have deprived of natural subsistence; I will, therefore, no longer see these, my 
brethren, having need, and shut up my bowels of compassion from them; but 
henceforth, according to the land by me possessed, I will, every year, for their 
melioration and spiritual benefit, voluntarily give, not less than one farthing per 
acre?51 
More so than ever Philanthropus’ evangelical tracts suited the Gazette’s new religious and 
moral preoccupation under the editorship of Robert Howe, following the death of his father in 
May 1821.52 Despite the increasing inclusion of of such sentiment, however, the paper 
ultimately did little to unsettle the foundations of white victimhood.53  
 In reporting upon the attacks which occurred around Bathurst in May 1824, the 
Gazette drew upon a letter it received from the overseer at Samuel Terry’s property ‘Milla 
Mulla’. Along with detailing the outcome of these attacks, including the Wiradjuri’s seizure 
                                                
51 Sydney Gazette, 8 January 1824. 
52 J.V. Byrnes, Howe, George (1769–1821), Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
<http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/howe-george-1600/text2851>. 
53 By the end of 1824 the Gazette would find itself no longer beholden to official censorship, but for the duration 
of hostility in the vicinity of Bathurst this authority remained in place. As with previous eras of frontier conflict, 
the political and religious leanings of its editor notwithstanding, what appeared in the Gazette as the Wiradjuri 
mounted their resistance did so under the eye of colonial administrators. 
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of “7 stand of arms”, the letter writer purportedly warned that “unless timely succor is 
afforded, many more lives are likely to be sacrificed”. It was “presumptuous for anyone to 
deny” the government’s imminent suppression of such attacks, followed the report, anxious 
as it was “to afford and ensure all the protection and security in its power, so loudly called for 
as in the present instance.” With much the same eye to the suffering of frontiersmen it had 
applied across the Cumberland Plain and the Hawkesbury, the Gazette assured “the affrighted 
settler, and unprotected stockmen” of measures in train to relieve their anxiety. What was 
different in this case was its more balanced suggestion that no vigilantism take place in the 
absence of an official response. It condemned such activity, known to have already taken 
place resulting in the deaths of three Aboriginal women. Reminding its readers of its 
newfound evangelism, the paper decried, “Heaven will not readily absterge so foul a stain, 
how then is it to be expected that man should justify such blood-stained guilt?” Believing 
rather in the “wisdom and energy of the Executive Authority”, the paper looked ahead to the 
“no distant day” which would see the “civilisation and evangelisation of those present hostile 
myriads.”54 
Belying its longstanding proximity to said authority, such speculation under the 
auspices of newly found Christian hope also obscured the means by which such “wisdom and 
energy” had previously been exercised. Not so a Bathurst settler whose sentiment was printed 
in the Gazette on 5 August 1824 in an extract of a letter forwarded to the Gazette by a 
subscriber: “Dread of our arms seems the only access nature affords to their understandings; 
and by any other means it will not be possible to reconcile such jarring interests as theirs and 
ours.” More accurately depicting the course of previous official intervention on the frontier, 
                                                
54 Sydney Gazette, 10 June 1824. 
  
86 
for this settler the imperative of self-preservation was clear. Although wanton violence 
against Aboriginal people was to be detested he was:  
equally certain that the security dictated by the first law of our existence, as well 
as the retention of any out stations, makes absolutely necessary the infliction of a 
very summary and severe chastisement; such as will not only impress them with a 
terror of our power, but keep them in such fear as will drive them to a distance 
from the establishments of the whites.55 
According to such a rationale, settlers were only able to overcome their own fear by inspiring 
it in the hearts of their frontier counterparts. This marks a clear continuity of the emotional 
performativity of violence established in the context of earlier area of settlement. Expressing 
an awareness of official measures which had been taken earlier on the other side of the Blue 
Mountains, this particular settler in fact drew upon a broader principle, one that clearly 
prefigured the thrust of settler colonialism:  
The Government of the United States have experienced this evil to a great degree, 
even up to the present day; and after exhausting their ingenuity, both in measures 
of vengeance and mildness (and of late years they have not been accused of 
unnecessary acts of the former), have declared that it is impossible to give 
security to their back-wood settlements, but by terror; and it seems an axiom, 
confirmed by the history of all intrusions of civilized man upon his savage 
brethren, that they must give way and retire further back into their proper 
domains. I can easily conceive the reluctance which must be felt in the quarter 
from whence it must emanate, at giving instructions to drive these unfortunate 
beings from the country they have hitherto enjoyed; but, if it is meant that we 
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should occupy it, it is a necessity which, if not yet, must ultimately be had 
recourse to. The savages seem naturally brave, and instead of now dreading us, 
seem to hold us cheaper than ever, and appear also to be combining together and 
moving in larger numbers than formerly.56 
Broadening the understanding of “Aboriginal barbarity” across Anglophone frontiers, 
the Gazette claimed that the Wiradjuri “are not unacquainted with the horrible art of scalping, 
for the skins of those poor men were completely torn over the face, and the bodies otherwise 
exhibited a most frightful sight.”57 While the murders of stockmen and shepherds to which 
this claim referred were indeed horrific, as attested to in Wilkes’ examinations, there is little 
actual evidence to suggest that scalping took place around Bathurst at this time. Apparent 
artifice aside, there was much with which the Gazette agreed in the anonymous settler’s 
letter, indicating that it now saw the imperative lying before government with greater urgency 
than the previous month. The “wisdom and energy” of the government now seemed best 
concentrated on the path of self-preservation. Providing clear verification of the settler’s 
plight, mixed with a humanitarian’s conscience, the Gazette maintained the need for the 
preservation of life,  
even the life of the savage! But compassion, for those murderous tribes, must be 
in a very low ebb after such horrible assurances of hostility. Reason has scarcely 
yet shed one beam across their benighted minds, and till that faculty can be 
brought to operate upon the savage disposition, it cannot be expected that their 
hearts will be melted by the "law of kindness." On so important a question we 
abstain from venturing the publicity of our thoughts, human blood being at stake; 
but we do surmise, that there can be almost but one opinion upon the subject. We 
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are not to argue any longer, it would appear, who was primarily the aggressor; but 
here the point becomes concentrated. Are we (the Europeans) to kill them, in our 
own defense? Or, are they (the natives) to butcher us, with impunity?58 
Such a clear delineation of the government’s prerogative could only consolidate settler 
anxieties and bolster their calls for military assistance. At once the humanitarian sentiment 
embodied in Philanthropus’ letter seemed to have dissolved. In a letter published on 12 
August, Honestus, other than inflating the number of Wiradjuri warriors to “six or seven 
hundred”, underlined the pretentions of philanthropy:  
About 20 Englishmen have already fallen miserably before those pitiless savages; 
and, still a Philanthropist obtrudes himself upon the Public, recommending the 
"law of kindness." Would not the wisest of men say, "this also is vanity and 
vexation of spirit? He that spareth the rod  hateth his child." Every, true friend of 
the Aborigines must desire that they should be made to learn, by terror, those 
lessons which they have refused to acquire under a milder discipline. We are now 
to oppose strength to strength, that an end may be put to the effusion of human 
blood.59  
As the vigilantism of some stockmen at the end of May demonstrated, even before martial 
law had been declared such “discipline” was already being metered out.  
Other than suggesting an interest in Aboriginal legal status, what the declaration of 
martial law did achieve was a clear alignment of these subjective tendencies with the 
overarching aims of colonialism. Brisbane’s declaration is thus a stark demonstration of the 
“radicalisation process” Moses assigns to the realisation of settler colonialism’s 
                                                
58 Sydney Gazette, 5 August 1824.  
59 Sydney Gazette, 12 August 1824 
  
89 
“eliminationist logic”. For Wiradjuri historian Mary Coe, martial law amounted to nothing 
less than “conscious and deliberate” genocide. Arguing that it afforded settlers “the means to 
lawfully try to annihilate the rightful owners of the land”, Coe paints a harrowing picture of 
the Bathurst Plains: 
No mercy was extended to any [Wiradjuri] person who came within the range of 
the Redcoat’s guns. Pregnant women became special objects for torture and 
amusement. Rumour has it that white men would run them through with their 
swords, cut their breasts off and use them as purses to carry their money. Children 
were brutally slaughtered, usually hit or kicked in the head. Large groups of 
Koorie men were caught and supposedly taken into Bathurst to stand trial. The 
Koorie men never made it that far, the white men executed them and to justify 
their deaths, said they were killed trying to escape. The white men killed 
[Wiradjuri] people and hung their bodies from trees or on fence posts as a 
warning to others.60 
Describing an ambush at Billiwillinga whereby food was placed to attract large groups before 
they were killed en masse, Coe also adds a dimension to the otherwise diffuse myth of the 
Bells Falls gorge massacre. She argues that “redcoats” had managed to isolate a group of 
women and children from a handful of warriors before herding them off the gorge to their 
deaths. Another massacre at Clear Creek claimed 40 Wiradjuri lives. 61 Even before the 
period of martial law Coe reasserts the Gazette’s estimate of 60 to 70 Wiradjuri deaths after it 
downgraded the number back to as little as eight or nine. Offering insight to the extent of 
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settler vigilantism, she claims “squatters” often conducted raiding parties and laced dampers 
with arsenic intended for Wiradjuri consumption62.  
Despite the assertiveness of these claims, the overall death toll and scale of violence on 
the Bathurst frontier remains contentious.63 Connor cites at least one case during the period of 
martial law in which 16 Wiradjuri were killed by a group of servants led by Cox’s overseer 
near Mudgee, including a leader of the Wiradjuri resistance named ‘Blucher’.64 Various 
estimates place the overall settler death toll during hostilities between five and twenty.65 
There is otherwise some speculation regarding how many Wiradjuri fell to the official 
expedition led by Major Morisset comprising both mounted settlers and soldiers of the 40th 
regiment which scoured Wiradjuri territory from north of Mudgee to present day Lithgow in 
the east. The official parties reported no casualties indicating that they had only seen two 
Wiradjuri, an operational deficit that emphasised Morisset’s request for a mounted unit to be 
deployed on the frontier.66  
Siding with Keith Windschuttle, Connor also emphasises the weakness of evidence for 
the Bells Falls massacre, suggesting that belief in its occurrence has come to rely upon a 
mythology developed in line with the views of writers sympathetic to the Wiradjuri.67 In 
seeking to understand the collapse of the Wiradjuri, Connor prefers to highlight the 
confluence of alarm caused by known massacres, such as that conducted by Cox’s overseer, 
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and the overall disruption of their livelihood caused by Morisset’s expedition.68 But this need 
not relegate the validity of Coe’s assertions.  
As Bain Attwood has argued there is a need to allow a multiplicity of narratives to 
contend with one another in providing a more meaningful understanding of Australian history 
and Aboriginal peoples’ place within it, particularly oral history in instances of trauma.69 In 
any event there is clear evidence that settlers on the New South Wales frontier deployed 
tactics such as the ones Coe suggests. Her reference to swords being used against women also 
aligns directly with the Supreme Court case in which one assailant admitted to giving a 
Wiradjuri woman a “prick” as he passed on his horse. And as this thesis has already shown, 
the gibbeting of Aboriginal warriors was a deliberate strategy to intimidate Aboriginal 
communities across the out-settlements of Sydney, lending credence to her claim that 
Wiradjuri were hung from trees.  
There is little debate regarding the Wiradjuri’s eventual willingness to negotiate 
peace. 70 Coe is categorical that the sheer numbers and force before them made the Wiradjuri 
resistance impossible, a fact recognised by Windradyne when he ordered his people to retreat 
into the “back country” upon learning the substantial price that had been put on his head.71 
By October and November Groups of “peaceable” Wiradjuri had made their impression upon 
colonial administrators and the public.72 By 11 December Brisbane felt comfortable to 
proclaim that “the judicious and humane Measures pursued by the Magistrates assembled at 
Bathurst have restored Tranquillity without Bloodshed”.73 As with its inauguration in 1816, 
the annual “Meeting of the Natives” at the end of 1824 marked what the end of what Connor 
                                                
68 Connor, The Australian Frontier Wars, p. 61. 
69 Attwood, Telling the Truth About Aboriginal History, pp. 155 – 196. 
70 Connor, The Australian Frontier Wars, p. 61. 
71 Coe, Windradyne, p. 56; Sydney Gazette, 2 September 1824.  
72 Sydney Gazette, 21 October 1824; Sydney Gazette, 28 October 1824; Connor, ‘The Frontier War that Never 
Was’, p. 22.  
73 Sydney Gazette, 24 December 1824.   
  
92 
refers to as a “peace process”.74 According to the Gazette, the Wiradjuri had been “induced to 
break through all fear, and behold those wonders, with the mere relation of which they had 
been astonished”. 75 Also attended by Aboriginal people from Jervis Bay, Shoalhaven and the 
Hawkesbury, giving “peculiar interest” to this occasion was the presence of Windradyne 
wearing a straw hat adorned with the word “PEACE” alongside “a little branch representing 
the olive”.76 His countenance was otherwise marked by the trials he had most recently faced, 
having diminished significantly in size and grandeur from the “most manly” stature he had 
come to embody in the settler imaginary. “He is supposed to have suffered severely from 
unusual agitation,” wrote the Gazette, “in consequence of the efforts that were resorted to for 
his apprehension”.  
* 
Peace had of course not been as bloodlessly realised as Brisbane related to London in 
December 1824. The “coming in” of the Bathurst Wiradjuri can only be understood in the 
frame of what martial law allowed: the coordination of military action and settler initiative on 
a scale sufficient to send “a wave of terror through the Wiradjuri” and convince them of the 
necessity to negotiate peace.77 No more is this intent captured then in George Cox’s advice to 
a party sent in search of Wiradjuri believed to have stolen cattle: “Shoot them all and manure 
the ground with them.”78 Martial Law was but the third and final strategy Brisbane deployed 
to counteract violence in the Bathurst region having previously raised the Bathurst garrison to 
75 and requesting permission from Earl Bathurst to organise “A Troop of Colonial 
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Cavalry”.79 Martial law afforded Bathurst settlers and the military a level of legal protection 
on the frontier, but the advantage of mounted officers was not realised until settlement had 
expanded into the Hunter Valley in 1827. 
More fertile than the Bathurst Plains, the settlement of the Hunter Valley developed 
under a more contained implementation of the system of land tenure advocated in the Bigge 
report of 1822-23.80 This may have lessened the sense of remoteness and alienation that had 
affected the lonely hut-keepers on the Hawkesbury and Bathurst Plains, but it did not remedy 
the violent consequences of dispossession. Increasingly colonial administrators faced a 
familiar dilemma: how to impress peripheral contingencies upon the metropole, while at once 
paying heed to growing calls for a more humanitarian approach to colonisation. Brisbane’s 
request for mounted cavalry, which was made in June 1824, was initially rebuffed by Lord 
Bathurst on the grounds of expenditure. Bathurst was otherwise “unable to appreciate the 
urgency” for any reinforcements, particularly cavalry, given the situation at Bathurst without 
a detailed report from the commandant Major Morisset.81 It was not until June 1826 that 
Bathurst agreed to Brisbane’s subsequent request for the provisioning of forty mounted 
horseman, largely as a means of “checking the system of Bushranging” in New South 
Wales.82 This instruction, not officially acknowledged until February 1827 by Brisbane’s 
successor Governor Ralph Darling, also took into account Lieutenant Governor George 
Arthur’s requests for assistance with the same threat in Van Diemen’s Land.83  
The Colonial Office’s retrospective approval for such a unit aside there was 
something fait accompli about Brisbane’s request for its formation in November 1825, 
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“strongly impressed with its absolute necessity” as he was despite Bathurst’s initial 
reservations.84 One month later, acting governor William Stewart wrote to Bathurst with the 
information that the “Mounted Police” had been formed “for the express purpose of pursuing 
and capturing Bushrangers”.85 Yet by June 1826 the New South Wales Mounted Police unit 
was being deployed to combat both bushranging at Bathurst and Aboriginal resistance in the 
Hunter Valley where, under the command of Nathaniel Lowe of the 40th regiment, a party of 
soldiers was stationed at Wallis Plains.86  
Whatever trepidation Bathurst felt regarding the need for a mounted police force, and 
given such a force’s ostensible role in arresting bushranging, it is unsurprising that they were 
deployed against Aboriginal resistance. In a schism that demonstrated the deeper paradox of 
colonisation under the banner of “amity and kindness” since 1788, Governor Darling had to 
reconcile a role which emphasised a protective prerogative towards Aboriginal people as it at 
once advocated the use of force. In the same despatch which contained official instructions 
which stressed the need “to especially take care to protect” the “Native Inhabitants” of New 
South Wales, in view of recent events Bathurst wrote to Darling regarding his duty “to 
oppose force with force” and to treat Aboriginal “Aggressions…as if they proceeded from 
subjects of any accredited state.”87 Such was the aberration of Bannister’s “particular bent”. 
With Bathurst’s recommendation Darling could respond to the escalation of violence in the 
Hunter without entangling himself in martial law.88 The extension of British legal status was 
short-lived. So too the legal protections which came with the suspension of civil law for 
settlers and the military.  
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This deviation in administrative responsibility, however, did not alter the contingency 
of violence as settlers pushed further into the Hunter region. Following the establishment of a 
penal colony at the mouth of the Hunter River in 1804, by 1820 settlement at Wallis Plains 
and Paterson Plains (present day Maitland) corresponded largely with the government’s 
interest in acquiring cedar.89 Allan Wood notes that this small community of settlers also 
grew corn along with their obligation to supply cedar, once again setting the foundations for 
frontier tensions.90 From his interrogation of Bigge’s 1820 report, Wood mentions that four 
soldiers were located at each settlement “to protect the settlers against the blacks.”91 Prior to 
this, reflecting his reverence for the Wonnarua and Kamilaroi people of the Hunter region, 
Wood remarks that “the finest Australian Aborigines, the native people of the Upper Hunter 
Valley and their kindred on the great plains over the range, lived in their ancient ways 
without awe of any other men.”92 
But as with the British “acquisitive impulse”, which sparked settlement across 
Wiradjuri country, it was not long before the colonists sought to inspire awe among the 
Wonnarua and Kamilaroi. In opening up a passage from the Hawkesbury to the upper reaches 
of the Hunter River in 1819, John Howe described parts of the fertile country between the 
Wollombi River near present Singleton and the mouth of the Goulburn River as “the finest 
sheep land” he had seen since leaving England.93 Following the granting of land to settlers 
already established on the Hawkesbury, from the early 1820s settlement increased with many 
settlers both new and old to the colony petitioning Brisbane for land promised either by 
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Macquarie or Earl Bathurst if migrating from England.94 Further explorations into the upper 
Hunter by Henry Dangar, in combination with Brisbane’s growing enthusiasm for settlement 
in the region, led to widespread occupation from 1825, a year after the calming of relations at 
Bathurst.95 By 1826 much of the region was overstocked, forcing settlers to run their stock 
beyond the Limits of Location. In Eric Rolls reckoning, by settling their cattle near 
Yarramanbah Creek, discounting “the unknown cattle thieves always in advance of 
settlement”, Benjamin Singleton and Henry Baldwin became “Australia’s first squatters” 
following a subsequent government order which ruled them out of bounds.96  
 In the district of Merton, Lieutenant William Ogilvie and his family managed to 
establish friendship with the Wonnarua and Kamilaroi and become familiar with various 
cultural practices.97 But this was an exception rather than a rule. The breakdown in relations 
between the Wiradjuri and Dharug respectively with settlers was over crop raids and the 
killing of stock. In the Hunter it was settlers preventing the Wonnarua and Kamilaroi from 
accessing their land at all provided the salient impetus for attacks. The prospect of violence 
was thus more proximate than ever, the Wonnarua and Kamilaroi were responding more 
directly to the brute consequences of dispossession rather than in reprisal against settlers 
anxious to secure their property. The clearest case of this took place on the farm of James 
Grieg whose property was located near the Goulburn River.98 In their report at the end of 
October 1826 to Colonial Secretary Alexander McLeay which aimed to explain the genesis of 
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Kamilaroi hostility, magistrates Robert Scott and Alex Macleod in fact drew attention to the 
collusion of the Wiradjuri ‘Mudgee Blacks’ before listing “Mr. Greig’s known aversion to 
having the Natives about him” as exciting their “hatred”99  
This “aversion” places settlers such as Greig squarely within a New South Wales 
settler community wary of the threat posed by Aboriginal people, long bolstered by a 
sympathetic press. From the end of 1824, the now independent Gazette was contending with 
The Australian under the editorship of W.C. Wentworth, and Edward Smith Hall’s Monitor 
from May 1826, as influences upon the thoughts and feelings of settlers. In and of itself this 
diversification of public opinion is significant. But particularly regarding events in the 
Hunter, it allows for a broader analysis of the spectrum of colonial emotional life in early 
New South Wales. This pluralisation of the public sphere also had important consequences 
for how emotions coordinated relationships between the settler public and colonial 
administrators.    
As Connor has observed, when the coalition of Wiradjuri, Wonnarua and Kamilaroi 
warriors began to threaten farms in the upper Hunter in June 1826 the Australian was 
forthright in its response: “to strike these with terror, by the discriminating application of fire-
arms, which will ultimately prove a saving of human life, and leave the people in the quiet 
enjoyment of their farms.”100 Such rhetoric tapped a long-standing sentiment within the 
settler community. In the context of this particular geographical arena of violence, the 
Australian merely became the most likely newspaper to advocate terror and give voice to 
combative settler feelings. In the case of this particular article of 28 June 1826, the Australian 
drew its suspicion across recent conciliatory measures adopted by the colonial government:  
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It is related of them that they have acquired the notion that blankets, &c. have 
only been given to them by the Governor to ensure their good will and render 
them inoffensive, and that they have expressed their determination not to be 
bribed to preserve peace with the white people. If this be true, the remedy against 
them has been much mistaken, and acts of kindness entirely thrown away upon a 
race of beings who give very strong proofs that they can only be marshalled into 
obedience at point of the bayonet. It is vain to temporize with savages, who have 
only cunning enough to comprehend that their enemies—enemies only in their 
own imagination—desire to conciliate them, and who have no capacity to 
understand that it will promote their own welfare to live on friendly terms with 
their co-occupants of the territory. With such foes—if foes they can be called—
with such tribes, there is but one course to be adopted. If they be insensible to that 
mode of treatment, which humanity and not fear—as they may imagine—dictates, 
they must be taught to feel that force of which they seem ignorant.101 
 Prior to this the paper reported they had reason to suspect that the commencement of 
hostilities in the Hunter “did not originate in the misconduct of Overseers or Stockmen, but 
solely in the bad disposition of the Blacks” and recommended despatching the mounted 
police to “convince those sable depredators that they cannot attack the peaceable Settlers with 
impunity.”102 This was a sentiment reflected even earlier by its readership. In the wake of 
martial law in the vicinity of Bathurst, a settler from Windsor writing under the pseudonym 
ADÆLOS drew attention to the “negligent” attempts of “zealots” interested in the 
“deplorable state of the Aboriginal blacks”. ADÆLOS argued that a “truly erroneous opinion 
prevails amongst some individuals on the subject of [Aboriginal] innocence, who apply the 
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primary aggravation to have been by the whites”, and suggested a “system of amelioration” 
based upon enforced labour with the hope of preventing further “unhappy disputes” on the 
frontier.103        
 With Darling’s eventual decision to send the mounted police under Lieutenant Lowe 
to the Upper Hunter, Connor recognises the entry of a figure sharing the rationale of the 
Australian whose “campaign of terror” involved the execution of a prisoner named “Jackey 
Jackey”.104  Three other Aboriginal men purportedly trying to escape the custody of the 
mounted police were also shot under Lowe’s watch.105 In reporting “Jackey Jackey’s” death, 
the arrest of whom was made on the grounds of his involvement in the murder of a servant at 
the Dr. James Bowman’s station, the Australian registered its anxiety over “the particulars of 
this business”. But it assured its readers that in “open warfare, and at a time when the 
Aborigines are committing outrages which cannot be prevented, except by shooting, or in 
some way or other by taking the life of the depredators at the very instant, we should not let 
any squeamishness about the mode of disposing the assailants.”106 It later justified the 
shooting of the other three prisoners by affirming that the mounted police had “no means of 
securing the prisoners alive, they deemed it advisable to secure them dead; and so they fired 
upon them, and shot them, and shot them dead too.”107  
 The Gazette continued to offer its mixture of philanthropic pragmatism to the 
unfolding frontier drama. In light of the establishment of a Wesleyan mission at Wellington 
Valley, hopes were high for the “aboriginal tribes” to one day “feel as we feel, to live as we 
live” and make a contribution to settler society.108 And while broadly in favour of the 
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decision to send Lowe to the Hunter as means of bringing “Offenders to Justice”, the Gazette 
asserted that “no Man of common Reflection, who is acquainted with the Character of the 
Natives, would consider them, as a Body, deserving of Punishment.”109   
Providing another challenge to settler hearts and minds was Hall’s Monitor. From the 
start the Australian reflected Wentworth’s agitation for a free New South Wales press and 
endorsement of the interests of emancipists and the prospect of representative government.110 
Hall likewise espoused the virtue of representative assembly, but in drawing upon his 
Benevolent Society roots was more than anything concerned with the plight of the poor and 
the undue subjection of convicts to the law.111 Overall, they often diverged significantly in 
their sentiment towards Aboriginal people. At the beginning of June 1826 the Monitor 
received a letter from a “Correspondent” concerned with the “unfriendly state of the 
Aborigines” at Lake George in the County of Argyle, who took the view “that to effect a 
permanent friendship with the Aborigines of this colony, cold steel must be called into 
operation, and the nature of peace thus obtained, will be proportionate to the example made.” 
Calling this “experiential knowledge” this particular correspondent was obviously well aware 
of the previous measures administrators had taken to subdue Aboriginal resistance. Including 
this letter on account of its “intelligence”, the Monitor was unable to agree with the “very 
summary argument of cold steel”, which Hall “disliked extremely”. Savouring “too much of 
irresistible power”, the Monitor was more for 
moderation and magnanimity and forbearance, - in exact proportion as our power 
exceeds that of these poor blacks - a people, generally innocent, good-natured, 
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and simple - a people whose territory we have occupied without even taking the 
trouble to say to them "by your leave;" and who have personally helped us to 
explore the finest portions of their soil, being contented in return to call at our 
newly-made huts two or three times a year, and receiving with good-humoured 
smiles as the price of their choicest estates, a few gallons of boiled bran, omminy, 
and cabbage; an ounce of tobacco for the chief, and a little sugar for his Jinne.112 
Hall also pointed to the tendency of stockman to take “too great liberties” with 
Aboriginal women. Engendering the imaginative coherence of white victimhood, Hall’s 
correspondent was sorry to be counter-posed with such “imbecile refutable arguments” on 
account of their historical implausibility and their “most unfeeling spirit” towards suffering 
settlers:  
Among the number of merciful suggestions to ensure peace, the extreme of folly 
has been conspicuous, and the consequences of such mistaken lenity, has been 
experienced in the most barbarous and horrid sacrifice of many of our fellow 
subjects; on the contrary, where determined severity has been carried into action, 
the Aborigines have been finally less sufferers, though intimidated by it, and a 
series of security has thus been offered to the hapless stockmen, who, from the 
nature of their unfortunate circumstances…are compelled to await their doom, in 
the lonely sequestered country, whether their destiny depend on the fickleness of 
power or mere chance. The instances laid down in the chronology of the colony, 
the particulars of which can be recited by living witnesses of the most respectable 
authority, during the administration of governor King, down to that of governor 
Macquarie in 1810, succeeded by the awful yet recent consequences of 
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Aboriginal barbarity, in that of Sir Thomas Brisbane, all afford direct 
incontrovertible support to my argument. The land then you say is defiled with 
blood, yes! and with the blood of the innocent - of innocent fellow subjects, 
whose blood still calls from the earth for retributive justice.113 
“If our readers are convinced by such arguments as are used above”, Hall retorted, 
“they are soon convinced; and consequently, their opinion in our eyes, would be of very 
small importance on any subject.”114 As much as Hall so relegated the views of stockmen, he 
also made sure the paper addressed the broader point of legal equality. The lack of 
punishment for the known murderers of a hutkeeper near Lake George named Thomas 
Taylor, for instance, risked creating “a neighbourhood of whites thirsting for revenge, and 
withheld from assassinating every black that comes in their way, from the fear of the law.”115 
Conversely, 
At Upper Hunter's River…we hear of retaliation without mercy. But as the law 
does not authorise retaliation, it becomes nothing less in the eye of the law but 
murder. Yet the government remains dormant. The murderers of the whites of 
Argyle are not brought to trial. The murderers of the blacks at Hunter's River are 
not brought to trial.116 
This obscured the fact that Darling had indeed already recalled Lowe to inquire into the 
death of ‘Jacky Jacky’, a measure the Australian viewed as being “deplored by a great many, 
who considered that he kept the blacks in due awe, and thus protected the property of the 
settlers.”117 The merit of such protection was obvious with an estimated force of “Aboriginal 
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natives” around Newcastle “nearly one thousand strong”.118 Highlighting the need for the 
mounted police the Australian warned that such a concerted force “would be rather awkward 
customers to deal with.”119  
Given that frontier warfare had been reframed as an activity between separate 
“accredited states” which condoned the use of force, Darling was not so concerned that the 
Lieutenant had killed Aboriginal people. His case was rather couched in terms of what is 
today considered “war crime”, the fact that Lowe’s interpretation of force against force 
compelled him to shoot prisoners.120 As Darling wrote to Bathurst in October 1826,  
There can be no doubt of the criminality of the Natives, who have been concerned 
in the recent outrages; but, though prompt measures in dealing with such people 
may be the most efficacious, still it is impossible to subscribe to the massacre of 
prisoners in cold blood as a measure of justifiable policy.121 
This reservation makes it difficult to place Darling among the lineage of New South Wales 
who so clearly articulated terror as the means of arresting frontier violence, no matter how 
clearly he framed Aboriginal people as open enemies. It is also clear is that his pursuit of 
Lowe was on the wrong end of public opinion, a fact spelled out in the pages of the 
Australian.  
Wentworth and his co-publisher, Robert Wardell, were otherwise involved in this 
matter as Lowe’s counsel when the case of “Jacky Jacky’s” murder went to trial the 
following year. The central argument they devised in Lowe’s defence was that Aboriginal 
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people were ignorant of the British law, ere go no one could be found guilty of their 
murder.122 In addition to chief justice Forbe’s refutation of this argument on legal grounds, 
Connor notes that Lowe’s defence was factually incorrect given that four Aboriginal men had 
themselves been hanged for murder over the last two years. 123 In view of the evidence 
presented against Lowe, not contradicted by those in his defence, Forbe’s recommended a 
guilty verdict to the jury of military offices. Like Bannister before him, Forbes thus 
challenged the status quo of jurisdictional pluralism in the administration of law on the New 
South Wales frontier. As much as it resisted this challenge, the not guilty verdict eventually 
delivered revealed the overarching emotional sentiment of the settler community, channelled 
through the protectionist zeal of the military. The Australian proclaimed, “Loud and general 
applause accompanied this announcement of the verdict. The numerous friends of Lieutenant 
Lowe crowded round to congratulate him on the happy termination of the trial. A second 
burst of applause was given as he triumphantly left the Court.”124 
 The emotional commitment between those responsible for keeping Aboriginal people 
in a state of awe and its role in denying them the protection of the law is also explored by 
Penny Russell in her analysis of the contemporary prosecution of four cedar-cutters at Port 
Stephens for the murder of a Worrimi boy named Tommy. Adding nuance to Ford’s 
argument regarding jurisdictional pluralism, Russell asks that we look beyond historical 
insights which have viewed the denial of legal protection towards Aboriginal people as 
“embodying the paradoxes of British sovereignty”, and focus more on how the “formal 
administration of justice was everywhere entangled with the perplexities of a colonising 
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society.”125 Drawing attention to the “community-based and spatially defined” styling of 
emotion suggested by Benno Gammerl, Russell portrays the complexity of a penal settlement 
in which competing expressions of emotion and motivations for human action resulted in 
only one of the four men responsible for Tommy’s murder being hanged, and that for a 
different crime.126  
In Russell’s reading, contending with the notions of honour and self-preservation 
inherent to the act of violence itself was the myth of humane and “honourable” colonisation 
which motivated settlers such as Robert Dawson to bring the guilty sawyers to justice.127 
Being found guilty of the murder in the Supreme Court under the adjudication of chief justice 
Forbes, only two defendants, Thomas Stanley and Samuel Chipp, came to face the death 
penalty following a decision by the Executive Council.128 Rather than Stanley’s subsequent 
claim to innocence and allusion to the crime being committed out of honour, a need to 
inculcate fear among the Worrimi, it was such jurisdictional delays as the decision of the 
Executive Council which found the two men reprieved. The decision to hang the men at Port 
Stephens, “intended to lend a spectacular display of central authority”, instead became 
embroiled in more localised imperatives of maintaining legal parity on the frontier when 
Dawson set off in pursuit of a Worrimi offender alleged to have speared a shepherd, thus 
delaying the execution further. This delay, a factor of the expediency of attending to local 
interests of fairness, ironically enough coalesced with the same humanitarian impetus which 
drove Dawson’s prosecution in the first place. A sentiment supported by the Australian, by 
                                                
125 Penny Russell, ‘Death on a river: Honour and violence in an Australian penal colony, 1826 – 1827, in 
Carolyn Strange, Robert Cribb and Christopher E. Forth eds., Honour, Violence and Emotion in History 
(London: Bloomsbury, []), p. 108 (pp. 107 – 126.)   
126 Russell, ‘Death on a river’, pp. 108 – 109.  
127 Russell, ‘Death on a river’, pp. 115 – 117. 
128 Russell, ‘Death on a river’, p. 119.  
  
106 
April 1827 Forbes became convinced that justice could not be served given the lengthy time 
the two prisoners had faced the death penalty.129        
 Russell’s key point is to demonstrate the complex confluence of fear and honour in a 
penal settlement whereby morality was complicated by a “frankly brutal” environment. But it 
also draws close attention to how the need to address local contingencies gave credence to an 
“emotional community” which gave preference to white victimhood over that of Aboriginal 
people. A similar insight is offered by Lisa Ford, who frames the overwhelming support for 
Lowe’s acquittal as the settler community closing ranks against an “imperial hierarchy” 
endeavouring to apply a more holistic and territorially defined jurisdiction over Aboriginal 
people. In her words, the settler community was not defending “lawlessness but its own 
version of plural, imperial law.”130 This emphasis upon the legal solidarity of settlers on the 
grounds of self-interest against those of an imperial hierarchy holding to a humanitarian 
agenda meshes well with the growing dominance of an “emotional community” characterised 
by settler victimhood over any hopes for a humane colonial agenda explained throughout this 
thesis.  
Most conspicuous in the case of Lowe’s acquittal, the Australian’s discursive framing 
of an “emotional community” built upon settler victimhood and protectionism continued into 
1827. When details came to hand of settlers using poison in the Hunter region to combat the 
ever “troublesome” Wonnarua and Kamilaroi, the paper was hard-pushed to believe such 
reports. Yet while “deprecat[ing] the thought of using poison”, paper maintained the right of 
settlers to defend themselves if protection was otherwise not forthcoming: 
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If the government will not, or cannot give assistance to restrain them in their 
depredations, the settlers must keep themselves well armed, and open force 
applied in an open conflict, with whatever result it may be attended, cannot attach 
blame to those who defend themselves, their property, and their families. 
Humanising and conciliating the savage tribes sounds very well; but the isolated 
settler, with a rick of corn, finds that the only mode of conciliating, is to give 
away the whole of it. This is the only act of conciliation which finds its way to the 
breast of the savage.131 
The Australian also drew out the misguidedness of conciliation with respect to the 
comparative treatment of white prisoners at Newcastle, observing the “general distribution of 
blankets and slop clothing to the black natives of the neighbourhood, their comforts being of 
course considered paramount to those of the miserable shivering creatures shut up at night in 
barracks without a blanket to cover them”.132              
  However forcefully the Australian sustained such rhetoric it is difficult to reconcile 
its claims of Darling’s overbearing conciliatory program given that the use of the mounted 
police on the Hunter frontier only increased in Lowe’s absence, with reinforcements being 
sent from Sydney under Archibald Robertson camped at the station of James Glennie.133 
Following a series of botched arrests at the property of James Ogilvie at Merton in August 
1826, the destructive potential of the mounted police became all too apparent.  
The misidentification of two Aboriginal men, Tolou and Mirroul, as being involved in 
earlier attacks upon Grieg’s station led to their arrest despite pleas for their innocence from 
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Mary Ogilvie.134 After a second episode of mistaken identity, this time involving a man 
named ‘Jerry’, it was only the “most friendly terms” which existed between the Wonnarua 
and the Ogilvies which prevented any eruption of violence.135 Whether an act of retaliation or 
not, the Wonnarua did attack the farm of Robert Lethbridge, the proximity of which to 
Glennie’s station drew the quick attention of the mounted police.136 The Australian reported 
upon this series of events in late September with its patented alarmist language, claiming the 
cry “Kill white man” went up amongst the Wonnarua as they met the mounted police led by 
Robert Scott, the local justice of the peace.137 Connor attributes the two equally plausible 
Wonnarua death tolls of two and sixteen to the skirmish that followed. Neither figure is 
mentioned by the Australian but it did indicate that sixteen of the mounted party had muskets. 
The paper was hopeful that the loss of life would bring the Woonarua resistance to an end: 
“The blacks have had the glory of dying in battle, and that is enough, for men, whose wanton 
attacks have been far too numerous, and have gone far too long unpunished.” 138  
 A request for greater military protection from the Hunter on 2 September indicates 
that this action was neither successful in stopping the Woonarua nor quelling the anxieties of 
the settler community. In it eleven settlers, including the otherwise humanitarian Ogilvie, 
warned Darling that “in the event of our losing the protection of the troops, our property will 
be exposed to the revenge and depredations of these infuriated and savage people.”139 The 
urgency of this request reflected concern over Lowe’s withdrawal and asked for the 
suspension of the order for replacement troops to be sent to the Hunter. Given he had already 
taken measures to ensure the protection of Hunter settlers in despatching the mounted police 
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in the first, Darling’s response to this petition evinces a curious lack of empathy for the 
settlers’ fears. Reminding them of their number in the region relative to their frontier 
enemies, he wistfully declared that “Every one knows that, from the natives as a Body, at the 
utmost but few in Numbers, nothing is to be feared.”140 It was thus beholden upon the settlers 
to take their own measures against self-defence and establish an “ascendancy” on the frontier. 
Too much of a reliance on the military, Darling argued, would only lead the “Natives” to “no 
longer fear the Settlers” and “renew their depredations.”141 Nor was Darling willing to ignore 
the fact that the majority of the settlers he addressed were in fact absentee landholders, 
meaning “that not one of the Number was on the spot when the outrages alluded to took 
place.”142 The vicarious performance of emotion was likewise a factor in Bathurst two years 
earlier, but there is no indication that Brisbane questioned whether settlers were directly 
subject to the “outrages” of the Wiradjuri or not. 
The difference is of little overarching consequence. What this comparison of the 
Bathurst and Hunter frontiers ultimately affirms is the “logic of elimination” at the heart of 
settler colonialism and the intermittent roles of fear, suffering and terror in activating its 
“genocidal potential”. As Connor notes, however Darling responded to this particular call for 
assistance, the intensity of violence in the month of September eventually led him to send 
troop reinforcements to the Hunter. And while the Wonnarua and Kamilaroi maintained their 
resistance into 1827, perhaps adding a certain impetus to the trial of Nathaniel Lowe, the 
presence of more troops spelt the end of unrest.143 Either way, troops or no, Darling’s 
response to the anxious settlers is perhaps one of the more unsettling realities of the New 
South Wales frontier. As we have seen time and again, only fear begat fear. Given the 
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imperatives that drive any settler colonial agenda, this could mean only one thing for the 
Wonnarua and Kamilaroi as much as it had for the Wiradjuri. Despite the growing clutch of 
voices reminding settlers of whose land they were cultivating, New South Wales remained a 
community greatly unsettled by the fear of Aboriginal violence.  
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Chapter 3 ‘a wanton and savage spirit’: the Unsettled Districts of Van Diemen’s Land, 
1824 – 1831  
Unsettled feelings on the Bathurst and Hunter frontiers, and the corresponding 
difficulties they posed the New South Wales government, coincided with heightened frontier 
unrest in the “Settled Districts” of Van Diemen’s Land. Reading excerpts from Hobart papers 
in the Sydney press, New South Wales settlers could gain insight and relate to the plight of 
their Van Diemonien counterparts. As a report from the Colonial Times appearing in the 
Sydney Gazette read on 6 December 1826, “To be again compelled, after a interval of no 
more than one week, to record some of the atrocious acts of the Native Aboriginal Blacks, is 
truly painful to our feelings.” The Hobart paper’s lament starkly mirrored rhetoric from the 
New South Wales frontier of the preceding two decades, outlining the same contours of 
Aboriginal savagery, settler victimhood and the urgency of official protection.  
Observing reports of raids upon shepherds’ huts near Campbelltown orchestrated by 
Kickerterpoller, also known as ‘Black Tom’, an Oyster Bay man brought up within a white 
household, the paper asked whether these attacks were “not enough to steel any bosom 
against every feeling of humanity towards these black tribes? Is it not dreadful that our inland 
settlers should be thus exposed to the fury of this now savage people? and is it not 
astonishing that some steps are not taken for their protection?” It suggested “that a reward be 
offered for the apprehension of Black Tom; that he be immediately gibbetted on the very 
spot, which has been the scene of his atrocities; and then, perhaps, some little degree of terror 
may be struck to the hearts of his associates, which will deter them from a continuance of 
these horrid outrages.” Eager to protect settlers and ensure the prosperity of the colony, the 
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paper issued a vague concern for the Island’s Indigenous inhabitants, alluding to comparable 
frontier scenarios which “darken the history of the Cape of Good Hope.”1 
 It was through such reports that New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land settlers 
could co-imagine their frontier experience. The emotional and imaginative purchase of 
colonial newspapers allowed for a much deeper and broader expression of the horrors that 
could be inflicted by “Aboriginal savagery” then was proscribed by geographical, although 
adminstratively porous, boundaries. Alongside excerpts from Van Diemen’s Land papers, the 
Gazette also offered its own direct observations of events in the sister colony. In July 1818 it 
observed that the “natives of Van Diemen's Land are unquestionably the most perverse 
known anywhere.”2 “The Sister-Colony is in a state of war!”, the Gazette exclaimed, as 
emotions ran high in Van Diemen’s Land during the Spring of 1830: 
Emboldened by success, the Blacks have become a universal terror to the 
country; their prejudices against the Whites have ripened into deadly hate; and 
instead of those occasional annoyances of which the settler had formerly to 
complain, he is surrounded by savage hordes thirsting for his blood. War upon the 
English is now their sole business.3 
With copies of Sydney papers arriving regularly in Hobart, Van Diemen’s Land settlers could 
likewise gain insight to the emotional lives of settlers in New South Wales. On 7 October 
1826 the Hobart Town Gazette reported that it was “sorry to learn that the black natives in 
New South Wales have become more outrageous than ever. In the neighbourhood of Hunter's 
River, in particular, their attacks have been attended with disastrous effects, and several lives 
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of the settlers have fallen a sacrifice.”4  This flow of information provided ample measure for 
a degree of emotional reciprocity between the two colonies. It forged an “emotional 
community” not just along geographical lines but couched in terms of the threat Aboriginal 
violence posed to the white community more broadly. With this continuity we gain a glimpse 
of what became known as the ‘Black War’, which rocked Van Diemen’s Land between 1824 
and 1831. 
* 
 As Nicholas Clements writes, Van Diemen’s Land never experienced “a golden era of 
frontier relations”, with the Island’s Indigenous inhabitants consitently dealing “reluctantly 
and uneasily with the whites, if they dealt with them at all.”5 Suggesting a contrast with the 
idea of a “golden age” between settlers and the Eora, Clements’ observations of Van 
Diemen’s Land ultimately reflects the contingency of cross-cultural amicability during the 
early years of British settlement in New South Wales pointed. As will be discussed later in 
this chapter, the unfortunate events of Risdon Cove in 1804 have often been applied 
misleadingly to explain the intense racial animus which fuelled the Indigenous resistance to 
settlers in the 1820s. In the intervening years, despite being a relatively peaceful period in the 
colony’s history, as convict hunters spread throughout the Van Diemen’s Land interior in the 
hope of finding game they were frequently attacked by Aboriginal warriors.6  
A key argument developed by James Boyce in his landmark study of Van Diemen’s 
Land draws upon this prelude to the explosion of white settlement across the region which 
became known as the Settled Districts, ranging between Hobart and Launceston. Uncovering 
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the ingenuity of the island’s early “convict settlers”, obscured by the emergence of a settler 
elite in the 1820s, Boyce emphasises the “economic and cultural background, combined with 
the experience of servitude in a penal colony” which allowed convicts to adapt to their new 
isolated location.7 This adaptability to a new and challenging environment demands that 
convicts be seen as more than just victims of a repressive colonial regime, but rather as early 
colonial agents with a culture and enterprise all of their own.8 What Lyndall Ryan refers to as 
the existence of a “creole” society is arguably one of the key differences between the early 
European settlement of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land before the “pastoral 
invasion” of the 1820s.9 This difference owed greatly to the environmental conditions 
respective to each colony, New South Wales being notorious for the initial difficulties it 
posed early colonists in terms of subsistence, whereas Van Diemen’s Land geography and 
ecology allowed those with enough resourcefulness to adapt more easily.10 Central to this 
adaptation were so-called kangaroo dogs, utilised in the hunting of their eponymous prey to 
meet not only the immediate needs of their masters but also feed the entire colony.11    
As Boyce recognises in view of the drastic Indigenous demographic decline from 
1824, it was these same characteristics which made convict pioneers such a threat to 
Aboriginal people. Clements similarly remarks that the “hardening effects of squalor and 
violence” go hand in hand with understanding how “the colony’s demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics helped incubate the war” which raged in the late 1820s.12 With 
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less emphasis upon convict initiative, Clements draws close attention to the lack of agency 
they, along with soldiers, possessed in their new surrounds which drastically narrowed their 
interests towards Aboriginal people. Bereft of most rights, exposed to attack and sex-deprived 
as they were, this interest “rarely went beyond killing them, having sex with them or avoiding 
them.”13 Emphasising the scarcity of “acceptable” sexual outlets available to convicts as an 
explanation for the exploitation of Aboriginal is far too biologically deterministic. However, 
this does not necessarily lessen the insight of Clements’ designation of sexual violence, along 
with “the desire to evict the invaders, the desire to avenge a variety of insults, and the 
difficultly of hunting in hostile territory”, as one of the more “proximate causes” of 
Aboriginal aggression.14 Affording Aboriginal people with as much agency as depraved 
convicts, Clements also writes that “[m]uch of the war’s initial violence probably stemmed 
from broken or misunderstood prostitution agreements.”15 
It was this “suite” of causes combined with the “rising torrent of white men that swept 
the interior during the 1820s” which amounted to Aboriginal people responding to pastoral 
settlement much as they had in New South Wales.16 The sheer scale of this land grab was 
vast: 132,550 acres being granted between 1804 and 1822 compared to the 1,899,332 
between 1823 and 1831 when free land grants ended.17 As with New South Wales this 
extensive alienation of land can only be understood in the context of the economic and social 
revolution instigated by the Bigge report. As far as the emotional lives of settlers and their 
servants is concerned a further similarity between these two colonies is the extent to which 
fear became a common denominator. Not only in terms of the discursive potential of 
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newspaper rhetoric, which flowed between the two colonies, but in the way that settlers 
mobilised fear and victimhood in appeals for assistance to colonial administrators.  
Drawing upon the broader environmental framework of his thesis, Boyce accredits the 
“otherwise exaggerated settler fear that the Aborigines could ultimately triumph [with] dread 
of that defining feature of the Van Diemonian environment – fire”. “Given the vulnerability 
of crops and houses to almost instant combustion”, he writes, “the Aborigines’ fire sticks and 
war cries seemed to mock the property and pretensions of the invaders.” 18 Despite Boyce’s 
evidence of increasing incidences of arson in 1828-29, generating “hysteria among the 
settlers”, Clements argues that its potential during the Black War was never fully realised, but 
there was nonetheless a reasonable fear that it would be.19  
Being the first study of Van Diemen’s Land to take emotion as its central object, 
Clements is far less inclined to dismiss the fears settlers held towards their frontier enemy. 
Acknowledging the emphasis newspapers gave to settler fears as a means of drawing 
government assistance, in drawing upon the broader written record including private 
correspondence and diaries Clements provides a clear case for the legitimacy rather than the 
exaggeration of settler fears during periods of heightened frontier conflict.20 “Emotions like 
grief and rage”, he writes, “only affected some people, some of the time, whereas virtually 
everybody on the frontier was afraid, all the time.”21 In arguing for this ubiquity of fear, 
Clements affords Aboriginal people substantial emotional agency, a capacity to frighten 
settlers which he attributes to their “deadly guerrilla tactics and uncanny elusiveness”.22  
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This observation draws a further comparison between New South Wales and Van 
Diemen’s Land, otherwise supported by Clements’ breakdown of the specific fears individual 
settlers faced. Describing soldiers and convicts as  “the engines of colonisation”, agents of a 
process in which they nonetheless exercised very little choice outside of responding to the 
broader contingencies of British colonial movements, Clements draws a distinction between 
the experience of fear relative to social standing.23 “Initially motivated by the desire for sex 
and the thrill of killing,” he argues, colonial violence later drew its animus from “revenge and 
self-preservation.”24 Given their relative exposure to frontier violence, as with factors such as 
remoteness on the New South Wales frontier, self-preservation could mean starkly different 
things for settlers and their servants. As with the New South Wales frontier this could create a 
vicarious emotional relationship across social divides. In a telling statistic Clements notes 
that 87 per cent of all white casualties in the course of violence in the Settled Districts 
comprised rural labourers.25  
Beyond this sacrifice settlers were more than anything anxious about what harm they 
and their loved ones could suffer on top of the growing probability of damage and loss of 
property. A preoccupation with economic prosperity and the prospect of financial loss, in the 
face of the growing ascendancy of Aboriginal resistance tactics, were the most salient causes 
of settlers’ fear.26 And while some settlers expressed concern for Aboriginal welfare, more 
pragmatic concerns gained emotional leverage over time. Whatever direct economic toll the 
loss of property created translated into a more psychological and emotional burden as to what 
the ultimate result of such attacks might be. Yet, as Clements makes clear, fear for one’s own 
life and that of loved ones cannot go understated given that settlers did make up a proportion, 
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however small, of those exposed to violence.27 This direct exposure to violence only 
exacerbated an existential crisis settlers otherwise understood on more economic grounds. 
Time and time again, alarm grew into hysteria as violence intensified throughout the war.  
Many chose to assuage this anxiety “proactively”, which only tended to engender 
more Aboriginal aggression.28 Drawing on the diaries of Adam Amos, Boyce writes that by 
1824 “east-coast settlers were forcibly evicting Aborigines from the Oyster Bay district 
wherever they were seen, despite it being one of the most important regional food sources 
and seasonal gathering places.”29 Amos recorded that following the death of a stockman in 
June, his neighbour George Meredith distributed arms among his men, a clear sign of his 
willingness to kill Aborigines in the absence of more official protection. Such anecdotes 
place substantially more responsibility with settlers rather than their sexually depraved 
servants in explaining how the cycle of violence evolved in the Settled Districts. However, 
both explanations need to be considered. In highlighting the frequency of the ‘gin’ raid as an 
“established tactic” throughout the Black War, whereby frontiersmen ambushed Aboriginal 
camps to acquire women for sex, Clements also points out that many settlers encouraged 
vigilantism among their servants, if they were not directly involved themselves.30 
That settlers in time appealed to Arthur for military assistance, much as had long been 
the case in New South Wales, reveals the futility of their vigilantism. Charles Rowcroft, a 
prominent settler from Norwood wrote to Arthur in June 1824 of “Natives infesting” the 
district of the Clyde River under the leadership of Musquito, the man exiled from Sydney by 
Macquarie many years earlier. Reluctant to ask for help as he was, Rowcroft warned that 
“unless some forceful steps are taken by Government for the purpose of apprehending the 
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leaders of this marauding party of natives, and of conciliating their followers, this winter will 
add still more instances to the melancholy consequences of their depredations and murders.” 
As things stood the military presence across the whole island was “totally inadequate”.31  
It would initially take more than expressions of “melancholy” to shake Arthur from 
his hope of progressing a more conciliatory frontier policy. On 24 June 1824 he issued a 
proclamation prompted by the information that “several Settlers and others are in the Habits 
of maliciously and wantonly firing at, injuring, and destroying the defenceless NATIVES and 
ABORIGINES of this Island.” Observing the command issued by both the British 
government and Brisbane as Governor-in-Chief “that the Natives of this Colony and its 
Dependencies shall be considered as under British Government Protection”, Arthur saw his 
duty “to support and encourage all Measures which may tend to conciliate and civilize the 
Natives of this Island; and to forbid and prevent, and when perpetrated to punish, any Ill-
treatment towards them.” While this order was also extended to Aboriginal people, indicating 
an awareness of who was ultimately responsible for escalating violence, Arthur largely 
targeted the behaviour of convict servants: 
All Magistrates and Peace Officers, and others His Majesty's Subjects in this 
Colony are to observe and enforce the Provisions of this proclamation, and to 
make them known more especially to Stock-keepers in their several Districts, 
enjoining them not only to avoid all Aggression but to exercise utmost 
Forbearance towards the Aborigines, treating them on all Occasions with the 
utmost Kindness and Compassion.32  
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Roughly coinciding with the declaration of martial law in Bathurst, this proclamation 
likewise demonstrates a departure from jurisdictional pluralism. It was a measure seeking to 
ameliorate any legal discrepancies between local magistrates while at once asserting legal 
equality between settlers and Aboriginal people. Yet, no settler was ever prosecuted for 
killing an Aboriginal person in Van Diemen’s Land.33  “In spite of their stern rhetoric”, 
Clements writes, “the colonial authorities were loath to indict anyone for killing blacks for 
fear of inciting public outrage.” On top of this public pressure was the fact that the frontier 
was poorly policed; evidence could be easily concealed even if a charge was brought against 
a colonist. And as Clements remarks, the sociocultural forces that governed general 
behaviour were severely diluted in the colony: 
Even settlers, while they sought to establish a good standing in the colony, 
experienced dislocation from the family and community networks that had once 
patrolled the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. Isolated as they were at the 
edge of settlement that was itself at the edge of the known world, colonists 
experienced few barriers to killing blacks beyond the difficulty of surprising 
them.34  
However such cultural disorientation clashed with Arthur’s “Kindness and 
Compassion” mattered little as settlers became increasingly forceful in their calls for 
protection. As Bronwyn Desailly writes, Arthur was far from “immune to the peaks of 
hysteria that prevailed in the colony periodically”.35 As with a succession of New South 
Wales governors before him Arthur quickly found himself confined to the task of protecting 
settlers and securing the economic interests of the colony, a shift made all the easier by the 
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more relaxed instructions Darling received from London regarding Aboriginal legal status in 
1826. But this shift in priorities must also take into account the more immediate contingency 
of settler grievance, a sense of victimhood given as much thrust by the Van Diemen’s Land 
press as it had been in New South Wales. Local newspapers certainly provided an 
imaginative bridge to the mainland when it came to the horrors of the frontier, but as the 
Black War lengthened Hobart pressman articulated their narrative of white victimhood most 
clearly with respect to the population of the Settled Districts. 
In 1819, well before Arthur’s arrival in the colony, the Hobart Town Gazette and 
Southern Reporter, under the proprietorship of government printer Andrew Bent, in fact 
condemned the ‘outrages’ committed against the island’s ‘Native Tribes’ as “repugnant to 
Humanity and disgraceful to the British Character”. The paper also condemned the lack of 
effort to “to conciliate the Native People, or to make them sensible that Peace and 
Forbearance are the Objects desired.”36 Arthur’s language of “Kindness and Compassion” 
would have therefore come as a welcome approach to some. As Clements observes, with 
hostilities increasing by the mid-1820s, this meant “a growing tension between pragmatic 
frontiersmen and humanitarian townsfolk”, with the government, the urban middle-class and 
certain pressmen maintaining the hope of some form of peaceful coexistence.37 Such 
optimism was couched in terms which tacitly recognised the injustices of colonisation and 
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sort to excuse the actions of Aboriginal people on the grounds of their natural racial 
inferiority and ‘childishness’.38  
Maintaining its reservations regarding “British Character”, by the inception of the 
Black War, the tone of Bent’s was also beginning to resonate with frontier anxieties. In 
August 1824 it reported an attack by 200 warriors on a cattle farm at Eastern Marshes from 
information received by two stockmen who managed to escape. Registering the alarm caused 
by the attack the paper wrote that “[t]he men are still in town, and such is the fear they 
entertain, that nothing can persuade them to return to their abandoned occupation.” An 
indication of the fear that was brewing in the Settled Districts, on this occasion the paper 
reserved any rhetorical flushes to condemn “stock-keepers and others” whose long 
“unprovoked aggressions” were the reason for the “mischievious dispostion” of  the 
“Natives”: “The many recent unfortunate deaths of stockmen afford the sad example of the 
imprudence of molesting the Natives, who have always been considered the most harmless 
race of people in the world; and have consequently never been known to show their revenge 
until within these last few months.” Far from attributing any inititaive for violence to the 
Island’s native inhabitants, the paper also vaguely alluded to the nefarious influence of 
“Musquito and other blacks”.39 At this particular stage of the war, writes Boyce,  
[i]t was convenient for the settlers to blame Mosquito for the increase in 
hostilities. Not only did the explanation deflect concerns about the consequences 
of the free settlers’ land grab, but, as a New South Wales Aborigine who had 
spent much time with the British, his actions could be characterised as those of an 
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individual criminal – a far less threatening prospect then an uprising by the 
Indigenous people.40  
Such convenience, however, lost its explanatory power with the escalation of violence 
following Mosquito’s death.41  
 In April 1825, renewing its early conciliatory tone and approving of Arthur’s 
measures to ensure Aboriginal protection, the Hobart Town Gazette warned:  
However verging on brutality, or destitute of energies to render them respectable, 
the sable natives of Van Diemen's Land may be absurdly considered by those 
who do not know the real impress on their character, and the ruling passion which 
they lack but ability to exhibit; we boldly venture without fear of encountering a 
refutation to describe them as comprising a very superior mental grade and as 
calculated, to prove either an eminent blessing or a fatal scourge to their fair 
complexioned fellow-creatures.42    
Whether the “wild and gothic minded savage” became an “eminent blessing” or “fatal 
scourge” would be decided not by their own conduct but that of settlers. “If instead of 
conciliation, aggressive measures be adopted”, settlers could only expect “death and ruin 
throughout every district in the colony.”43  
 Any idea that the white community had anything to gain by adopting a conciliatory 
stance, however, very quickly lost appeal as frontier violence grew in intensity. A more and 
more febrile press provided not only a means for settlers to imagine one another’s suffering 
but also gave a public voice to such expressions of emotion, adding pressure to a government 
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whose apparent inaction did little to alleviate frustration settlers felt at not being able to 
adequately defend themselves.44 The prospect of abandoning the colony was even entertained 
by the editor of the Hobart Town Courier James Ross in November 1830. 45 However such 
an idea may have appealed to Ross’ readers at the time, his own personal reflections suggest 
a far more amicable cross-cultural engagement. In 1836 he would write glowingly of the 
otherwise “most savage blacks” he encountered near his property on the Shannon River. 
“They never once committed the smallest trespass or annoyance on my farm”, he wrote 
assuredly, “while the most dreadful outrages were committed by them all round, they never 
once attacked my farm nor any one belonging to it.”46 Confounding a growing public 
consensus Ross described a people in whom he “not only found no want of sense or 
judgment…but on the contrary much to admire in them as thinking men – as endued not only 
with much ingenuity and penetration, but with the tenderest sympathies of the heart, and all 
the nobler passions that elevate man in the scale of being.”47 
 But such reflections were unknown to Ross’ readers in 1830, for whom the prospect 
of abandoning the colony could be easily entertained with the increasing intensity of 
Aboriginal resistance from the mid-1820s.48 As Clements points out, “some of the attacks 
that colonists lived through were truly terrifying”, and if they didn’t experience such violence 
directly they could rely upon “a vibrant network of formal and informal communications 
channels” from private correspondence to word of mouth and the press.49 The psychological 
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and imaginative power of stories could be “unnerving in the extreme”, everyday horrors 
which newspapers could consolidate  “with the violence and gore exaggerated by rumour.” 50  
Just as such stories were gaining traction, settler anxieties were in fact focussed more 
around bushranging. Incidentally, Ross was far more discouraged by the losses he suffered 
from this menace than any Aboriginal threat, a circumstance which led to him becoming one 
of the more prominent pressmen in Hobart.51 From June 1825, following Bent’s falling out 
with the government, he was appointed government printer alongside George Howe with 
whom he published a new Hobart Town Gazette.52 In September Ross and Howe drew a clear 
relationship between the unsettled feelings caused by bushranging and the ardour with which 
settlers met this challenge: “The dreadful and unspeakable enormities committed by the 
bushrangers have affected every one throughout the Island with abhorrence, but not dismay. 
A rallying spirit is stirred up in the community, which throws in oblivion all little petty 
animosities.”53 Such rhetoric encouraged a level of practical and emotional coherence among 
settlers towards a common threat to life and prosperity, just as Aborigines were looming as 
the same. With clear relief the paper proclaimed 26 March 1826 “a memorable day in the 
annals of bushranging in this Colony”, as it marked the date that several key bushrangers 
were brought in to Hobart from the district of New Norfolk.54  
But this relief would be shortlived.“In contrast to the Bushrangers before them”, 
writes Clements, “the blacks took on an aura of dread all their own. As the reports grew more 
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horrifying, colonists evolved a new way of conceptualising the once ‘pitiable savage’.”55 The 
“guerrilla tactics” and “elusiveness” of the Aborigines combined to evoke a much greater 
sense of self-preservation and fear among settlers than bushrangers ever could.56 With stark 
similarity to the language used to ‘concpetualise’ Aborigines in New South Wales, Clements 
describes how  
the natives’ sudden and brutal attacks, combined with their ability to ‘vanish like 
spectres’, had generated an image of them as magical, even demonic. To 
colonists, the blacks were a mysterious race that seemed to lurk almost ghost-like 
in the wilderness. Their intimidating ‘war paint’ and chilling ‘war-whoop’ only 
added to the effect.57 
This aptly put “mystique”, similar in conception to Silver’s “anti-Indian sublime” in pre-
revolutionary Pennsylvania, is central to understanding how newspapers provided the 
imaginative currency through which the already fraught emotional lives of individual Van 
Diemen’s Land settlers came to commune around fear of Aboriginal violence. A 
demonstration of this thematic appeared in the Launceston Advertiser when it described how 
Aborigines “daily exhibit such demonic delight in the successful accomplishment of their 
diabolical purposes, and develop such a skill and watchfulness in following up their purposes, 
that most…fill the breasts of all the out-settlers and stock-keepers with fear and dread”. 58  
On 12 May 1826, Bent’s new paper the Colonial Times reported the murder of a 
settler named Browning in the Macquarie district after his property was attacked by a group 
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of 30 warriors. “After neatly severing Mr. B.'s head from the body with a tomahawk,” it 
gruesomely related, “they most barbarously cut the servant man in various parts of the head, 
with a similar instrument.” Indicating the familarity that could exist between settlers, their 
servants, and Aboriginal groups, this particular report noted that the “poor old servant man, 
who, we are happy to state, is likely to recover, says, that he could recognise several of those 
who were present.” On the behalf of settlers, the paper was pleased to note that the military 
had “been since in pursuit of them.59  
 This use of the military notwithstanding, in the Hobart Town Gazette Ross and Howe 
wrote in a far more moderate tone that 
[w]ere it not that we are aware that the hands of Government are fully occupied 
with numerous and important matters, we should press, with more than ordinary 
force the necessity of speedily organising to its full extent the Field Police, and 
military stations which are to be estabished throughout the Colony. Besides 
bushranging and sheep-stealing, which would be prevented by this measure, the 
depredations of the natives would also be checked.60 
Other than functioning as imaginative engines in their representations of Aboriginal violence, 
the importance of newspapers in consolidating a sense of settler victimhood was therefore the 
influence they could exert upon colonial administrators. As 1826 drew to a close a spate of 
violent episodes found the same paper expressing its “pain” in learning   
that a skirmish has taken place between a numerous tribe of the black native and 
some stock-keepers on the other side of the Island, in which many of the former 
were severely wounded, if not slain. They had made…an outrageous attack on the 
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cattle and persons of the stockmen, and provoked them to fire in self-defence. We 
grievously lament these occurrences, and hope they may speedily be put a stop 
to.61  
Once again trying to balance its sympathy for both settlers and Aborigines, the paper reported 
that it was “sorry to learn that a black native, half civilized, who had been some time at the 
settlement at Macquarie Harbour has joined a tribe of about 100 of his countrymen, and leads 
them to commit various and atrocious acts of aggression on the sequestered huts in the 
neighbourhood of the Shannon and the Lakes.” Maintaining their belief that the Island’s 
Aborigines were “harmless” unless encourarged to be otherwise, Ross and Howe evinced 
some hope in the parties that had been sent out to bring in this “corrupting” character.62    
 But it was the Colonial Times during that time which contributed most to the 
Aboriginal “mystique”. And perhaps owing in part to Bent’s earlier difficulties with the 
Government, and in a reversal to his previous sympathies, the paper was far more forceful in 
calling for something to be done about their “evil” behaviour. In the same article of 17 
November 1826 which appeared in the Sydney Gazette at the beginning of this chapter, 
reporting the “Dreadful Murders” so “painful to our feelings”, the Colonial Times wrote with 
equal alarm that “SEVEN MORE PERSONS HAVE BEEN INHUMANELY 
MURDERED!!!”. If the emphasis of this headline was insuffucent, the paper proclaimed “If 
some effectual measures are not instantly resorted to, by the Government, the consequences 
must be seriously alarming.”63 The following week Bent had to write that this report had been 
based upon “misinformation”, suggesting the power of rumour at the time in and of itself, but 
was “sorry to be compelled to lay before the Public, a statement of a most horrid and 
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treacherous occurrence, which has since taken place.” At least one sawyer working at a mill 
in the Cockatto Valley had been killed, and several others injured. It was becoming evident 
that something needed to be done to arrest the growing unrest, lest “we shall have our inland 
Settlers, particularly those at the Shannon, or such remote districts, sharing the same fate with 
the unfortunate inhabitants of the back-woods of America.” Evidence once again of the 
shared trope of white victimhood in regions of Angolphone settlement, Bent promised in the 
forthcoming issue his thoughts on the best appraoch “to remedy this serious, alarming, and 
rapidly increasing evil”, knowing as he did that the issue was being considered by Arthur and 
the Executive Council.64 
 In a stark demonstration of the relationship between the press and settler emotions, 
Bent went about this task with the understanding that it was beholden upon a “journal” on 
certain occassions “to express the general sentiments and wishes of the people, and in some 
instances, to regulate and lead them”, whatever the “painful results” maybe. It was this 
“feeling” with which the paper turned its attention “to the present situation of those poor, 
wretched, but infatuated savages, the Aborigines of this Island” and the dangers they posed to 
settlers. It was becoming all too clear that “the natives are no longer afraid of a white man — 
that they know, once a gun is fired off, it is useless.” Inefficeniencies in technology aside, it 
was just as clear that the cross cultural encounter “has produced only hatred, and revenge, 
and nothing, but a removal, can protect us from incursions, similar to the Caffrees in Africa, 
or the back-woodmen, in North America.”  
Deploring the physical and economic dangers that settlers found themselves after 
emerging from similar threats posed by bushrangers, in a complete reversal of his earlier 
views Bent sought to make  “no pompous display of Philanthropy” in declaring that “SELF 
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DEFENCE IS THE FIRST LAW OF NATURE. THE GOVERNMENT MUST REMOVE 
THE NATIVES — IF NOT, THEY WILL BE HUNTED DOWN LIKE WILD BEASTS, 
AND DESTROYED!”. Proposing at once the “security” of the settlers and the “protection” 
of the Aborigines, Bent suggested the latter be removed to King Island in Bass Strait. There 
they would be “compelled to grow potatoes, wheat, &c. catch seals and fish, and by 
degrees…lose their roving disposition, and acquire some slight habits of industry, which is 
the first step of civilization”.65 Arthur was becoming aware of settler frustration with the 
frontier situation by more direct means, but the langauge of the press added a certain urgency 
for him to act.  
In fact leaving the Colonial Secretary’s office several days before Bent’s exhortation, 
on 2 December the Hobart Town Gazette published a proclamation in which Arthur 
expressed the “greatest pain” he felt from the Aborignes’ “wanton Barbarity in which they 
have indulged by the commission of Murder, in return for the kindness, in numerous 
instances shewn to them by the Settlers and their Servants .”66 Evincing his sympathy for 
suffering settlers to Lord Bathurst, Arthur acknowledge that “the fears of the settlers have 
been much, and certainly justly excited by the late unusual hostile proceedings of the natives, 
who have committed several murders.”67 Suggesting a sense of settler benevolance which he 
lacked earlier,  Arthur otherwise knew all too well the cause of Aboriginal violence. 
Convinced that “these Savages are stimulated to acts of Atrocity by one or more Leaders 
who, from their previous Intercourse with Europeans, may have acquired sufficient 
Intelligence to draw them into Crime and Danger”, Arthur was also aware that his aim of 
instilling a sense of “forbearance” among settlers and their servants towards the Aborigines 
was failing. It was only with “extreme regret” that he began to direct his frontier policies 
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away from conciliation, ultimately in the hope of capturing those he understood to be 
instigating Aboriginal resistance.  
 The proclamation consisted in six recommendations, each order essentially 
legitimating the use of force against Aboriginal people who either appeared “Determined” to 
committ violence against the “White Inhabitants” or were known to have already committed 
a felony. Arthur placed particular emphasis upon the issuing of warrants for the apprehension 
of particular “Principals” known to have instigated violence and other offences such as theft. 
But the overall signficance of the proclamation is its framing of Aborigines as “open 
Enemies”. This permitted civilians to use open force far more than was the case on the 
Hunter: “[w]hen a Felony has been committed, any Person who witnessed it may 
immediately raise his Neighbours and pursue the Felons, and the Pursuers may justify the 
Use of all such Means as a Constable might use.”68 Implicit in this language is an obvious 
hope to bring about a quick surrender.  
 The response from the press to this proclamation was divided. The Hobart Town 
Gazette declared the government’s sentiments “highly satisfactory”, reminding settlers as it 
did so of their duty and privilege to government protection and self-preservation that the 
“common law of nature” conferred upon them. Tempering the appeal of Arthur’s 
proclamation to the rising tide of public ardour to confront Aboriginal aggression, Howe and 
Ross exhorted that “no one be led away by a needless cry or feeling of alarm for his personal 
safety to commit an irremediable act, which on future and calm reflection he could not justify 
to himself. Common prudence and caution will preserve any man from danger, which at the 
very worst is temporary.” The paper also reiterated Arthur’s earlier belief that the current 
level of aggravation among certain Aboriginal tribes owed to the influence of their “half-
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civilised” leader Kickerterpoller. But the paper was adamant that should such “inflamed and 
vindcitve feelings” persist for another year than it was beholden upon magistrates “to call in 
every civil and military aid within his reach to apprehend them.” Echoing the Colonial 
Times’ call for the relocation of the Island’s native inhabitants, Howe and Ross wrote of the 
natural virtue of King Island as an Aboriginal refuge abounding “with every sort of animal 
and natural production on which these people usually subsist”. This refuge was the best way 
that “the personal safely of the blacks would be secured, their chance of civilization 
established the seeds of religion sown and cherished.”69  
 The Colonial Times was much more critical of Arthur’s measures. Noting that 
government communications “should be expressed in the clearest manner so that they, may 
be at once understood by the meanest subject”, instead of being informed as to what measures 
to take in their own protection settlers had been issued a government order “without sense or 
meaning”,  “a mass of contradiction and confusion”. Taking each order upon its merits, 
Bents’ central concern was that settlers may expose themselves to criminal prosecution for 
actions which they otherwise thought justifed. This reaction speaks to the broader lack of 
clarity Clements identifies as to the “legality of killing blacks” compounded by bewilderment 
at the number of Arthur’s proclamations.70 In view of the complicated history of Aboriginal 
legal status in New South Wales, it is clear in Van Diemen’s Land that Arthur had a similar 
difficulty in establishing British sovereignty in an era defined by jurisdictional pluralism. The 
Colonial Times was certain that the proclamation had little hope of achieving its object, 
lenient as it was in hoping “to spare the lives of this benighted, savage people.”  
Appealing directly to the base of white victimhood, Bent asked dramatically, “does not 
the blood of the numerous murdered settlers and servants cry from the earth where it has been 
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so barbarously spilled, for redress for retributive justice on those whose hands are embrued in 
it?” Such “redress” could take two forms: 
To spare them now is only to reserve them for a greater slaughter, as it is certain 
that an additional murder will kindle an additional hatred towards them, and once 
in pursuit, with the murder of a Colonist fresh in their memory, the people will 
kill, destroy, and if possible exterminate every black in the Island, at least so 
many as they fall in with.71  
 It would be “far better for the Local Government to have raised a party of volunteers 
among the prisoners to go in pursuit of them, under the command of some person who could 
be depended on for coolness, and to take them, if possible without bloodshed, and have them 
sent to King's Island”, not as means of enslavement but rather in the hope of sowing “the 
seeds of civilisation”. 72 Deriding the inadequacy of Arthur’s measures a week later, Bent 
again favoured transportation ot King Island rather than “empowering a class of people, so 
notoriously ignorant and uneducated as the generality of stock-keepers are, to hunt down and 
destroy their fellow…by an Act which it is extremely difficult to understand.”73 News from 
Launceston of the murder of a servant near Piper’s Lagoon provided a further opportunity to 
drive home the neccesity of relocation:  
A more shocking spectacle was never seen. His body, especially his head, was 
literally beat to a mummy! His throat cut, and his lower extremities cut off!!! 
Indeed he was cut to atoms. His body was dragged a few yards from the place 
where he was thus so cruelly butchered, then thrown in a large hole and covered 
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over with two large logs of wood…The outrages of these people are now as great 
as ever, and have only been for a time diverted from their objects.74  
The Hobart Town Gazette on the other hand was content in claiming that the “late enormities 
committed by the natives, as we predicted have ceased”, suggesting the successful 
implementation of Arthur’s measures.75 Unable to conceive how the “Government Gazette” 
could arrive at such a conclusion and feeling a duty “to point out the legitimate alarm” native 
unrest continued to cause, the Colonial Times began 1827 with an ominous warning: “The 
Settler, recollecting the recent murders of his fellow Colonists and servants will, in our 
opinion, omit no step whereby he may destroy the black tribes even to utter extermination. 
The stock-keepers act upon the same principle, and carnage must inevitably follow on both 
sides.”76 
 Time and again in the early months of 1827 the Colonial Times proffered “the 
removal of the blacks to King’s or some other Island adjacent” each time it spoke of the 
“poignant feelings”, the pages “stained by a recital of the outrages committed by the savage 
Aborigines.”77 In February a hut was attacked at St. Pauls Plains. In April Kickerterpoller 
was identified at the head of a party which attacked a hut near Jericho. The level of deception 
involved in this attack, peaceful offerings having been made before violence took place, was 
an added warning to stockeepers: “the cunning and wiles of the blacks are like those of Satan 
himself”. “Horror” and “distress” were the only feelings that could attend the paper’s 
“opinion on the conduct of the Aboriginal natives”, even when it reported hopefully, and in 
the end mistakenly, of Kickerterpoller’s death.78 Until October 1827,  when Bent refused to 
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apply for a license under the Licensing Act introduced that year, the Colonial Times reverted 
to its mantra of removal to a Bass Strait Island as the only means of securing settler lives and 
livlihoods while ensuring against the prospect of Aboriginal extermination, complaining that 
“no week passes without a record of their violence.”79 With Arthur yet to make a genuine 
commitment to their protection, the Colonial Times was the clearest public voice which 
recognised the urgency of settler suffering.  
From the beginning of 1827 the Hobart Town Gazette became a paper dedicated to 
the publication of government notices soley presided over by Ross, Howe moving on to 
publish the Tasmanian. From October, Ross regained a level of editorial autonomy, albeit 
largley in support of the government, when he established the Hobart Town Courier.80 As 
1827 was drawing to a close, it was always a “painful” and “sorry” duty for the paper to 
report upon the continuation of Aboriginal attacks, but it did so with far less settler-driected 
empathy and extravagance than the Colonial Times, merely arguing that “surely something 
must be quickly done with these people.” 81 
 By this stage settlers were feeling in far more urgent need of protection, evincing a 
sense of alarm more in line with Bent’s commentary, drawing on the growing cache of 
Aboriginal “mystique”. In July a settler named William Bryan wrote to deputy judge 
advocate Edward Abott that unless protection was afforded the splitters and shepherds in his 
district they would be unable to attend to their tasks. “The system and fury of these black 
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monsters”, he later wrote, “exceed[s] anything I have yet encountered.”82 Relaying this 
concern to the colonial secretary, Abott wrote that the “savages have got bolder…and spread 
great alarm among those servants residing at distant places”83. Mirroring heightened emotions 
of New South Wales settlers, a coalition of landholders from the district of Cornwell 
broached Arthur for military assitance. Citing a confluence of remoteness and 
unprotectedness, the settlers felt “at all times liable to surprise.” The alarm caused by the 
“atrocious murders” committed “under circumstances of the most horrid barbarity” in the 
neighbourhood of Launceston and Norfolk Plains was so severe that it threatened “to 
terminate in the abdandonment of such property, as is not in the immediate vacinity of an 
armed force”. Fear had come to operate “so strongly on the minds of their stockkeepers, as to 
induce many to refuse to remain in charge of their flocks, and others, to keep them so closely 
at Home, as to render the greater part of their lands perfectly useless”. The intesection of 
emotion and the economic imperatives of settler colonialism’s “eliminationist logic” could 
not be more clearly drawn. Settler attempts to “conciliate and civilise these savages”, far 
from being productive, “only tended to render them more daring and systematic in their 
attacks, as well as desirous of plunder.”84 In far more tepid language a similar memorial from 
some settlers near the Elizbeth and Macqaurie Rivers complained that “the outrages 
committed by the Aborignes are daily assuming a more dangerous character.”85 
Arthur’s response to the settlers from Cornwall was the appointment of 26 additional 
field police and a party of military.86 Yet it was clear that there were issues with such 
deployments on logistical grounds throughout the Settled Districts. Captain Clark wrote to 
Arthur from the Clyde district in March 1828 suggesting that if the movement of military 
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parties were directed by an officer or sergeant in person “the happiest result might be 
expected”. Adding to the aura of an already elusive frontier enemy, the magistrate of 
Campbell Town district James Simpson attributed the difficulty his parties faced in tracing 
“these creatures” to the “secrecy” of their movements and suggested that the military be 
placed in a series of huts throughout the neighbourhood to allow for a better chain of 
communication.87  
Meanwhile, settlers continued to complain of attacks. J.B. Hart from Swan Park wrote 
to Arthur explaining that “stock-keepers are frequently obliged to abandon their charges”, 
noting “how much more awful” the situation would become if Aborigines began to conduct 
their attacks at night. As Clements explains, a unique feature of Aboriginal guerilla warfare 
was indeed the “dependable nocturnal relief” it afforded settlers.88  However “painful” it was 
for Clark to again communicate such “unpleasant intelligence”, at the end of March he 
reiterated to Arthur “the continued outrages committed on the frontier by the aborignes.” All 
in all, 1827 witnessed a marked jump in the intensity of Aboriginal violence from 1826, with 
the number of documented incidents of Aboriginal attack rising from 29 to 72 and the 
number of settler deaths rising from 20 to 52 respectively.89  
Recognising the inadequacy of previous frontier policies and the growing anxiety 
across the Settled Districts, in April 1828 Arthur issued a proclamation which esssentially 
sought to partition the Island along racial lines. Holding out hope that negotiations with 
“certain Chiefs of Aboriginal tribes” might help bring about an arrangement that would 
ensure tranquility throughout the island, it had “become indispensably necessary to bring 
about a temporary separation of the Coloured from the British population of this Territory”. 
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Given the “growing spirit of hatred, outrage, and enmity against the subjects of His Majesty 
resident in this Colony” evinced by the Aborigines, Arthur ordered that they “be induced by 
peaceful means to depart, or should otherwise be expelled by force from all the settled 
Districts therein.” Towards this end Arthur deployed 300 troops across “a line of Military 
Posts…along the confines of the settled districts” from which all Aborigines were excluded, 
with some provisions made to maintain the integrity of seasonal paths of migration in the 
form of a passport.90 Unlike the proclamation of November 1826 which essentially 
sanctioned settler violence, in this case Arthur forbade all colonists from using force unless 
sanctioned by a magistrate or military officer.91 
Muddying the legality of killing Aborigines even further – Bent would surely have 
had much to say if he was in print at the time – it is unclear whether or not settlers and their 
servants took to these obligations. Suggesting a loophole in the proclamation, a correspondent 
for the Hobart Town Courier from Macquarie River reported that the local magistrate had in 
fact appointed settlers as constables so that they could “act with their own men if occasion 
presents”. “When the blacks commit an outrage,” wrote the correspondent, “the whole 
neighbourhood must rise and capture the whole tribe, every individual of which is guilty in 
the eye of the law either as principals or accessories.”92 Becoming increasingly clear was the 
equally strong determination of Aborigines to exclude settlers from their territory, evinced by 
the escalation of violence in the Spring of 1828. The attack upon Patrick Gough’s property at 
Oatlands on 9 October stands alone as an incident which marked a new height of settler 
desperation, filling “the country with alarm and consternation.”93  
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Such incidents forced even those otherwise sympathetic towards Aborigines to push 
for more action to be taken to alleviate the suffering of settlers.94  The particular 
circumstances of the attack at Gough’s property, ending the lives of Gough’s wife, his four 
year old daughter and another woman named Anne Geary, compelled the Hobart Town 
Courier to observe that it could “no longer be doubted that the natives have formed a 
systematic organised plan for carrying on a war of extermination against the white inhabitants 
of the colony.” Mrs Gough was reported to have pleaded with the Oyster Bay tribesmen to 
spare her ‘Picanninies’ only to be told “no you white Bitch we’ll kill you all”, before 
suffering repeated blows to her head.95 Many settlers were no doubt already convinced of the 
existential crisis they faced. To have the usually moderate Hobart Town Courier espouse the 
prospect of extermination so explicitly only inflamed a community already defined by its fear 
and hatred of Aborigines.  
With the Executive Council recommending to Arthur the declaration of martial law, 
an end to settler suffering seemed in sight. In doing so on 1 November Arthur highlighted the 
Aborigines’ “evident disposition systematically to kill and destroy the white inhabitants 
indiscriminately whenever an opportunity of doing so is presented”, citing the failure of his 
April proclamation to stem the progress “made by the Natives into the…settled Districts”. As 
was the case in Bathurst this step provided soldiers legal protection in the actions they took 
against Aborigines, and likewise for settlers in the case that they acted in self-defence. Arthur 
qualified this allowance, ordering “that bloodshed be checked, as much as possible…and that 
defenceless women and children be invariably spared. “But in reality”, writes Lyndall Ryan, 
“martial law was further legitimation of the slaughter of the Aborigines that had began on 26 
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November 1826”, suggesting a measure which merely formalised a frontier rationale already 
in operation.96 
The most immediate consequence of the November proclamation was the 
establishment of civilian ‘roving parties’ under the command of Gilbert Robertson, suggested 
to Arthur by Oatlands police magistrate Thomas Anstey.97 Military ‘pursuing parties’ were 
subsequently also deployed. By March 1829 close to 200 soldiers were spread throughout the 
Settled Districts in 23 separate parties, which when including smaller detachments of troops 
meant a combined military presence of 400 men.98 In May 1829 a mounted police force was 
also introduced and Robertson’s party was divided into six smaller and wider ranging 
groups.99 This development has led Ryan to suggest that “from the declaration of martial law, 
in November 1828, to February 1830 the purpose of the very strong military presence in the 
Settled Districts was largely directed at killing rather than capturing Aborigines”, describing 
the “days of terror” encapsulated by this fifteen month period.100 The ‘success’ of this 
arrangement in the eyes of authorities is evinced by the fact that roving parties, such as the 
one led by John Danvers on 26 November 1828, who had been effective in tracking down 
and killing Aborigines were often redeployed.101 According to Clements, “roving parties 
were the colony’s primary defence against the blacks, and Arthur was unwilling to 
compromise their authority. Indeed, he went so far as to reassure rovers that their rewards 
would be safe, even if they were ‘unavoidably compelled to use violence, and loss of life 
ensued.’”102 Called to action immediately after an Aboriginal attack, whatever their actual 
impact, they “at least gave colonists a sense of agency at a time when many felt 
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powerless.”103 In one of his reports as head of a roving party, Jorgen Jorgensen mentioned to 
Oatlands magistrate Thomas Anstey that a “favourable feeling” towards him and his men 
travelled throughout the area.104 Arthur was nevertheless made aware of concerns that 
convict-led parties were insufficient when compared to the military. Captain Vicary of the 
Bothwell Police office held reservations that “the district can be effectually protected by less 
force than 100 men”, expressing his lack of “confidence in the parties of prisoners employed 
on this duty.”105   
Suggesting a reversion to at least a tacit recognition of Aboriginal legal status, in 
enacting martial law Arthur sought to promote legal equality in the circulation of 
proclamation boards which depicted the fair distribution of justice for frontier offences. But 
as Ryan argues, this was “an imagined future rather than the reality of martial law”.106 Nor 
did the determination of Aboriginal resistance lessen, becoming particularly localised in the 
Clyde, Oatlands and Richmond police districts subject to the attacks of the Big River and 
Oyster Bay tribes. This coalition killed nineteen colonists between August and December 
1829, bringing that year’s settler death toll to 33.107 Between the declaration of martial law in 
November 1828 and March 1830 the overall settler death toll was approximately 50, with 60 
wounded, while at least 200 Aborigines lost their lives. Not only was the war “beginning to 
take its toll on both sides” through sheer loss of life, the actual nature of the violence was 
“becoming more dreadful and inexplicable”.108 Compelling Arthur to explain to colonial 
                                                
103 Clements, The Black War, p. 46.  
104 Jorgensen to Anstey, 24 Mar 1829, CSO 1/320, p. 293.  
105 Vicary to Arthur, 29 Nov. 1829, CSO 1/316, p. 338.  
106 Ryan, Tasmanian Aborigines, p. 115 
107 Ryan, Tasmanian Aborigines, p. 117.  
108 Ryan, Tasmanian Aborigines, pp. 118 – 119, 121. 
  
142 
Secretary Lord Murray that the frontier had become ‘”the most [anxious] subject of my 
Government”, it also made for an increasingly unsettled settler community.109  
 A day after the declaration of martial law, Captain Clark wrote to Arthur from the 
Clyde district that his “servants will not go about their ordinary occupation…Time was when 
the aborigines would fly from the presence of an armed man but now they will face even the 
soldiers.”110 Henry Torlesse of Montecute near Bothwell wrote “of the very precarious state ” 
of the countryside and “the general dread that pervades the minds of the settlers”.111 So afraid 
had settlers become that they were “never without a gun”, their fear of Aborigines “quite 
paralysing”.112 Nor were settlers harbouring any real hopes of any chance of conciliation. 
Writing towards the end of February, Clarke feared that “the mutual distrust which has so 
long subsisted between the natives and the settler will for some time make any chance to 
communicate abortive.”113 A settler from Latour near Launceston, while acknowledging the 
“barbarities of the stockkeepers”, had similarly “become less sanguine in [his] hopes of 
conciliating so treacherous a people”.114      
 A despatch from Sir John Murray towards the end of 1828 brought to the Licensing 
Act, which since introduced regulated the press in the hope of preventing “seditious libels”. 
Arthur’s proclamation of this order on 24 December 1828 led to Bent re-establishing the 
Colonial Times in the new year, declaring a free press as “essential to the well-being and 
happiness of a nation”. In doing so Bent praised the existence of newspapers in lessening the 
inconvenience of slow communication which went hand in hand with a community as 
remotely scattered and thin as Van Diemen’s Land, demonstrating his awareness of the social 
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cohesion the press provided. Taking off from where it left, the paper emphasised how far 
Aboriginal violence had come to fill “the minds of the people with horror and consternation.” 
Given the measures Arthur had taken, rather than avidly calling for increased official 
protection of settlers the paper could now comment upon the “utmost activity” taking place to 
arrest the Aborigines efforts to defend their territory. Reporting on Danvers’ guidance of a 
party in pursuit of hostile Aborigines, the paper recorded with some satisfaction how the 
military discovered some huts and “burnt the whole of them to the ground.”115 
 Meanwhile, aware of the difficulty of making such a suggestion when the “spirit of 
some of the hordes of natives is so strong”, the Hobart Town Courier saw its “duty as well as 
the peculiar interest of every inhabitant of the island to forward as far as possible the truly 
philanthropic views of His Excellency on this subject.” Ross was referring to the newly 
established settlement on Bruny Island, initally established as a ration station but then 
developing in line with Arthur’s latent hope that “a civilized colony of these blacks might 
shortly be raised”, being brought to some fruition following the employment of George 
Augustus Robinson in 1829. “What more noble monument could be erected to the glory of 
the colony?”, asked the pro-government paper.116 
By June, keen to highlight the “gratifying accounts of the Aboriginal Establishment at 
Bruny island”, the Courier was becoming critical of the impact had by Gilbert Robertson’s 
roving parties. Referring to the “bond of society” which should prevent those living in towns 
from remaining aloof from those “in imminent danger of their lives”, it was clear that more 
action was needed:  
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We do not by any means wish to sound the tocsin of alarm, we are only anxious, 
consistent with our duty as a public journalist, to pre-admonish and forewarn. 
And we therefore, do give it as our candid opinion, that some bold and energetic 
step must speedily be taken to quell, the daily increasing confidence and 
murderous habits of the black. We do not pretend to point out the mode which 
should be adopted, that must rest with, the collective wisdom of the colony, and 
be detered by it. But as far as we can see, the common duties of life must be 
abandoned for a while by the strength of the people, who must form themselves 
in to a line as extensive as possible, and so advance and sweep along the country, 
driving the blacks into a corner or surrounding them. Such a measure as this as 
we conceive, must be adopted, or else a stationary line must be fixed, with posts 
at such near stations as will completely present the passage to and fro of the 
natives, without discovery or apprehension.117 
With uncanny synchronicity, Jorgen Jorgensen suggested to Thomas Anstey in a letter dated 
18 June 1829 that to avoid “indiscriminate slaughter…the enemy must be driven from the 
wide and extended parts of the country into the more narrow straits.”118 More so than ever, 
ardour seemed be to contending with fear in the minds of settlers, with some writing to 
Arthur offering their services in such pursuits.119 In the case of one settler near the River Isis 
at least, such offers came with the hope of securing a grant of land.120 
 By February 1830, less inclined to call for the relocation of Aborigines to Bass Strait 
as explicitly as before, the Colonial Times urged that new measures “be acted upon, and that 
quickly, otherwise, the evil will increase, and each year will bring fresh cause of regret that 
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the present state of things should have so long continued”: “pacific measures, and the 
exercise of that humanity, which doubtless all the European and Native-born classes would 
prefer cannot be long entertained.”121 In the subsequent week, demonstrating the destructive 
power of fire as a frontier weapon, John Sherwin lost his house near the Clyde River 
following an attack upon his property.122 Presenting the details of these “outrageous” the 
Colonial Times wrote favourably of Arthur’s “humane feeling” in coming to the private 
assistance of Sherwin and his family.123 But by this stage, as Ryan puts it, “the settlers on the 
Clyde had had enough” and addressed a memorial to Arthur asking him for more protection 
and that he bring an end to the policy of conciliation. Yet, in spite of his obvious willingness 
to act upon settler anxieties in the past, Arthur was not prepared to wholly entertain any of the 
demands made by settlers nor the final solutions suggested by the press.124 
 Instead, he issued a government order through which he hoped to “animate the settlers 
to a hearty cooperation with the government in the adoption of measures tending either to 
conciliate these people or to expel them from the settled districts.” In response to this “earnest 
desire” to conciliate, John Batman, who led a roving party near Launceston, wrote to Anstey 
of his opinion “that there is very little chance of…opening a reconciliation whilst such a 
deadly hatred exists on the part of many of the tribes towards the Whites.”125 Along with 
bolstering the mounted police Arthur introduced a bounty of five pounds for every Aboriginal 
adult and two pounds for every Aboriginal child brought to a police office alive.126 These 
measures were taken in conjunction with Arthur’s appointment of Archdeacon William Grant 
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Broughton to the head of the Aborigines Committee, established in November 1829.127 In its 
report released on 19 March the committee provided its explanation of the causes of 
Aboriginal hostility and offered measures that might check “the destruction of property and 
lives occasioned by the state of warfare which has so extensively prevailed”. 128Meanwhile, 
the Colonial Times recorded “fresh instances of outrage by some of the aboriginal tribes.”129  
The Committee’s report drew liberally upon a cache of elite chivalric discourse, 
strongly suggesting the type of society Van Diemen’s Land was becoming. Taking aim at the 
initial violence Aborigines suffered “on the part of miscreants” who were “a disgrace to our 
name, and nation, and even human nature”, the committee felt “bound to consider that the 
Natives are now visiting the injuries they have received, not on the actual offenders, but on a 
totally different and innocent class.”130 A clearer official expression of settler victimhood is 
hard to find in the history Van Diemen’s Land. The closest the committee could come to 
recognising dispossession as the most profound act of violence on the part of the colonists 
was to declare the debt of “taking possession of the country” as paying Aborigines 
forbearance in their continued attacks and afford them “the path of civilisation.”131 Grandly 
hoping to provide a future point of reference for colonisation across the world, Broughton 
and his committee emphasised the “strict obligation [which] exists to ensure mercy and 
justice towards the unprotected savage, and how severe a retaliation the neglect of these 
duties…may ultimately entail upon an entire and unoffending community.”132  
As Ryan observes, in hearing multiple cases of mass killings at the hands of settlers 
and their servants, the Committee chose to only include “the colony’s founding massacre at 
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Risdon Cove on 3 May 1804” in its report.133 “In discounting the evidence of recent 
massacres”, as she rightly points out, the committee also failed “to understand the real 
meaning of the ‘measures of forebearance’ that Arthur had implemented since November 
1826, [absolving] the government of responsibility for the war’s escalation.”134 The 
committee was at pains to recognise the “observance of these principles” in the government’s 
actions during this period, leaving it to identify the recent “systematic plan of attack” on the 
part of Aborigines, along with their lost “sense of the superiority of white men, and the dread 
of the effects of fire arms” as the prime cause of escalating violence. 135 This tendency, the 
committee was persuaded, “is generally to be regarded, not as retaliatory for any wrongs 
which they conceived themselves collectively or individually to have endured, but as 
proceeding from a wanton and savage spirit in them”.136  This conclusion, in conjunction with 
the evidence it had received from settlers, left the committee with  
no hesitation in expressing their persuasion that a sentiment of alarm pervades the 
mind of the settlers throughout the Island, and that the total ruin of every 
establishment is but too certainly to be apprehended, unless immediate means can 
be devised for suppressing the system of aggression under which so many are at 
this time suffering, and of which all are in dread that they themselves become the 
victims.137 
 Clearly demonstrating the relationship between settler emotion and the operation of 
colonial power, the committee made a suite of recommendations to alleviate white suffering, 
desirous “not to occasion, but to prevent the effusion of blood.” Among these were the 
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general recommendations that settlers be armed and alert, that they warn their servants of the 
consequences of “barbarous conduct”, that kangaroo hunting be prohibited, the centralisation 
of frontier operations with police magistrates, the placement of mounted police at each 
pastoral station, and an increase in the number of field police and the aid they receive from 
the military.138 Arthur was particularly favourable towards the recommendation that settlers 
take more precaution against Aboriginal attacks, having been disappointed by the tendency of 
settlers not to take “ordinary measures of precaution” after visiting the Clyde police district 
before the release of the report.139 Governor Darling expressed a similar frustration towards 
settlers in the Hunter region in 1827. Arthur was less inclined to agree with the deployment 
of mounted police, on fiscal grounds, despite their apparent success on the New South Wales 
frontier. As Ryan puts it, Arthur “was still unwilling to provide the settlers with the complete 
police protection that they expected.”140  
In opposition to the growing pressure from the press to adopt measures that went 
beyond the committee’s recommendations, secretary of state for the colonies Sir George 
Murray’s memorable refrain that “the adoption of any line of conduct having for its avowed 
or for its secret object, the extinction of the Native-race, could not fail to leave an indelible 
stain upon the Character of the British Government” caused Arthur more concern, particular 
in the case that Murray should receive the report.141 Once again, how did one balance the 
respective interests of metropole and colony when they seemed so discrepant? By this stage 
under the editorship of Henry Melville, on the grounds of the “law of nature” and the 
imperative of self-preservation, the Colonial Times was deeply preoccupied with the question 
of  
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what right we have taken possession of this country, and having established that 
right, to discuss the question how far we stand justified, not only in repelling the 
aggressions of the Aborigines, but even pursuing them to death, in case they 
should not desist from invading the settled habitations of the white Colonists.142 
This right became evident through an explanation of the “law of necessity” as the ownership 
of land and what it availed in accordance with sheer numbers, an argument essentially 
undermining sole Aboriginal enjoyment of Van Diemen’s Land. This reasoning precluded 
any explanation of native aggression as pertaining to the act of disposession, but rather the 
“restless and ambitious spirit” of men such as Musquito. Nor could the instigation of violence 
be explained by the mistreatment of Aboriginal women, who in fact “yielded willingly to the 
lawless desires of white men.” This torrid trail of scapegoating led to the conclusion that 
indeed “the British have a most unquestionable right to take possession of the soil of Van 
Diemen's Land for all the legitimate purposes of cultivation and industry…and are justly 
entitled to repel the aggression of the Aborigines, without in any way considering the causes 
that may have led to those disastrous scenes which we every day observe passing around 
us.”143 
     Preferring to leave “the measures most likely to establish a permanent peace, and 
afford protection to all” in the hands of the government at this stage, by July the Colonial 
Times was calling for the militarly to be fully deployed to “teach them a lesson”.144 In the 
same month captain Vicary warned from Bothwell that “unless a speedy check is put to their 
atrocities many of the settlers must temporarily abandon their properties .”145 Settlers in the 
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Cylde police district claimed that the Big River and Oyster Bay tribes had made 22 attacks 
between April and August, that they “threatened the ‘extinction of the Colony itself by firing 
our crops and dwellings’”.146 Thomas Anstey wrote to Arthur on 24 August “that the natives 
have evinced towards the white inhabitants…a spirit of the most determinance and rancorous 
animosity” and warned “that the coming Spring will be the most bloody that we have yet 
experienced” without sufficient military protection.147 Five days prior Arthur had in fact 
released a government notice announcing the “less hostile disposition” evinced by the natives 
contacted by Robinson, on the basis of which he urged settlers and their servants to “abstain 
from acts of aggression against these benighted beings” and “to concilaite them wherever it 
may be practicable.”148  
In doing so, he only made the job of managing the frontier even harder, enticing settler 
consternation to new heights. This frustration was clear in a memorial from a group of settlers 
from Jericho, who contemplated “with inexpressible alarm” such an order “when the 
Aborigines are becoming daily more and more systematic and serious”. Rather than the 
“spirit of zeal and enthusiasm” engendered by Arthur’s previous promise of grants of land to 
settlers who captured Aborigines, “gloom and misery and apprehension” had overcome the 
community. Arthur must have been “deceived” by Robinson’s reports regarding the success 
of conciliation and Aboriginal character: 
The bringing in of a few inimical blacks – a distinct people from those in the 
interior who have not had any intercourse with the European settlers is no 
criterion to judge of the character of Aborigines generally as a people, and the 
events of the last week in this district must convince Your Excellency of the 
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necessity of the most energetic measures for the protection of settlers…As Your 
Excellency will be informed from other sources of the proceedings of the Savages 
in this quarter it is unnecessary to detail them. But we respectfully entreat YE to 
adopt some measures to relieve the Colonists from their present perilous 
condition.149    
At once Arthur had received a dispatch from Murray ordering that settlers be prosecuted for 
killing Aborigines, an instruction the Executive Council essentially overrode in view of the 
threat posed to the colony’s economy if settlers were reluctant to act in “self-defence” for fear 
of punishment.150 Showing complete disdain for the prospects of conciliation, the council 
essentially declared war on the Aborigines of Van Diemen’s Land.151  
Contrary to London’s demands the Executive Council threw its support behind what 
became know as the Black Line, which it justified on the grounds of preventing both the 
declining prosperity of the colony and the protection of Aborigines.152 As Ryan writes, 
“Arthur bowed to the inevitable”. This hoped to be decisive manoeuvre asked settlers to 
congregate at seven designated locations in an attempt to drive Aboriginal people from the 
Settled Districts, to “come forward and zealously unite their best energies with those of the 
Government in making such a general and simultaneous effort as the occasion demands.”153  
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This operation shared stark continuity with ideas previously suggested in the 
press and in passing by Jorgen Jorgensen. 154 Ryan has also demonstrated the similarity 
between the deployments of such “human cordons” as offensive strategies against 
Indigenous people in other Anglophone colonies, including Macquarie’s deployment of 
the 46th regiment in New South Wales during April 1816.155 She also compares the 
Line to a similar movement of men in Georgia during the 1830s which targeted the 
Cherokee people.156 The idea was therefore not just part of the discursive and 
intellectual fabric of the colony. It was entangled in a much broader imperial network 
of military strategy. But this does not discount the fact that Arthur’s path of such 
decisive action was a factor of the emotional volatility of the settler community and the 
colony’s darkening economic prospects. The fact that Arthur, after many years of 
settler frustration, applied the “sledgehammer”157, to borrow Ryan’s description of the 
Line, that he did suggests that settlers in Van Diemen’s Land were almost completely 
absorbed in the fear Aborigines could evoke. In Clements words, “Tasmania’s 
Aborigines succeeded in providing a kind of hysteria among many of their invaders.”158  
This emotional communion was clearly spelled out in the Hobart Town Courier, 
which shortly after Arthur’s government order observed “with pleasure the zeal which the 
approaching movement against the Blacks is entered into by all classes of the community.”159 
On behalf of settlers the Colonial Times likewise welcomed the idea “that all should…rise in 
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a body to protect the general tranquility of the Interior”.160 The Line can thus be framed as the 
pinnacle of colonists’ collective anxiety, a means through which ardour could overcome 
years of accumulated fears and helplessness.161 On 22 September “one of the most numerorus 
meetings” ever to be held in the colony to discuss provisions for the “approaching movement 
agianst the Blacks” allowed all of these feelings to coalesce.162 Those present gathered 
around “the imperiousness of the present call on every inhabitant of the colony”, relieved at 
last to receive a government order that demonstrated strong and decisive leadership to 
counter the aggravation caused by the Aborigines.163   
However, the enthusiasm which typified the response to the Line deteriorated along 
with its decreasing chances of success as a result of insufficient planning, poor weather, 
sickness and challenging terrain, not to mention the fact that many of those involved were 
convicts and not there by choice.164 Ultimately, the line was a failure, managing to capture 
only two Aborigines, and was abandoned at the end of November. This failure, writes 
Clements, “cast a dark cloud over the frontier community”, which when accompanied by the 
continuing albeit fluctuating level of violence throughout 1831 meant that settler fears and 
anxieties remained constant, leading to a renewed desperation for drastic measures.165 On 13 
June 1831 the Launceston Advertiser asked:  
Are our columns never to be free from the details of murders and attrocities by 
the natives? Shall we never live to see the extinction of that vindictive feeling, 
which actuates these benighted savages?, Is there nothing which can be done 
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either to pacify, quiet, exterminate, or capture the blacks ? ls a colony of 20,000 
Englishmen, to be kept continually in terror by a handful of naked savages?166  
The previous month the same paper had already entertained various means of “exterminating 
the blacks”.167 At the end of August, the murder of Captain Thomas Bartholomew and his 
overseer in particular drew a fount of settler emotion.168 In general the continuation of 
violence bred a strong exterminationist sentiment among the public and the press, providing 
impetus to a growing consensus around the long-running idea that all Aborigines should be 
removed to an Island in Bass Strait.169 For all they knew, settlers thought they still faced a 
large and ferocious enemy. 
But by this stage the drastically reduced numbers of the Oyster Bay and Big River 
played heavily into their decision to surrender to Robinson on 31 December 1831.170 Boyce 
goes as far to argue that whatever fears kept the white community captive, they were in 
reality fighting “a defeated enemy” by 1828, noting the 26 Aborigines Robinson met with in 
the New Year of 1832. This has led him to question the overall advantage that Aboriginal 
people possessed in frontier conflict, which he argues was only relevant during the well 
documented “guerrilla” stage of conflict between 1828 - 1831 Relying on evidence which 
suggests that most Aboriginal groups possessed a “full demographic ” in 1824, and as late as 
1827, along with a lack of any observable wide scale impact of disease, Boyce argues that 
“other explanations must be sought for the speed of the Aborigines’ demise”. 171 Re-
evaluating the number of Aborigines likely to have been massacred “when whole 
communities had been in the firing line”, otherwise discounted by twentieth century 
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historiography, he ultimately attributes the sharp deterioration of Aboriginal demographic 
integrity to the guile and knowledge of Aboriginal movements possessed by the bushmen 
who led roving parties. This advantage combined with the increased vulnerability of 
Aboriginal communities with a full demographic, complemented by the young and the 
elderly. “Far from being an ineffectual force in the pursuit of Aborigines, as the roving 
parties have usually described,” he writes, “they soon killed, or broke up through sustained 
pursuit, the few remaining large groups of Aborigines still to be found in the settled 
districts.”172 In a sad twist of irony the difficulty that these parties faced in the latter phase of 
guerrilla warfare, dominated by Aboriginal groups unencumbered by the young and the 
elderly, was therefore mainly a factor of their earlier successes.173 
Ryan provides clear insight to the toll that both sides of the frontier suffered between 
1828 and 1832, citing the 90 colonists killed during this phase of the war alongside 350 of the 
500 remaining Aborigines of the tribes inhabiting the Settled Districts, 100 of whom being 
victims of mass killing of six or more, which included members of the Oyster Bay and Big 
River tribes.174 But with Boyce’s research in mind she is likewise convinced that the period 
before the declaration of martial law in 1828 requires more attention in order to understand 
the extent of demographic trauma suffered by Aboriginal people. Arguing that more 
Aborigines were killed between 1826 and 1828, Ryan speculates that Arthur “may have 
considered massacre, even though it failed, a necessary strategy to force a quick surrender” 
during this period.175 
Its evocation in the press notwithstanding, an official policy of “terror” is far less 
explicit during the Black War than similar conflicts in New South Wales where it was 
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officially endorsed by a number of colonial administrators. This is perhaps surprising given 
Arthur’s willingness to resort to the public display of hanged men. Citing the 260 hangings he 
ordered during his term in office, Boyce writes that “Arthur knew that it was not dying, but 
the desecration of the body after death, that was the most dreaded punishment in the popular 
mind.”176 Yet there is no evidence that Arthur ordered the public display of Aborigines killed 
during the Black War as a means of evoking terror, and even killing as such was deemed 
appropriate only when necessary. As chapter 4 will demonstrate, there is much complexity in 
untangling Arthur’s actions and his humanitarianism. As Clements notes, he had little control 
over the more proximate triggers to the escalation of violence caused by the “behaviour of 
brutalised and sex-deprived convicts”, men ultimately “victims of their circumstances, 
assumptions, hatred, frustrations, fears and sadnesses.”177 The “appalling tragedy” of Van 
Diemen’s Land was a scenario in which the “traditional dichotomies of strong and weak, 
cowardly and courageous, victim and victimised simply do not stand up to scrutiny.” Van 
Diemen’s Land had become a place where “[p]ractically everyone saw themselves as the 
victims.”178  
This corresponds with Clements’ argument regarding the question of genocide. Citing 
a lack of clear “ideological impetus to exterminate” Aborigines, he argues that the claim of 
genocide obscures the intensity of the conflict which existed across the Van Diemen’s Land 
frontier. Evoking the Indigenous potential to commit genocide upon British settlers while at 
once labeling the prospect absurd, he argues that it was a mutual sense of self-preservation 
that drove frontier violence, not any perceived desire to exterminate on the grounds of race.179 
Similarly highlighting the anxieties which drove many settlers to acts of violence, Henry 
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Reynolds is scathing of international genocide scholars for not recognizing the state of war 
that existed on the island between Europeans and Indigenous peoples, risking “the 
patronizing view” of passive Aboriginal victimhood.180    
But as in the case of New South Wales, conclusions which attach such diffuse agency 
to the violent consequences of settler colonialism tend to obscure crucial frontier realities. 
With the consensus of Boyce and Ryan in mind, it seems far more pressing to search for a 
more concrete association between emotion and human agency given that decisions were 
made which ultimately led to the mass killing and dispossession of Van Diemen’s Land 
Aborigines. The connection between fear, white victimhood and the activation of settler 
colonialism’s “genocidal potential” is particularly pertinent to the settlement of Van 
Diemen’s Land.  
At a pragmatic level, Ann Curthoys arrives at the conclusion that genocide did occur 
within this particular colony insofar as practices were perpetuated in knowledge of their 
destructive impact upon Aboriginal life and culture.181 On similar grounds, in a project 
seeking more to emphasise  the genocidal culpability of successive British governments 
rather than their humanitarian rhetoric, Tom Lawson underlines that metropolitan and 
colonial actors did not explicitly evoke the elimination of Tasmania’s Indigenous population. 
But however benign the policies they adopted were, they “ultimately envisaged no future 
whatsoever for the original peoples of the island.”182  
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On top of these arguments is the crucial role that fear played in activating the 
destructive power of the settler state. It is one thing to say that the settlers of Van Diemen’s 
Land faced an existential crisis – they and many New South Wales settlers were convinced 
they did – but it is another thing entirely to overlook the emotional dialectic through which 
this sense of self-preservation became manifest in official policy. As shown in the case of 
New South Wales, it is this very tendency of settler societies to fall back upon fear and 
victimhood that leads to the subjective alignment of exterminatory sentiment with the 
objective genocidal trajectory of settler colonialism.183 This case for genocide in Van 
Diemen’s Land will ultimately become clearer in view of the actions of the central figure 
who is in fact best known for his kindness towards Aboriginal people. It is to George 
Augustus Robinson’s story that we now turn. 
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Chapter 4: ‘An irresistible feeling of sympathy’: George Augustus Robinson and his 
Friendly Mission, Van Diemen’s Land 1824 – 1831 
By November 1831, George Augustus Robinson was nearing the completion of his task to 
conciliate the “hostile natives” unsettling the midlands of Van Diemen’s Land. As he so often 
did, Robinson turned to his diary: “No man can enter into my feelings. No man can know the 
intense anxiety of him whom providence has called upon to experience except he [who] 
personally undergoes the same, but then all men have not the same anxious feelings, are not 
all prompted by the same principles.”1 Before making this entry Robinson’s “just 
indignation” had just been raised by the reluctance of his “sable companions” to proceed in 
their pursuit of the Big River and Oyster Bay people following a brief moment of respite on 
the trail. “I could no longer suppress my feelings at the careless and utter indifference 
manifested by these people”, he complained, furious with the “savage grin of satisfaction that 
sat on their countenances.”  
Robinson’s extensive journals, which detail the course of his various conciliating 
expeditions across Van Diemen’s Land, are replete with similar expressions of feeling. As 
this chapter will demonstrate, it is by way of such sentiment that Robinson contested the 
emotional register typical of the colonial press and the settler community at the time, 
characterized by fear and white victimhood, in Van Diemen’s Land and New South Wales. 
Robinson was a participant in an elite colonial discourse which sought to reconcile the 
injustices and brutality of settler colonialism, ever-present in both colonies, but gaining more 
and more political purchase across the British imperial world at the beginning of the 1830s. 
As both a contributor and a beneficiary of this discursive rupture, through emotion Robinson 
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self-consciously posed a subjectivity which clashed with the growing sense of white 
victimhood. This insight allows a response to recent calls to re-evaluate Robinson’s place 
within Australian colonial history. By interrogating the emotional turmoil that accompanied 
his controversial role in the administrative response to frontier violence in Van Diemen’s 
Land, it will be shown that Robinson was motivated by far more than the wealth and fame 
that nonetheless still drove him throughout his Friendly Missions. Both he and Lieutenant 
Governor George Arthur were incipient agents in a humanitarian movement that sought to 
change the trajectory and practice of settler colonialism. It is with no little tragic irony, 
however, that this shift in colonial policy only makes the case for genocide in Van Diemen’s 
Land more compelling.  
* 
At the beginning of his new role as conciliator in May 1829, Robinson observed that 
“in point of intellectual advancement the aborigines of this colony rank very low in the 
savage creation”. At once he drew attention to the “many amicable points which glitter like 
sunbeams through the shroud of darkness by which they are enveloped”. It was this potential 
which “operated most powerfully in calling forth from the discriminating and philanthropic 
observer an irresistible feeling of sympathy on their behalf and an urgent desire to employ 
those means which the God of all has vested in him for the cause of humanity, the mollifying 
of their condition and the subservience of their general interest welfare.”2 
 In applying for what was essentially a stock keeper’s role on Bruny Island, a job 
which in the end entailed trekking across much of Van Diemen’s Land, Robinson was 
responding to Lieutenant Governor George Arthur’s own “anxious desire to ameliorate the 
                                                
2 Robinson, Friendly Mission, p. 80.  
  
161 
condition of the aboriginal inhabitants”.3 As shown in chapter 3, reconciling Arthur’s 
humanitarianism is difficult in view of the polices he authorized which explicitly targeted 
Aboriginal people as open enemies, a response to the growing settler unease. Nor was the 
security of the white community absent in Robinson’s understanding of the role he made his 
own. In a later reflection upon what drove him to apply for this position, Robinson clearly 
evinced an awareness of the role as not just protecting Aboriginal people but also settlers. 
Critical of the more coercive measures to quiet the frontier, Robinson decried the terror that 
spread throughout the colony, regretting the abandonment of farms: “the reports were of the 
most painful and heartrending description, and yet nothing apparently could be done to stay 
these sanguinary proceedings.”4 With the benefit of hindsight Robinson could justify his 
application for the job on Bruny Island on the grounds that “justice was to be dealt out 
equally between two races and a kindly feeling cultivated and friendly relations established.”5 
Like many of his contemporaries in both New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, 
Robinson’s hope of racial harmony fit squarely within the bounds of a discourse which 
attributed the shortcomings of colonisation to the portions of British society sadly lacking in 
human feeling. In understanding the “bloodthirsty temper amongst the aborigines” one had to 
consider “that this colony had imported the joint depravity of the three united kingdoms, men 
in whom common feelings of humanity are deadened and the voice of reason suppressed by 
the machinations of sin”.6 Robinson explained Aboriginal violence in view of circumstances 
“too well known to be adverted to”, a vague expression referring to the events of Risdon 
Cove in 1803: “it is very certain that the natives to this very hour foster in their minds a 
remembrance of this wanton massacre of their fellow beings, and are anxious to atone for this 
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aggression by the blood of their enemies.”7 In the autumn of 1830 he was nonetheless 
compelled to intone an impassioned plea for understanding:  
O God, what has filled these poor unoffending people with such dire 
apprehensions! Can I imagine for a moment that the white man, my fellow man, 
has murdered their countrymen, their kindred and their friends, has violated their 
daughters…Yes, it is only too true. Regardless of all laws, human or divine, they 
have imbued their hands in the blood of these poor unoffending people.8 
Robinson was later confounded by the anxiety he felt in the apparent lack of 
appreciation extended by his new charges. To be begin with, ameliorating the Indigenous 
“thirst for revenge” was a matter of emotional management:  
It will be necessary not only to eradicate these rancorous and malignant 
impressions and that fell inveteracy which they fasten against their Christian 
fellow beings, but to substitute in their place feelings of sorrow and remorse for 
their past barbarities, and a new appreciation of those blessings conferred upon 
them through the medium of their persecuted Christian deliverers.9 
And it was the very same righteous energy which allowed him to elide any fear of Aboriginal 
people. As we have seen, fear and alarm had come to pervade the settled districts of Van 
Diemen’s Land, spreading to the colonial center with the help of the Hobart press.  
Robinson was also aware of the fear that could generate between specific Aboriginal 
groups across the island. Of the fewer than twenty Aboriginal people on Bruny Island were 
members of the Port Davey tribe, one of whom shared with Robinson her knowledge that this 
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group had played a central role in the attacks upon settlers and their property.10 With this 
information at hand, and on account of the high death rate on Bruny Island rate the settlement 
was abandoned at the end of 1829.11 Following several months in Hobart, by April 1830 the 
Friendly Mission was in pursuit of the Port Davey tribe on the mainland in April 1830.12 
Robinson observed:  
my natives had become much alarmed, having as they thought saw where the 
natives had sharpened their spears. In fact they [were] more frightened of the 
natives then any of the white men. Certainly, from the reports which had been 
circulated respecting the natives upon this coast, much might be feared.13 
But Robinson paid little to attention to such “flying reports” as far as his own personal safety 
was concerned.  
Combining his passion for the task at hand and his belief in its divine providence, on 
17 October Robinson wrote, “[m]y heart’s desire is to get to the natives, and that they may 
ultimately be saved. Situated as I now am, away from all assistance, how easy would it be for 
any number of natives to annihilate me and my little band of Aborigines. In God is all my 
trust and I know no fear.”14 Robinson’s companions were again alarmed when contact was 
made with an Aboriginal group on the north east coast in November 1830, fearing they would 
all be speared. Robinson reflected that “a larger body of natives might be at hand and come 
down upon us, but fear was not an occupant of my breast. I knew God would deliver me from 
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danger and he who had hitherto crowned my labours with such abundant success would not 
suffer me to perish if my trust was wholly placed in him.”15 
Without discounting the depth of Robinson’s hope in God’s will, on a more pragmatic 
level his lack of fear can also be explained by the fact that by the stage the Friendly Mission 
had embarked upon its expedition to the north-east of Van Diemen’s Land no genuine threat 
had presented itself. Following his encounter with the Port Davey tribe Robinson led the 
Friendly Mission to the north-west, covering the territory of the Van Diemen’s Land 
Company and arriving in George Town on 1 October 1830. As Vivienne Rae-Ellis remarks, 
for the duration of a nine-month journey which skirted the western coast of the Island for 
1000 kilometres, “not a shot had been fired in anger, and not one of the party had been 
injured”.16  
Robinson’s ability to disarm any fear for those he pursued did not, however, extend to 
the white community. In attempting to convince a group on the expedition to the north-east to 
accompany him he in fact posed the threat of soldiers quite explicitly: “I had told them 
previously such a story of the soldiers killing the blacks that they would not stop on any 
account and all said they would accompany me.”17 A form of emotional blackmail to be sure 
but a genuine and not unfounded concern, one that Robinson felt for himself as well. Eagerly 
making way to a boat which would take the mission to what would become the new native 
settlement on Swan Island, Robinson heard what he thought to be the sound of a fallen trees, 
which “the natives said was a musket”. Complementing his companion’s anxiety Robinson 
took alarm, envisioning that he “should be shot…and anxious to get back before the soldiers 
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had killed all the natives.” 18 Of the 23 Aboriginal people residing on the island at the end of 
1830 was Mannalargenna, a key figure throughout Robinson’s expeditions.19 
Robinson’s anxiety in securing his new captives on the boat to this new location 
suggest how far he had come to identify with the growing number of Friendly Mission 
Aborigines. Often this identification with the Aboriginal imaginary occurred quite explicitly 
by way of emotion. Returning to Swan Island from Cape Barren Island on 15 November 
1830, Robinson writes,  
Bullrub was informed that one of her brothers had been killed, and that one of the 
natives shot to the southward of Georges River was her brother. This information 
was the occasion of general lamentation and there was not one aborigine but wept 
bitterly. My feelings [were] overcome. I could not suppress them: the involuntary 
lachryma burst forth and I sorrowed for them. Poor unbefriended and hopeless 
people. I imagined myself an aborigine.20 
For those who accompanied Robinson on a further voyage between Hobart and Swan Island 
on 14 March 1831, being reunited with their companions was a “truly affecting” moment. 
“The scene was too much for me”, wrote Robinson, “and I turned away to suppress the 
involuntary lachryma. I saw I entered into the feelings of these poor people in a way that 
those unacquainted with their character could not possibly imagine.”21   
Considering the recent consensus regarding the cultural relativity of emotional 
expression, here Robinson is making quite a remarkable claim. He is suggesting that the 
intimacy he shared with those he gathered on Swan Island rendered a form of emotional 
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literacy quite specific to his own experience. There is no doubting the sincerity of Robinson’s 
feelings toward his captives, and perhaps the Aboriginal population of Van Diemen’s Land 
more broadly. His experience was certainly unique among the island’s white population, and 
we should not presume that the apparent incongruence of emotional norms formed in specific 
cultural contexts will always preclude the genuine sharing of feeling. Such stricture renders 
particularly shallow expectations for the possibility of critically engaging emotions across 
cultures, of negotiating emotion as a broader human phenomenon.22 
It is another thing entirely to conflate one’s feelings across the frontier as Robinson 
does when he so closely identifies with his captives. In doing so he risked blurring the 
imbalance of agency inherent to colonial encounters, particularly a scenario in which one 
man is so self-consciously taking complete responsibility for the survival of an entire people. 
In any event there is no direct empirical evidence available to us today by which such a claim 
could be upheld. We will never know exactly how Robinson, or any other historical figure for 
that matter, actually felt. What is more available to our interrogation is the discursive quality 
of emotion through text, and how its expression is involved in the negotiation of identity in 
various scenarios and disparate social spaces.      
Just as emotion was a central vector by which settlers were negotiating their 
subjectivity, so it was for Robinson. Just as those who had previously decried the 
mistreatment of Aboriginal people, Robinson could not of course remove himself from the 
process of dispossession. Like those who perpetuated an ostensibly humanitarian narrative 
regarding the colonisation of Australia, on this particular occasion Robinson’s critique of 
colonisation was strictly qualified, gliding over elite culpability in the violence caused by 
dispossession and placing it at the feet of the certain colonial agents. Reiterating chivalric 
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discourse Robinson once again complained, “We have imported into this land, which as some 
people have said flows with milk and honey, the wickedness of three kingdoms. These 
miscreants have committed dire atrocities upon these poor hopeless creatures and have 
maligned their character to the greatest extent.”23 But however Robinson may have 
scapegoated convicts, through such discourse he became a participant in the antipodal 
expression of emotion which ultimately contested the feelings held by many settlers towards 
Aboriginal people.  
This challenge went hand in hand with the unique insights he offered regarding the 
emotional state of the Friendly Mission Aborigines. On 17 November 1830 their concern 
again radiated from a story told by an Aboriginal woman recently arrived to the Swan Island 
settlement that a “boat had gone to Launceston to bring soldiers to shoot them”, an 
impression given by the sealers with whom she had contact. On 30 December a woman 
named Walyer threw “the whole of the natives into a state of alarm by telling them the white 
people intended shooting them, women and all.” That Robinson sought to keep this woman 
apart is curious given his own use of such stories as encouragement to join his party. But 
more than anything it speaks to the valence that emotion had in negotiating frontier 
encounters. It suited Robinson to exploit the emotions of those he wished to recruit by raising 
the specter of soldiers marching to kill them, but such stories were of little value once he had 
them gathered in one place. Little group cohesion could be gained by the perpetuation of 
alarm.  
Robinson was engaged in a task that made a necessity of emotional manipulation. Just 
as many of his contemporaries had done, Robinson mobilised fear as a strategy to negotiate 
the difficulties emerging from frontier spaces. Whereas many New South Wales governors 
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were quite explicit in their hope “striking terror” in the hearts of Aboriginal people, however, 
Robinson hoped more to exploit the white propensity for violence already active in the minds 
of his captives. Nevertheless, the fact that fear featured at all in the course of Robinson’s 
conciliation of Van Diemen’s Land Aborigines only consolidates the argument that it played 
a crucial role in allowing the progress of white settlement. We must also consider Robinson’s 
mobilization of fear as a mark of the urgency he felt was required to render the safety of his 
captives. At this particular moment this undoubtedly sprang from a genuine regard for the 
general and emotional welfare of those now gathered on Swan Island. Overarching all of 
these factors was Robinson’s clear attempt to shape an identity which opposed the dominant 
emotional sensibility characteristic of the settler community.  
What this meant for his standing among other colonists varied. On 26 August 1830 
the Hobart Town Courier was all praise for Robinson’s expedition from Port Davey to the 
north-west, emphasizing the “most friendly” intercourse he had with many tribes.24 This 
coincided with Arthur’s ongoing favor for conciliation, urging settlers to take a “friendly 
approach” to the Aborigines in a government notice on 21 August.25 Heightened frontier 
violence eventually convinced the Executive Council to qualify the need for conciliation in 
favor of settlers so long as they didn’t attack any inoffensive tribes.26 Settlers were indeed 
remiss with any rhetoric which encouraged less severe methods of frontier conduct, a 
sentiment acutely demonstrated by the group of settlers from Jericho who penned a memorial 
on 24 August citing their “inexpressible alarm” at Arthur’s government order, a document 
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considered by the Executive Council before it agreed to full-scale military action in the form 
of the Black Line.27   
Robinson held strong doubts of the Line’s potential for success. On 23 November, 
drawing on his extensive knowledge of Van Diemen’s Land, he asked the question in his 
diary: “if the lines are to be so close that a native can’t get out, what way will they get rid of 
the lagoons, the rivers, the tea-tree swamps, the impervious forest through which a native will 
pass, the fallen timber, the craggy [precipice] along which the natives can crawl, the deep 
gullies and ravines?”28 More so than Arthur at this stage Robinson also registered the Line’s 
moral illegitimacy, which only reinforced the urgency that accompanied his task and goes 
some way in explaining his play upon Aboriginal emotion. The danger they faced from 
settlers was after all real, even more so in the context of the Black Line. Robinson’s anxiety 
was further excited when the Friendly Mission arrived in Launceston from George Town on 2 
October. As he wrote to his wife in Hobart, the town was thoroughly enamored of the idea of 
“extirpating the original inhabitants”, and he found it difficult insulating his captives from 
this aggression.29  
A further example of the sincerity of Robinson’s emotional commitment to 
Aboriginal protection, examining what otherwise motivated his enthusiasm for the Friendly 
Mission is a key site of historiographical debate. Well after the failure of the Line, Robinson 
arrived in Hobart on 17 January 1831 and met with Arthur two days later who spoke of 
rewarding him with “pecuniary compensation”, being so pleased with the Friendly Mission’s 
progress.30 For his success in securing the Aborigines then on Swan Island, numbering thirty-
three, Robinson was awarded “the largest possible grant of land, 1035 hectares, plus an 
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increase in salary to 250 pounds (backdated to his appointment in 1829) and a gratuity of 100 
pounds.”31 He was also able to leverage his success as a means of increasing his credibility as 
an authority on Aboriginal affairs, as demonstrated by his negotiations with the Aborigines 
Committee to ensure the relocation of the Aboriginal establishment to Gun Carriage Island 
and remove the roving parties, which he saw as “exceedingly expensive and useless.”32 
The Executive Council supported these two recommendations but had difficulty 
agreeing upon the Aborigines Committee’s suggested method of relocating those already 
recruited by the Friendly Mission, which amounted to forced and permanent deportation. 
Chief Justice Pedder in particular recognised the injustice of this recommendation, 
notwithstanding Robinson’s assurance that the people concerned would abandon their 
territory voluntarily.33 Robinson’s assurance in itself involved a high degree of deceit. In 
James Boyce’s reckoning, there was a reason that Robinson travelled alone to Hobart and not 
with Mannalargenna, despite the Oyster Bay chief’s request to accompany him: “Robinson 
knew Mannalargenna to be an articulate and charismatic leader whose evidence would both 
contradict his own account of the circumstances of the Swan Island removal” along with any 
assurance that there would be no general objection to being removed to an Island in the Bass 
strait.34 There is thus much to rue from the missed opportunity for Pedder and Mannalargenna 
to meet. The policy, which was decided in March 1831, in essence announced Arthur’s 
support for the removal of hostile Aborigines and abandonment of any hope for a treaty.35   
The presentation of this decision to London was made with the assertion that Robinson had 
offered the option of taking the food and protection of the government or maintain peaceful 
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relations with settlers, even though Robinson indicated he had never made such an offer.36 
This involved both men in a “web of deceit”.37  
In August 1831, much to Mannalargenna’s delight, Robinson explained to the 
Mission Aborigines that he had been   
commissioned by the Governor to inform them that, if the natives would desist 
from their wonted outrages upon the whites, they would be allowed to remain in 
their respective districts and would have flour, tea and sugar, clothes etc given 
them; that a good white man would dwell with them who would take care of them 
and would not allow any bad white man to shoot them, and he would go with 
them about the bush like myself and they could hunt.38 
Following this declaration Arthur was immediately informed that such a deal had been 
struck.39 As Boyce points out, “Robinson must have been well aware that the agreement he 
had reached with Mannalargenna contradicted his own undertakings to the Aborigines 
Committee and the executive council”. Nor could Arthur have been under any illusion “that 
an agreement had been reached for the Aborigines to leave the main island of Van Diemen’s 
Land voluntarily.”40 As Rae-Ellis similarly speculates, “Robinson knew that the nomads 
would have to be contained geographically before they could be controlled”. As such he must 
have been convinced that deportation was the only real option that would ensure the safety of 
the Aborigines.41  
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On top of his deceitful involvement as an authority on Aboriginal affairs, it is 
ultimately the substantial material benefits Robinson accrued from his work which leave him 
open to the interpretation that the creation of wealth and social mobility were what ultimately 
drove him. Although Robinson’s concern over the Line was moral, he may have also seen the 
maneuver as a threat to his role as conciliator, its potential success undermining a project for 
which he saw himself uniquely suited. Moreover, Robinson used the presence of the Line to 
coax his new captives to Swan Island, an exercise that was otherwise conducted with their 
potential value in reward money in mind.42 When Arthur announced the so called ‘bounty 
five’ in February 1830, Robinson thought himself best suited to take advantage of this 
arrangement but was unsuccessful in doing so during his expedition in the northwest shortly 
after the policy was announced.43 He had in fact sent four prisoners to Launceston only for 
them to be released, leaving him with no grounds for reward.  
This remunerative potential of the Friendly Mission is the basis of Rae-Ellis’ stinging 
critique of Robinson’s character. Rather than a man genuinely invested in the welfare of the 
Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land, what emerges from this representation is an opportunist, 
perhaps even a fraud. Alongside his belief that he was the one person who could gain the 
confidence of the Island’s Aboriginal people, something that led him to frequent rivalry with 
other conciliators such as Gilbert Robinson and John Batman, Rae-Ellis quite remarkably 
attributes Robinson’s success to his “latent skill as a mesmerist”.44 This claim rests 
awkwardly upon Robinson’s later interest in this mystic practice which developed from his 
attendance at a public lecture in 1850.45 More plausibly, beyond “drawing on any occult 
powers he might have possessed”, Rae-Ellis cites his uncommon acceptance of and 
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participation in Aboriginal customs along with a cheerful and affable aspect.46 To gain the 
confidence of his intended captives Robinson quite openly “went to work on their feelings”, 
to use his own words.47 This conscious admission of emotional manipulation accords with 
Robinson’s mobilization of fear to ensure the protection of the Friendly Mission recruits. But 
it also indicates how feelings operated between himself and the Aborigines of the colony, 
demonstrating the relationship between his personal investment in their safety and how he 
positioned his emotions practically and discursively in opposition to the majority of settlers.  
The coercive strategies Robinson deployed to settle Aborigines on Swan Island and 
his conduct during the Friendly Mission more broadly should never go unremarked, but this 
must always be balanced with the depth of feeling he demonstrated towards Aborigines. 
Disembarking his captive Aborigines at Swan Island on 14 March 1831 from Hobart, by way 
of Maria Island, Robinson reported a “truly affecting” reunion:  
A mother meeting with her son to others with their acquaintance and members of 
their own tribe. The scene was too much for me and I turned away to suppress the 
involuntary lachryma. I saw and entered into the feelings of these poor people in 
a way that those unacquainted with their character could not possibly imagine.48 
Following the Executive Council’s approval of the Aborigines Committee’s 
recommendations in February, Swan Island remained the site of such reunion for but a few 
days before the Aboriginal settlement was temporarily moved to Preservation Island before 
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being more permanently established on Gun Carriage Island.49 The settlement was moved a 
final time to Flinders Island (Great Island) in June 1831 at Robinson’s recommendation.50 
 Beginning to show signs of disaffection for the work of the Friendly Mission during 
1831, demonstrated by his frustration with his followers’ intransigence while in pursuit of the 
Big River tribe towards the end of the year, Robinson embarked upon an expedition across 
the north of the Island in June and August. This resulted in the capture of more Aborigines 
around Anderson’s Bay.51 But it was the pursuit of the Big River tribe beginning on 21 
October that seemed to create the most anxiety for Robinson. His agitation by this stage may 
have also stemmed from the need to negotiate between Arthur and other conciliators at a 
meeting at the beginning of October, particularly Batman, regarding the best way to conduct 
affairs.52 According to Rae-Ellis, “by deft maneuvers throughout 1831 Robinson had 
overthrown all potential competitors and his position as supreme authority on Aboriginal 
affairs was secure.”53 Robinson could take some heart from Arthur’s obvious favor, just as he 
could in September when the success of the Friendly Mission so far generated astonishment 
among the people of Georgetown. 54 
 As had been the case on previous expeditions, Robinson’s main concern at this stage 
was the threat posed by the white inhabitants to the Friendly Mission Aborigines. Time and 
again during the expedition in search of the Big River tribe around the Ouse district, 
Robinson expressed his anxiety over the proximity of so many settlers: “were the white 
people to see us the whole country would be in alarm and parties would be sent out and we 
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should be in danger of being shot.”55 As with previous occasions Robinson was particularly 
wary of stockkeepers, “as the practice of this class of individuals is to come upon 
[Aborigines] and to fire at them – a similar practice to the blacks in their attacks upon the 
whites”.56 The presence of this menace allowed Robinson to maintain the expedition’s 
momentum, cautioning his natives on 23 October that “if the whites saw them they would be 
shot.”57 On this particular occasion his Aboriginal companions met Robinson’s concern with 
a laconic rejoinder, “that they could see the whites first and that they could not always shoot 
straight.”58  
 The pursuit of the Big River tribe in particular indeed seemed to blanket whatever 
fears settlers evoked in the minds of his companions. As Robinson recorded on 27 October 
Mannalargenna told him “that the Big River tribe and Oyster Bay tribe together would spear 
us, blacks and whites together, and that I ought not to have sent away the guns”. Once again 
Robinson drew upon the providence of the Mission, consoling Mannalargenna by saying that  
there was enough of us and that I did not care how they come so long as they 
would come, that I was not frightened of them, that God had hither to protected 
me and would continue to do so, that since the commencement of my labours 
there had been no sickness amongst any of my people nor had had there been any 
accident.59  
Not entirely removed from the “great danger… to be apprehend from the hostile natives”, 
travelling through the settled districts meant largely one thing for Robinson, 
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the danger to be apprehended was from the white people, as their usual practice 
of attacking the natives was heretofore at night and firing upon them at their 
encampment…if they were to hear or see my natives and not observe me or my 
son [George Jnr.] and the other white men…they might attack us at our 
encampment and surrounding us fire upon us and destroy us all.60  
 It is through such expressions that Robinson drew his emotions further and further 
from those of the general white community, while of course maintaining his complicity in the 
process of dispossession. Yet however Robinson may have imagined his emotions as aligning 
with those of the Friendly Mission Aborigines in particular, it is unsurprising that their 
expression of emotion remained distinct. As Nicholas Clements remarks of the emotional 
climate of Van Diemen’s Land at this time, while fear was a clear common denominator 
among settlers “for the Aborigines, emotions such as anger, despair and sadness were equally 
salient.”61 There is an “abundance of evidence attesting to the Tasmanians’ emotionality”, he 
writes.62 Often drawing upon Robinson’s diaries, juxtaposing the emotions of settlers and 
Aborigines is one of many contributions Clements has made to the more nuanced 
understanding of Australian frontier relations in the post-History War world. And other than 
calibrating Robinson’s emotions relative to those of settlers, this is indeed an insight Friendly 
Mission provides. As John Connor has noted, Robinson’s observations are of particular value 
to military historians, vital for constructing “the face of the battle.”63 There is little reason to 
doubt that fear played a significant role in the lives of Van Diemen’s Land Aborigines, both 
towards settlers and other Aboriginal tribes, given the violence that had come to characterize 
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the colony during the 1820s. But a sense of grief and sadness on the part of the Friendly 
Mission Aborigines become the most vivid expressions of emotion in Robinson’s diaries over 
time. On arriving at a camp on 25 October 1831, writes Robinson,  
the female guide pointed out the embers of a fire and where she said her and her 
tribe has enjoyed a little hilarity by dancing…On beholding this spot again the 
woman evinced much feeling and all the circumstances connected with burst on 
her mind and with which she agreeably entertained her sable friends.64 
On 6 November 1831, after hearing of the murder of a Bruny Island Aborigine named 
‘Boomer Jack’ from Captain Clark, Robinson writes that the Aborigines accompanying the 
Mission of the same tribe “were much affected whilst the melancholy tale was told.”65 On the 
same day Robinson recorded the story of a woman from the Big River tribe travelling with 
the Mission which purported a rare piece of evidence suggesting that dead Aborigines were 
being hung from trees, but it is unclear whether this resulted from settler violence. Either 
way, the circulation of such stories can only have added to the dread being felt by the 
Friendly Mission.66 In recognizing the tracks of her brother, one of the Mission women was 
brought to tears. “They have strong natural affections”, observed Robinson, “especially for 
those who are related to them by ties of consanguinity.”67 Moments of such poignant grief 
and longing must have been shared on many occasions as the Friendly Mission journeyed 
across Van Diemen’s Land, perhaps countless times beyond Robinson’s observation. But this 
doesn’t render accounts such as the ones above any less valuable to our understanding of the 
emotional experience of the Friendly Mission Aborigines.  
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Just as enlightening are Robinson’s general beliefs as to the emotions which drove 
Aboriginal violence, what hopes they held of defeating their frontier enemies: 
They do not suppose they can extirpate the white inhabitants. They entertain no 
such idea. No! they are actuated solely by revenge, revenge to the whites for the 
dire enormities that had been perpetuated upon their progenitors. They bear a 
deadly animosity to the white inhabitants on this account, and there is scarcely 
one among them but what has some monstrous cruelty to relate which had been 
committed upon some of their kindred or nation or people.68   
Settlers, servants and soldiers alike appear in tandem as perpetrators in the various accounts 
Robinson provides in support of this explanation. Otherwise perhaps drawing too closely 
upon the myth that frontier violence in Van Diemen’s Land was a direct consequence of 
events at Risdon Cove in 1803, what nonetheless emanates from Robinson’s diaries is an 
easily conceived impression of a collection of communities at once driven and paralyzed by 
the grief and anger generated by years of suffering.  
 Two days before sight was made of smoke emanating from a Big River tribe camp 
fire, Robinson again recorded his anxiety, eliciting a sense of the burden the Mission had 
become: 
None but those engaged knows the difficulty and great anxiety at the conducting 
of this enterprise and I pray God I may be enabled soon to succeed in meeting 
these people, so that I may retire to my family and remain in quiet, for I am now 
spending not only my strength and constitution but also domestic comfort and 
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peace of mind; and many of the settlers are people not deserving of any more 
exposing and perhaps sacrificing my life.69 
This of course only partially framed the Mission’s motive, and more than anything reiterated 
his disdain for much of the white population. “Tonight my heart is intent on meeting the 
natives. God grant it may be soon”, he anguished.70 On the night of 10 November smoke was 
at last sighted of the Big River tribe’s camp, yet the pleasure Robinson felt on such occasion 
was mingled with hope and fear, “hoping that I might get to see them and fearful lest I should 
not.”71 Coming so close to his target only seemed to exacerbate Robinson’s frayed nerves, 
building the expectation that if he failed no one could bring tranquility to the colony: 
No reward can recompense for the great anxiety and privations of every kind that 
I am called to endure. All my exertions, all my anxieties, hardships and dangers 
will be estimated as nothing if I succeed not. If we succeed we raise envy, and if 
we raise envy we are sure to incur censure. I may sow the seed and there are not a 
few who would readily and greedily gather in the harvest.72 
It was not until 31 December that contact was eventually made with the group at Bashan 
plains, north of Lake Echo, consisting in members of both the Big River and Oyster Bay 
tribes. The joint party numbered 16 men, nine women and one child and were led by 
Montpelliater and Tongerlongter.73 
As Brian Plomley notes, this encounter is not recorded in Robinson’s journal but only 
in his official report of 25 January 1832 in which he emphasise d the considerable fear his 
Aboriginal companions evinced towards a people “whom they deemed the most savage of all 
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the [A]boriginal tribes and by whom they said they would be surely murdered.”74 So alarmed 
was Mannalargenna that he defected from the Mission, promising not to return until they 
were under Robinson’s control.75 Reliant upon his Aboriginal conciliators as he was, this 
almost defeated Robinson’s “hope that the time would soon arrive when this arduous and 
harassing undertaking would be terminated.”76 Yet so it was, with the chiefs explaining to 
Robinson the genesis of their attacks upon settlers, “that they and their forefathers had been 
cruelly abused, that their country had been taken away from them, their wives and daughters 
had been violated and taken away, and that they had experienced a multitude of wrongs from 
a variety of sources.” In spite of this animosity, Robinson records their willingness to “accept 
the offers of the government” placing themselves under the protection of the Friendly 
Mission. “Tranquility is therefore (through the blessing of the Almighty) restored to the 
colony”, declared Robinson, “and the people are treated as human beings ought to be treated. 
No restraint in any way has been placed upon them since they have been with me.”77 
The arrival of Robinson’s party in Hobart Town on 7 January was indeed well met, his 
name spreading across town. A government notice praising his achievement, emphasizing 
faith in his belief “that there are no hostile natives remaining in the settled districts”.78 As the 
Hobart Town Courier reported, 
On Saturday Mr Robinson…made his triumphant entry into town with his party 
of blacks, amounting in all to 40, including 14 of his former domesticated 
companions, with the 26 of which the Oyster Bay and Big River Mobs were 
composed. They walked very leisurely along the road, followed by a pack of 
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dogs, and were received by the inhabitants on their entry with curiosity and 
delight.79 
As Clements remarks, on top of “curiosity and delight”, many settlers were astonished 
that such an “unimpressive remnant could have generated so much fear.”80 In his report 
Robinson wrote that he had promised the Big River and Oyster Bay people “a conference 
with the Lieutenant Governor…that the Governor will be sure to redress all their grievances”, 
insisting “they cannot and ought not to be treated as captives.”81 After this meeting, the 
Hobart Town Courier reported that the newly conciliated Aborigines were delighted at the 
idea of proceeding to Great island, where they will enjoy peace and plenty uninterrupted.”82 
More importantly, 
The removal of these blacks will be of essential benefit both to themselves and 
the colony. The large tracts of pasture that have so long been deserted owing to 
their murderous attacks on the shepherds and the stockhuts, will now be available, 
and a very sensible relief will be afforded to the flocks of sheep that had been 
withdrawn from them and pent up on inadequate ranges of pasture – a 
circumstance which indeed had tended to materially impoverish the flocks, and 
keep up the price of butcher’s meat.83 
This expression of hope more or less captures Robinson’s achievement, given the economic 
growth and sense of ease that accompanied the knowledge that by October 1833 only one 
Aboriginal tribe remained to be brought in by the Friendly Mission, and their territory was in 
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the relatively remote north-west.84 The Aboriginal menace immediately ceased to preoccupy 
both the press and private correspondence.85  
Despite the public regard building around him, there were nonetheless tensions 
emerging from apparent discrepancies in accounts of Robinson’s seizure of the Big River and 
Oyster Bay tribes. Plomley raises his concern that the location Robinson provides in his 
report dealing with the matter is “too vague and inaccurate”.86  Other than Arthur’s 
puzzlement at how Robinson actually succeeded, Rae-Ellis points to the incongruence 
between the heroism that the conciliator attached to his achievement, particularly in the 
absence of Mannalargenna, and the peaceful manner in which he purported to bring in the 
two tribes.87 Nor is there any evidence that Arthur honestly took on board any of their 
grievances when he met them in front of Government House, merely reporting to London 
their agreement to travel to Flinders Island.88 As Tom Lawson writes, “there is no evidence to 
suggest that the Aborigines agreed to the extraordinary, and surely almost inexplicable, 
notion of a permanent exile to a Bass Strait Island.”89  
This point is mirrored in Boyce’s analysis, which also suggests a similar lack of 
transparency involved in the meeting Robinson facilitated between Arthur and 
Mannalargenna in October 1830 at Launceston.90 No minutes at the October meeting were 
taken, but as Boyce writes, following it “the Aborigines clearly believed that 
Mannalargenna’s original agreement with Robinson had been endorsed, and that its terms 
would be fulfilled once the most feared enemy of all…had been conciliated.”91 At all events, 
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it is unlikely that Arthur would have approached this meeting with anything like good faith as 
far as the basis of voluntary removal were concerned. With a peak in violence in August 
1831, particularly the death of Captain Bartholomew Thomas near Port Sorell, the 
government and the press were reconciled as to the impossibility of settlers and Aborigines 
co-existing on the mainland. In spite of the relatively low settler death toll during 1831, and 
the quiet spring which followed Thomas’ death, by the time Arthur met with Mannalargenna 
and others at Launceston he was committed to the forced and permanent removal of the 
Aborigines of Van Diemen’s Land.92 This ossification was in spite of the continuous 
impression given to the colonial office that voluntary removal was being offered to the 
conciliated Aborigines. As Boyce puts it, “voluntary removal had become a charade 
maintained for the sake of imperial sensitivities.” 93 
Despite the minimal danger posed by the western tribes, bringing them in became 
Arthur’s next priority. And as Plomley writes, “Robinson was in a good bargaining position 
and could demand any terms within reason.”94 Initially being offered only 100 pounds to 
continue the Mission, the terms eventually agreed to were an immediate gratuity of 400 
pounds and 700 pounds upon the capture of the remaining Aboriginal population.95 Plomley 
marks this point as the beginning of Robinson’s “moral decline”: “the original selfless spirit 
which had prompted him to devote his energies to the amelioration of the aborigines was to 
become more and more obscured by thoughts of benefits to himself.”96  
Placing this as the source of Robinson’s inspiration much earlier, Rae-Ellis argues 
that the seven hundred pounds resting on the heads of the remaining Aboriginal population 
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only made him more systematic in his approach, more willing to use the force of arms as a 
method of persuasion. In an expedition to the north-west in 1832 lasting nine months, the 
only one in which Robinson’s life was seriously threatened, 30 Aborigines were transported 
to Flinders Island.97 In 1833, the Aborigines captured on the west coast were kept at 
Macquarie Island, an establishment which exposed them to the mistreatment of convicts and 
overall greatly increased their rate of attrition. 98 As with all other previous sites of 
detainment, it was not until the casualty rate was more than 75 per cent that the decision was 
made to remove them to Flinders Island, eventually taking place in November 1833. 99 While 
Robinson recognised the imperative of this move as a means of saving their lives, he also 
knew that he was running out of time to gain complete British possession of western Van 
Diemen’s Land.100 This contingency of course held substantial bearing upon the material 
rewards he stood to gain. 
The remaining Aborigines were taken between March and April 1834, and with some 
reluctance Robinson followed the Sandy Cape tribe to Flinders Island in September 1835 as 
magistrate.101 It is owing to this reluctance to reside at Flinders Island, Arthur had to order 
him in the end, that Rae-Ellis again emphasises the “at best ideological” concern that 
ultimately drove Robinson’s concern for the Aboriginal people of Van Diemen’s Land: “as 
previously, he was incapable of putting the welfare of any person, let alone a whole race, 
before his own personal interests and desires.”102 In spite of the obvious feeling Robinson 
expressed towards Aboriginal people, a level of empathy for their welfare that elevated his 
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concerns beyond those of most settlers, in Rae-Ellis’ depiction Robinson seems essentially 
driven by his own desire for wealth and the trappings of public acclaim.  
* 
What, then, can be ultimately said of Robinson in view of his conspicuous display of 
emotion towards Aboriginal people? The value of interrogating Friendly Mission from an 
emotional perspective speaks to Anna Johnston and Mitchell Rolls’ call to “excavate” 
Plomley’s transcription of Robinson’s journals so as to more productively evaluate 
Robinson’s place in Australian colonial history following the “rancorous and painful debates” 
of the History Wars.103 To this end, focusing upon Robinson’s emotional experience allows 
us to portray a character who was not a simple opportunist, manipulating Aborigines in the 
pursuit of wealth and power so strongly argued by Rae-Ellis. Though he certainly played this 
role, nor was he a one dimensional colonial agent hell-bent upon dispossessing Aboriginal 
people and consolidating the colonial enterprise. He was an individual whose feelings 
propelled what he saw as an urgent and necessary task, the protection of Aboriginal people 
from a settler community that held little regard for their lives and attachment to country. A 
genuine task in and of itself, it was this negotiation of feeling which allowed Robinson to 
delineate a subjectivity distant from the emotional register of most settlers. In this way 
Robinson embodied an “emotional community” which contested the normativity of emotional 
life in Van Diemen’s Land, and New South Wales as well.  
 This register of emotional expression also drew upon much broader cultural 
contingencies impacting the British imperial world at the time. Close attention has already 
been drawn to the discourse of chivalry through which colonial elites positioned themselves 
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as being more sympathetic towards Aboriginal people, unlike the convicts and stock keepers 
whose depravity led them to violence and depredation. Time and again, colonial 
administrators grew this discourse in ways which obscured their roles in directly or indirectly 
spreading terror among Aboriginal communities. This of course had its roots in an over-
arching sense of responsibility towards colonial subjects which was shaped and evolved by 
specific local circumstances.  
 Robinson can thus be considered a participant in a long running challenge to the 
emotional and physical relationship that dominated between Aborigines and British settlers. 
But the contingencies of the specific point in time which witnessed the rising prominence of 
the Friendly Mission draws Robinson into the orbit of a much larger shift in imperial attitudes 
towards Aboriginal people, namely the rise of the evangelical humanitarian lobby during the 
1830s which crystalized in the formation of the Aborigines protection Society in 1836. In 
conjunction with Johnson and Rolls’ insistence upon exploring Friendly Mission in more 
constructive ways, Lester uses trans-imperial networks to explain Robinson’s writings. 
Constituting “unique narratives”, writes Lester,  
if we are properly to contextualize Robinson and his work, we have to position 
them in relation to an extensive ‘propaganda war’ waged between humanitarian 
and settler lobbies in and between the West Indies, Australia, the Cape Colony, 
New Zealand, British North America and India among other places. This 
propaganda war was fought over the legitimacy of prevailing and prospective 
relations between Britons and indigenous people…Robinson’s own career was 
fundamentally bound up with it.104  
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This insight will be explored further in the following chapter, but what it shares with the 
discussion directly at hand is that in his views towards Aborigines not only was Robinson 
drawing upon a broader imperial discourse but that his “career and writings constitute an 
important thread through this trans-imperial context between humanitarian and settler 
discourses and politics.”105 In time, he was able to “deploy” this discourse as much as 
“shape” it once he gained a credible reputation across the British empire as an expert on 
Aboriginal affairs, a reputation for which he owed a significant debt to the reports circulated 
by Arthur and James Backhouse who traveled to Van Diemen’s Land in the 1830s.106  
Furthermore, Robinson’s feelings, while contingent upon his own experiences elsewhere but 
particularly in Van Diemen’s Land, were expressive of a collective sentiment gaining 
momentum across the British imperial world at the time.  
 Lester’s study of Robinson provides the starkest counterpoint to the argument that he 
was simply motivated by personal gain in his work with the Friendly Mission. “There is 
plenty of ammunition in Robinson’s own writings to condemn him for his insecurities, his 
vanities, his churlishness and his pettiness”, Lester writes, “but there is no doubt that he was 
sincere when he later wrote of his attempts to try to secure ‘a just and general restitution to 
the Aboriginal inhabitants of the settlement for the injuries and privations they had suffered 
through the medium of the white population.’”107 Recognizing the same sincerity in 
Robinson’s concern for Aboriginal people, as we have already seen Rae-Ellis provides a 
more qualified and ultimately scathing judgment of Robinson’s character and his emotional 
commitment to the Friendly Mission: 
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he was incapable of caring deeply for any individual, black or white. The 
shallowness of his friendship with individual Aborigines was demonstrated time 
and time again when he ignored their need for his loving care and personal 
attention. Easily moved by tears, Robinson’s heart was never assailed.108 
 Taking her cue from Manning Clark, who saw in Robinson someone who recognised 
“Aborigines as human beings with feelings as deep and profound as any of the settlers”, 
Lyndall Ryan explicitly refers to Rae-Ellis’ “shallow reading” of Robinson’s journals.109 
Ryan targets the view that Robinson was motivated by fame and wealth, hoping for a 
renewed historical assessment which would allow him “to be recognised as a man ahead of 
his time, a champion of the Aborigines and one of the most significant figures in nineteenth 
century colonial history” on account of him risking his life to protect Aboriginal people.110 
Such assessments find Robinson standing “condemned for saving the Aborigines from 
extermination by settlers."111 Ryan recognises that Robinson was misguided in his belief that 
it was his God-given duty to protect the Aboriginal people of Van Diemen’s Land, and to do 
this in the hope of bringing them to Christianity and civilization.112 But she is particularly 
critical of any appraisal which refuses to see him as anything but a flagrant and dishonest 
opportunist who relied upon mesmerism to achieve his personal ends, and, moreover, was 
willing to compromise the Friendly Mission by forming sexual relationships with his 
companions.113 Ryan draws upon Cassandra Pybus’ critique of Robinson in making the latter 
point and is otherwise critical of her broader assessment of Robinson as someone whose 
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humane impulses were overridden by “personal and economic gratification”, a criticism she 
also draws towards Keith Windschuttle.114 
 Like Ryan, Pybus emphasises the agency that the Friendly Mission Aborigines 
exercised, their attachment to Robinson being an act of volition in their hope for 
“independence and survival.”115 Likewise disputing the possibility that Robinson was a 
mesmerist, Pybus nonetheless argues that his interest and appreciation of Aboriginal culture 
were “a calculated ploy” to secure the trust of those he encountered upon his various 
expeditions.116 She also sees a clear connection between Robinson’s diaries and “the 
unmistakable sense that [he] saw Aborigines as the key to the upward mobility he so 
craved.”117 Speculating as to what may have occurred if Gilbert Robertson had been favored 
as conciliator instead of Robinson, ultimately leaving this scenario a moot point, Pybus 
argues, 
 there is little to suggest such an alternative narrative might have been less 
catastrophic. In this tragic saga there are few elements more disturbing than the 
spectacle of these two colonial misfits scrapping over the paltry financial benefit 
and dubious social advantage to be got in taking credit for the almost complete 
destruction of a whole people.118    
Ryan’s point is that such an understanding creates the unreasonable expectation “that 
people like Robinson should have behaved like a saint and thus suffered in some way, either 
from lack of money or by dying for his cause.” In reality “he was a public servant who earned 
a salary commensurate with skills and qualifications in order to carry out his highly 
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dangerous task”, a man whose religious drive aligned him with other colonial figures, most 
notably Arthur.119 On the grounds of such humanitarian evangelical discourse Henry 
Reynolds similarly asks historians not to rush to Robinson’s judgment, but to “place him in 
his cultural milieu, to see him as a man of his time.”120 Agreeing with this chapter’s broader 
argument, Reynolds cites Robinson’s uncharacteristic compassion towards Aboriginal people 
compared with the rest of settler society, a feeling that emanated from a missionary zeal 
maintained upon “claims of human equality” which led him to begin the Friendly Mission.121 
As Reynolds quips, although Robinson possessed an “abiding insecurity” as far as his 
finances were concerned, a relic of his working class background, embarking upon this 
journey was “scarcely a promising career move.”122 
As it is with historical understanding more broadly, it is beyond our capacities as 
historians to form a singular representation of any historical figure, let alone one whose 
reputation is so strongly contested.  Through these historiographical tensions it is of course 
possible to construct a pluralistic representation of Robinson, a man who was at once driven 
by material needs and wants as much as by feelings that compelled him to protect the 
Aboriginal people of Van Diemen’s Land. It was this emotional register, aligned as it was 
with the evangelical discourse gaining momentum at the time, which distinguished Robinson 
from the majority of settlers. Inga Clendinnen puts it well in view of the many contradictions 
which emerge when reading Robinson’s Victorian journals. “These plains must ultimately be 
made use of for sheep grazing”, writes Robinson. “How to explain that casual, shocking 
comment”, asks Clendinnen, “what is wrong with this man? Is he a fool, a hypocrite, a moral 
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imbecile; another thick-skinned imperialist playing bumpo with a wincing world?”123 For 
Clendinnen, Robinson is none of these things but rather one of many who “contrived ways to 
live with the appalling, immutable fact of Aboriginal death.” Robinson is thus best read for 
his “‘cognitive dissonance’: an uncomfortable condition in which a mind veers and twists as 
it strives to navigate between essential but mutually incompatible beliefs.”124  
Overarching these realities of biographical conciliation, of constructing the narrativity 
of one’s past, there remains a nagging question to be addressed, a question which draws us 
back to genocide and its coincidence with settler colonialism. To what extent was Robinson 
in fact a participant in the colonial logic which he fought so hard against? Once the settled 
districts of Van Diemen’s Land had been made pacific, why did Robinson, with Arthur’s 
consent, involve himself in the task of rounding up the remainder of the island’s Aborigines? 
What sense does it then make to establish the ‘immutability’ of Aboriginal death, particularly 
as their ‘extinction’ so easily became their accepted fate upon Flinders Island in the minds of 
colonial administrators?125 Far from the dishonored treaty which resulted in the removal of 
the remaining Van Diemen’s Land Aborigines from 1832, as Boyce rightly points out, “most 
were removed by either force or trickery from lands of no interest to the British, after they 
had already given up the fight.”126 For Boyce this makes for more than enough room for 
comparison with other tragedies faced by other Indigenous people across the world, such as 
the “trail of tears” in the United State.127 ‘Immutable’ and ‘inevitable’ thus become 
redundant, even dishonest terms to describe the fate of the Aboriginal people of Van 
Diemen’s Land.128 Such language, Boyce asserts  
                                                
123 Inga Clendinnen, Tiger’s Eye: A Memoir (New York: Scribner, 2000), p. 213. 
124 Clendinnen, Tiger’s Eye, p. 214.  
125 Boyce, Van Diemen’s Land, p. 296.  
126 Boyce, Van Diemen’s Land, p. 295.  
127 Boyce, Van Diemen’s Land, p. 295. 
128 Boyce, Van Diemen’s Land, p. 296. This could also be said of the broader myth of the ‘dying race’ which 
gained currency throughout the nineteenth century, a convenient means of forgetting in the settler imaginary.   
  
192 
Disguises the fact that the colonial government made a policy choice. The 
decision to remove all Tasmanian Aborigines after 1832 and to pursue this 
relentlessly to its tragic end was, even by the standards of its own time, an 
extraordinary and extreme policy decision. Robinson’s public lies and absurd 
journal self-justifications, along with Arthur’s carefully worded dispatches, have 
disguised the truth for too long. The colonial government from 1832 to 1838 
ethnically cleansed the western half of Van Diemen’s Land and then callously left 
the exiled people to their fate.129  
Why then was a demographically diverse population who posed no threat to white settlers 
made subject to such a policy choice? Boyce draws our attention back to the rewards and 
fame sought by Robinson, but ultimately places responsibility for the forced deportations 
between 1832 and 1835 with Arthur.130 But the Lieutenant Governor’s motivations remain 
unclear. Boyce alludes to Arthur’s dual belief that the inherent savagery of the Aborigines of 
Van Diemen’s Land meant that they would always pose a threat, and that they would 
themselves only benefit from being removed to Flinders Island.131 An alternative and more 
alarming impetus to consider on the part of Robinson, Arthur and the settler community more 
generally is the “pervasive psychological appeal…of a ‘native-free’ Van Diemen’s Land”, 
that the “removal of all Aborigines came to be seen as a good in itself.”132   
“Nothing highlights the terror of the war years more”, Clements explains, “than the 
sanity that returned once it was over.”133 As this thesis has continued to demonstrate, the 
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settler imaginary in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land had grown more and more 
hostile towards an Aboriginal menace both perceived and imagined, fixated upon the fear and 
victimhood generated by frontier violence. The circulation and performance of these 
emotions were in Van Diemen’s Land just as effective in driving the destructive course of 
settler colonialism as they were in New South Wales. There can be no denying Robinson and 
Arthur’s complicity in this logic. Yet as the 1830s unfolded more and more colonial agents 
across the British Imperial world nonetheless drew upon the Friendly Missions as they sort to 
recalibrate settler colonialism according to a more humanitarian agenda.   
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Chapter 5 – ‘the song of malevolence as well as benevolence’: The Myall Creek 
Massacre and the Unravelling of the Sydney Humanitarian Movement, 1835 – 1838.   
For a man who grasped so firmly the hand of providence, the end of winter 1838 was an 
auspicious time for George Augustus Robinson to arrive in Sydney. “Newspapers full of 
malicious attacks on the aboriginal natives”, read his diary entry of 13 September.1 Such was 
the outrage surrounding the impending trial of the 11 men in custody for the murder of 28 
Wererai people at Myall Creek in June. A month to the day prior to his arrival in Sydney 
Robinson had left Flinders Island for Hobart after reading in the Hobart Town Gazette that he 
was to be appointed Chief Protector of Aborigines in New South Wales. For those Van 
Diemen’s Land Aborigines who managed to survive the ravaging pulmonary complaints of 
the settlement at Wybalenna, the relatively new mainland settlement of Port Phillip was to 
become home. 2 This measure ultimately proved too much to ask of an anxious settler 
community, all too aware of the years of terror experienced by their counterparts in the sister-
colony.3 Nor was Robinson’s shift to the mainland a fait accompli, a level of trepidation 
otherwise caught up in the evaluation of his worth to the empire by colonial administrators in 
Hobart, Sydney and London. 
His appointment to the role of Chief Protector of Port Phillip following his trip to 
Sydney meant that Robinson could feel vindicated for his efforts. This journey also allowed 
him to commune with those who shared similar feelings regarding the protection of 
Aboriginal people. More so than ever Sydney was afire with contrasting emotions over the 
management of the frontier, an antagonism which came to coalesce around the Sydney 
Auxiliary branch of the Aborigines Protection Society and the so-called ‘Black Association’ 
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respectively. The former humanitarian group was essentially an offshoot of the London-based 
society of the same name, which had not long published extracts from the recently released 
Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Aboriginal Tribes led by Thomas Fowell 
Buxton. The ‘Black Association’ was a press euphemism for the Committee on the Disturbed 
State of the North Western Districts which formed in the wake of the Myall Creek massacre, 
its principal leader the Hunter settler Robert Scott.  
In tracing the emergence of these two organisations, and, in particular, how they were 
each mediated via the colonial press, this chapter will outline the competing emotional styles, 
long present within the colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, but brought 
into stark relief by events such as the Myall Creek massacre in June 1838. Moderating these 
two emotional communities was the recently arrived Governor George Gipps, a man of 
genuine humanitarian principle in line with those increasingly been held in London. How 
these principles could be upheld in the face of the political contingences of the frontier was 
another thing entirely. This analysis will provide a touchstone for the ways in which fear and 
compassion functioned as vectors for the expression of vastly different colonial subjectivities 
and in turn, how this was facilitated by public discourse and the agency of colonial 
administrators across both local and transnational channels.  
* 
Robinson arrived on Flinders Island towards the end of 1835 accompanied by 
Mannalargenna and 16 other Van Diemen’s Land Aborigines to join those already at 
Wybalenna. Shortly afterwards, his companion of so many long journeys across Van 
Diemen’s Land was dead. His illness aside it is difficult to comprehend the torment 
Mannalargenna must have otherwise suffered, perhaps reflecting the feelings of all those 
removed from their country. “The chief gave evident signs of strong emotion”, observed 
  
196 
Robinson as their ship from Hobart drew opposite Mannalargenna’s country on the mainland 
as they neared Swan Island: 
He paced the deck, looked on all the surrounding objects, fresh recollections 
came to his mind. He paced to and fro like a man of consequence, like an 
emperor. Round his head he had tied a slip of kangaroo skin, which added greatly 
to his imperial dignity. At one time he took the map in his hand and looked upon 
it intently, took the spyglass and looked through it. It was amusing enough to see 
him. He allowed that I was equally great with himself, that I had travelled in all 
directions.4  
This was Robinson at his ambivalent best. A sentiment just as apparent to his 
nonchalance of 2 December in hearing that Mannalargenna was expected to die, news of 
which he accompanied in his dairy with the matter of fact addition that he was “busy with 
native men employed in fencing in a large paddock front of my quarters.”5 This lends 
credence to the shift Plomley observes in Robinson’s character from the “remarkable man” of 
the Friendly Mission to the “pompous and rather ridiculous man and one very much 
concerned with his dignity” of Flinders Island. In this view Robinson was found wanting in 
his ability to adequately cater for the inevitable “culture clash” of removing a people from 
their home and introduce them to “civilisation”.6 There is some room to dispute such a claim 
in view of circumstances essentially outside Robinson’s control on account of him being, for 
all intents and purposes, a government agent. And he certainly maintained a belief in his 
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destiny to secure the safety of his “sable friends”, a father figure in whom they could “have 
the most implicit confidence.”7  
But Plomley is right to suggest that Robinson was unsure how to provide a meaningful 
existence for the exiled Van Diemoniens, however he sought to institute the gainful habits of 
modernity and bestowed upon them names lifted straight from the western canon: Cleopatra, 
King William, King George, Romeo and Queen Elizabeth to name just a few. Shortly after 
arriving on Flinders Island, in re-evaluating what he could ultimately hope to achieve, 
Robinson revealed the vacancy of his agenda: 
When I reflected that but a few years since these men were the cause of so much 
terror in the settled districts and were now so peaceably employed, I see great 
cause for thankfulness that I have been the honoured instrument in removing 
them from the main territory. The sad mortality which has happened among them 
since their removal is a cause for regret, but after all it is the will of providence, 
and better they died here when they are kindly treated then shot at and inhumanly 
destroyed by the depraved portion of the white community.8 
Such reflections continued to place Robinson squarely as a participant in the ostensibly 
humanitarian discourse characteristic of earlier colonial administrators. At once it was 
becoming clear that Robinson was enacting a form of paternalism so characteristic of what 
would become the Protectorate system. Functioning as God and the colonial elite’s 
“honoured instrument” was as much a factor in his humanitarian agenda as the reality of 
material gain.  
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Sparing those on Wybalenna from disease threatened either prospect. Robinson was 
astute enough to attribute the incidence of pulmonary disorders to inadequate provisions and 
the exposure of huts to the cold. But with this “havoc death” sweeping the settlement, 
Robinson’s feelings remained ever exposed as he described the “melancholy results”, 
“painful in the extreme”, of each illness and death.9 Notwithstanding his almost dismissive 
reference to Mannalargenna’s illness, as ever it is difficult to doubt Robinson’s emotional 
investment in those under his care, many of whom had been companions for years. When 
asked to see the corpse of his old friend, Robinson wrote that he was “too overpowered to 
go.”10 Perhaps his earlier ambivalence was a sign of the difficulty he had in digesting the 
prospect that “the Chief” was soon to die. 
Speculating that the “home government” would remove the Flinders Island Aboriginal 
population to the mainland was an anxious prospect all round.11 It seemed the most likely 
topic to lift Robinson’s spirits as much as the hopes of those under his care. Travelling to 
Hobart in March 1836 Robinson was heartened by talks with Arthur regarding the position of 
“protector general of the aborigines of New Holland”. 12 Further consultation with the 
Lieutenant Governor in September revealed Secretary of State Glenelg’s wish to have 
Robinson take up a similar position in South Australia, a prospect in which he hardly 
revelled.13 Once again Robinson’s diary witnessed the depth of his despair: “Philanthropy is 
nothing, the security of life and property is nothing…The beneficial results arising from all 
this in the civilisation and Christianisation of the natives is all nothing.”14 Indicating the 
strength of his desire to land a mainland position, this outburst can be qualified later in view 
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of Glenelg’s “basest ingratitude” in not recommending Robinson receive a pension and land 
for his son. Glenelg quipped that it was enough that he was employed at all.15  
How could Robinson digest such an ungrateful suggestion: 
after near nine years service in one of the greatest enterprises ever achieved of its 
kind, after the most signal advantages gained by the successful endeavours in the 
security of life and property, in the increased value of land consequent upon the 
removal of the aborigines by my exertions and that of my family, after being the 
instrument of resorting peace and tranquillity to the colony…in being the means 
of saving the lives of black and white.16  
Indeed, how could the settlement of Van Diemen’s Land have proceeded at all, settler 
emotions be salved, if not for Robinson’s efforts? The Black Line had manifestly failed in 
rounding up all but a few Aborigines. The roving parties, no matter what demographic trauma 
they inflicted, were often strategically outmaneuvered.  
Disillusioned with the task at hand, with the long entertained prospect of moving to 
the mainland in mind, arriving in Sydney at a time when there was such public antagonism 
around the management of frontier hostility may have been just what Robinson needed to 
excite his humanitarian passion. Indeed, there was much similarity between the emotional 
landscape of Van Diemen’s Land of the late 1820s and early 1830s and that of New South 
Wales in 1838, particularly at the level of public discourse.  
The “malicious attacks upon the natives” Robinson noted in his diary shortly after 
arriving in Sydney were largely contained within the Sydney Herald, established in 1831 
under the principal editorship of Ward Stephens. In the diversifying world of the Sydney 
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16 Plomley, Weep in Silence, p. 386. 
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press, the paper had become a key advocate of the squatting cause, plying Governor George 
Gipps with pressure to enact more punitive measures to ward off Aboriginal hostility and thus 
vitiate the plight of suffering settlers. Particularly in the case of the Myall Creek Trials, the 
Herald’s invective provided settlers with a rolling catchcry to lament what appeared to be 
inconsistencies in the management of frontier justice. It was all well and good to recognise 
the legal equality of Aborigines, but what of bringing to trial those “ferocious savages” 
responsible for the murder of “unprotected” whites?  
As this thesis has shown, this narrative was hardly a novel feature of New South 
Wales as settlers pushed across the Upper Hunter and Liverpool Plains. With some 
newspapers shifting in their attitude to Aboriginal people, at no stage since 1803 had the 
settlers of the colony, or Van Diemen’s Land for that matter, been without a discursive means 
of imagining themselves as members of a suffering community. With some papers opting for 
a more humanitarian tone, there was always an editor who maintained a fearful representation 
of Aboriginal people in the settler imaginary, tracing the not so subtle contours of white 
victimhood. 
The long presence of this narrative in the Sydney press suggests a tension in Rebecca 
Wood’s argument which emphasises the Myall Creek trials as “a discernible moment in the 
development of a distinct myth of white Australia, which began with a burgeoning and 
distinctive colonial identity, one that moved beyond a British identity but was not yet 
Australian.”17 Wood convincingly places the Sydney Herald as the key arbiter of this crucible 
of colonial identity as it “not only succeeded in portraying the colonists as isolated and 
threatened but also reworked and redefined notions of what it meant to be a settler.”18 But 
                                                
17 Rebecca Wood, ‘Frontier Violence and the Bush Legend: The Sydney Herald’s Response to the Myall Creek 
Massacre Trials and the Creation of a Colonial Identity’, History Australia vol. 6, no. 3 (2009).    
18 Wood, Frontier Violence and the Bush Legend’. 
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rather than contradicting Wood’s analysis this thesis has in fact been a validation of her 
argument, underwriting the important role newspapers played in the negotiation and 
expression of settler identity. Wood recognises that “the Herald came to act as the interface 
between one of many competing ‘narratives’ of colonisation and an imagined community of 
settlers.”19 In terms of the framework of this thesis, the Herald therefore emerges as the key 
“interface” contesting what it meant to be a settler in colonial Australia. In doing so it led a 
long-standing discourse of fear and white victimhood developed by the press in New South 
Wales and Van Diemen’s Land.  
Woods’ salient insight regarding the Herald is its harnessing of this discourse with 
respect to the specific circumstances of settler society at the time of the Myall Creek 
massacre. The significance of this flashpoint is the opportunity it offered the ‘squattocracy’ to 
fashion and deploy a sense of imagined community in a bid to contest political power, or at 
least have a significant influence upon the shape of colonial society. Unlike previous 
moments in the lurching progress of the New South Wales frontier, which more or less relied 
upon the valence of whiteness, the context of the Myall Creek massacre can thus be seen as a 
clear moment which allowed for the emergence of a “distinct myth of white Australia” with 
the potential to move “beyond a British identity”.20  
To underline the importance of Wood’s insight we first of all need to understand the 
relationship between the spread of the frontier into the Liverpool Plains beyond the Upper 
Hunter in the 1830s and the official response it drew from colonial administrators in terms of 
the occupation of Crown Lands by squatters. Just as it became the new field of expansion for 
settlers principally from the Hawkesbury in 1824, as the Hunter began to reach its stocking 
capacity in 1826 settlers began to stake their interests in the Liverpool Plains earlier unlocked 
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by Henry Dangar.21 The clutch of squatters who established themselves beyond the “limits of 
settlement” designated by Governor Darling in 1826 – the boundaries of which being 
formalised for the “convenience” of settlers making their selections as the Nineteen Counties 
in 1829 – are thus familiar characters.22 Dangar looms large over events of 1838 on account 
of his station being the site of the Myall Creek Massacre. Robert Scott, already familiar with 
frontier instability through his role in preparing a report for McLeay as magistrate for the 
Hunter explaining the origins of Kamilaroi hostility, is of even larger note owing to his 
important role in the formation of the “Black Association”.23 William Ogilvie and James 
Glennie also expanded their land holdings into the Liverpool Plains.  
In areas such as the Liverpool Plains, being just beyond the counties of Brisbane and 
Bligh, squatting created an administrative headache eventually culminating in the Australian 
Lands Act of 1846, an intervention from the Colonial Office which granted squatters tenure 
of their runs in the form of 8 and 14 year leases.24 Despite natural official reservation to 
mitigate the unregulated “dispersion” of settlers, the boundaries of the Nineteen Counties 
proved largely porous to land hungry squatters no longer able to consolidate their holdings 
within them. The most valuable runs being taken up, enterprise and the “acquisitive impulse” 
drove settlers into the fertile Liverpool Plains. Once again demonstrating the economic 
imperatives driving settler colonialism, the correlation between the growth of pastoralism and 
a prosperous New South Wales found Darling’s successor Richard Bourke legitimating 
squatting by introducing a yearly licence on runs held by squatters at 10 pounds in 1836.25 
                                                
21 Wood, Dawn in the Valley, p. 46; Roger Milliss, Waterloo Creek : the Australia Day massacre of 1838, 
George Gipps and the British conquest of New South Wales (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1994), p. 72.  
22 Sydney Gazette, 17 October 1829.  
23 Scott and Macleod to Darling HRA, series 1, vol. 12, p. 610. 
24 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, pp. 112, 720 – 721.  
25 Millis, Waterloo Creek, p. 113.  
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This measure built upon Bourke’s previous introduction of Commissioner’s of Crown Lands 
in 1833 as a means of limiting squatting with the limits of location.26.  
The Liverpool Plains shared with previous frontiers in New South Wales and Van 
Diemen’s Land a close correlation between the presence of Europeans and conflict with 
Aboriginal people.27 By the end of 1837 as squatters sent their stockmen emissaries to stake 
out runs along the Gwydir River and its tributaries, of which Myall Creek was one, to borrow 
Roger Milliss’ phrase the Liverpool Plains quickly became the new “flashpoint” of frontier 
hostility.28 As this chapter will soon discuss, with the arrival of the Governor George Gipps 
in 1838 this would create a policy intersection whereby squatters’ calls for the protection of 
their property from both European and Aboriginal threats would create grounds for the 
negotiation of Aboriginal protection, albeit not their rights to land, through increased powers 
to Commissioners of Crown Lands.  
The key factors in this negotiation were shifting attitudes towards Aboriginal people 
and their rights across the British imperial world. Bourke, and to an even greater extent 
Gipps, were the first Governors for whom this social and political movement would require 
particularly urgent attention. Bourke appears to have exhibited a similar reluctance to respond 
to settler calls for protection as Darling following the Lowe affair. Rather than attributing the 
“archival silence” with respect to frontier conflict until 1836 to an actual lull in hostilities, 
Milliss refers to an article in the Sydney Herald in 1839 which suggests that Bourke told 
settlers seeking protection in the face of Aboriginal ‘depredations’ to do so of their own 
accord.29 Indicating the tacit acceptance of jurisdictional pluralism with respect to the New 
                                                
26 Millis, Waterloo Creek, p. 112.  
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28 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p.102.  
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South Wales frontier despite longstanding humane directives, such a mode of governance 
was soon relegated by shifts in the global administration of empire brought about by the 
sharp focus of British humanitarianism towards the rights of Aboriginal people.  
Notwithstanding the release of the Select Committee’s Report in 1837, Bourke’s 
prevarication when it came to frontier instability was not shared by Colonel William 
Snodgrass who proceeded him in the role of Acting Governor from 5 December 1837 until 
Gipps’s arrival the following February. Bourke had been informed by late October 1837 of a 
report regarding the murder of two servants by some of the local Wererai people on the Terry 
Hie Hie property of William Waterford. On 27 October the Gazette, trusted that “the 
government will lose no time in dispatching some of the military to aid the residents in that 
vicinity in reducing the savages to order.”30 Falling short of that, Bourke ordered Major 
James Nunn of the Mounted Police to hold an enquiry into the matter.31 Nunn’s apparent 
failure to do so was followed by similar correspondence from Commissioner of Crown Lands 
Alexander Patterson as well as Robert Scott, which reported the general state of hostility in 
the vicinity of the Gwydir River.  
Scott’s letter to Colonial Secretary Edward Thomson rings a familiar note of settler 
anxiety and victimhood: “The inhabitants are much alarmed and I have thought it my duty to 
bring the disturbed state of the Country under His Excellency’s consideration that he may 
adopt such measures as in his wisdom he may deem necessary for the protection of the 
persons interested.”32 As with previous zones of frontier conflict, a partial explanation for this 
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state of hostility is alluded to in a letter from James Glennie to Scott which suggests that the 
white victims had previously abducted local Aboriginal women.33 Upon receiving further 
intelligence communicated to Nunn by Lieutenant George Cobban stationed at Jerry’s Plains 
that two more servants had been murdered on the property of John Cobb, Snodgrass ordered 
Nunn to the Gwydir at the end of December “for the purpose of enquiring into, and 
repressing as far as possible the aggressions complained of.”34 Under Snodgrass at least, the 
relationship between settler anxieties and the eliminationist logic of settler colonialism would 
once again become clear.  
 Managing to escape proper sanction for the massacre of perhaps as many as 300 
Wererai people at Snodgrass Lagoon on 26 January 1838 following his initial investigation a 
Cobb’s station, Nunn looms large throughout Roger Milliss’s comprehensive analysis of the 
history of violence on the Liverpool Plains.35 On account of his resemblance to the Duke of 
Wellington, the mythology surrounding Nunn and his involvement in this event was assured 
by the renaming of the locations as Waterloo Creek.36 Unlike his predecessor Lowe, however, 
he would never face a proper inquiry let alone a criminal trial. Rather in the face of political 
expediency and what Attorney General Plunkett labelled the ‘great excitement’ of the public 
mind, the Executive Council decided “that no object either of justice or Humanity could be 
attained by making the transaction in question the subject of further Judicial inquiry.”37 
According to Milliss’s account it was in fact the very events engendered by Nunn’s presence 
                                                
33 Glennie to Scott cited in Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p. 160.  
34 Thomson to Nunn cited in Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p. 164. 
35 Indicating that there is “no reliable or coherent account” of Nunn’s expedition, Milliss covers a range of 40 – 
50 victims on the basis of some testimony, while Threlkeld suggested that the numbers killed may have been as 
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36 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p. 197.  
37 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p. 666.  
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on the Gwydir that created the political contingencies which Gipps would subsequently cite 
as preventing him from conducting the necessary inquiry.38  
The circumstances of the Myall Creek massacre in particular can only really be 
understood in view of Nunn’s expedition. In light of there being “no reliable or coherent 
account” of this particular journey of the Mounted Police, Milliss draws upon the “folklore of 
the Bingara area” which suggests the possibility of the Mounted Police’s association with 
other massacres, such as the one which gave Slaughterhouse Creek its name. Just as startling 
is Milliss’s use of this “tradition” to detail Nunn’s parting orders to the stockmen of the 
Gwydir “to fend for themselves, as he could not be expected to come up from Sydney every 
time they had trouble with the blacks.”39 Even more so is the claim that after developing 
some “military finesse” in the company of the Mounted Police, in the absence of Nunn the 
already hostile stockmen mounted what became known as ‘The Bushwhack’. This violent 
drive across the countryside, purportedly instigated by the murder of a white woman at Terry 
Hie Hie, tells the story of a five-week scouring of the Gwydir region beginning in May and 
ending with the massacre of 300 people at Slaughterhouse Creek.40 According to the tradition 
it was the survivors of this massacre that ventured east towards present-day Inverell in search 
of refuge, which they found at Henry Dangar’s station Myall Creek, only to fall victim to the 
seven “toughest” whites most willing to continue to the ‘pogrom’ to its end at the beginning 
of June.41 
There are clear idiosyncrasies in Milliss’s broader telling of this stage of New South 
Wales history in which his often literary style presumes too much from the scant detail upon 
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which he necessarily draws.42 But his reliance upon folklore is a key strength, couched as it is 
with a wariness of its authenticity and awareness that “history will most likely…part 
company with the Bingara legend” as he frames the circumstances culminating in the 
massacre at Myall Creek. As this thesis has repeatedly demonstrated, the violent animus 
behind such tragic events was a clear and present reality of the New South Wales and Van 
Diemen’s Land frontiers, whether at the behest of official or vigilante forms of justice. In 
Millis’s words, “It had been one long Bushwhack since the whites first occupied the Gwydir 
country two years earlier. The blacks at Myall Creek were merely next on the list.”43 The 
vigilantism of the Myall Creek massacre can therefore only be understood in relation to the 
prior involvement of an official armed force at the behest of an unsettled white community 
and government, an action in itself resulting in a significant though difficult to specify 
Aboriginal death toll.   
The enhanced humanitarian dimension that Gipps brought to New South Wales, 
bolstered by a Colonial Office attempting to incorporate the insight of the Select Committee 
on Aborigines, meant that some form of accountability was far more likely to be sought for 
the victims of Myall Creek than in the time of Snodgrass. The difficulty that Gipps faced in 
achieving this indicates the strength of public feeling against any measures aimed at 
protecting Aborigines. Framing the reaction to Myall Creek was on the one hand a 
metropolitan-based, yet trans-imperially derived, humanitarian discourse of which Gipps was 
ostensibly a part. On the other hand were the cries for protection of a select settler community 
who were now more than ever bolstered by a sense of the crucial role the pastoral industry 
                                                
42 As Tom Griffiths has recently noted, Waterloo Creek disappointed many within the historical community on 
account of what was at the time considered a “narrow obsession with violence and white guilt” suggesting a 
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played in securing the colony’s prosperity, a sense of entitlement intensified at a time of 
financial difficulty and drought.44 
Nor were commercial interests absent from the conclusions of the Select Committee 
on Aborigines but rather explicit to its hopes for a humane and prosperous British imperial 
world. Whether or not its authors were aware of any alarm that it might create, not only did 
the Report claim that “a line of policy, more friendly and just towards the natives, would 
materially contribute to promote the civil and commercial interests of Great Britain.”45 It also 
proposed that rather than end the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples’ land and the economic 
activity derived from it, on top of the “national necessity of finding some outlet for the 
superabundant population of Great Britain and Ireland”, Indigenous people should be made 
“profitable workmen” and “good neighbours”.46 Underlining the consolidation of chivalric 
discourse in the humanitarian imaginary, the problem was not so much the exposure of the 
New World to modernity per se as it was “the desolating effects of the association of 
unprincipled Europeans with natives in a ruder state.”47 However strongly they challenged 
racial prejudice, humanitarians were far from free of the class prejudice of the time.48 
Evincing its evangelical roots, the Report declared that “there is but one effectual means of 
staying the evils we have occasioned, and of imputing the blessings of civilisation, and that 
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is, the propagation of Christianity, together with the preservation...of the civil rights of the 
natives.”49  
This fundamental ambivalence at the heart of the Select Committee Report has been 
recently underlined in Alan Lester and Fae Dussart’s insightful analysis of the origins of 
humanitarian governance. The main explanation they provide to suggest that this 
ambivalence should come “as less of a surprise” is that while humane governance was 
articulated at the “heart of empire”, it was “worked out through encounters and relations with 
diverse actors in a range of richly complex settings and configurations across the globe.”50 
George Arthur, and by association Robinson, figure as among the key “diverse actors” 
facilitating this network of communication. The rise in concern for “distant strangers” in the 
later eighteenth-century characteristic of humanitarianism can be explained by way of 
broader social phenomena such as dampening the class antagonisms of the industrial 
revolution and the Christian obligation to address new forms of economic exploitation.51 
Lester and Dussart argue that during this same period British people  
were made aware of being a part of, and of feeling a part of a new global 
assemblage of empire. New patterns of responsibility and new objects of 
compassion were potential consequences of these new novel relations. The 
geographical and temporal specificity of humanitarian interaction reflects the fact 
that specific components have to be brought into alignment in specific ways 
across space at a planetary scale for humanitarian feelings to take place.52 
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 Pointing to the primacy of emotion as a factor in the negotiation of colonial policy, 
this argument helps explain the fact that some form of humanitarian feeling had featured in 
the British settlement of Australia since its inception. Yet this is but one layer of Lester and 
Dussart’s explanation of the origins of humane governance. In the case of the proliferation of 
humanitarian discourse in the 1830s, they deploy both higher order and more historically 
specific contingencies. In the first instance, drawing upon the ideas of governmentality 
developed by Michel Foucault, “a modern state’s imperative to control, regulate and as far as 
possible monopolise the violence of colonisation”, emerges as a far more fundamental and 
almost arbitrary impetus behind the need to preserve threatened societies than the desire to 
differentiate Britain from other empires and individual needs to do “good rather than evil”.53 
At the heart of this imperative is the need to be seen as having control of settler communities 
and actually being in control. Either way colonial administrators were wary of ceding 
authority to individual colonists, a potentially anarchic reality which reflects Ford’s point 
about the prominence of jurisdictional pluralism in early colonial New South Wales and 
Robin’s Hobbesian analysis of modernity’s aversion to a ‘state of nature’. In pointing to 
governmentality’s prerogative of controlling “decisions concerning life and death”, Lester 
and Dussart explain that if  
emigrant settlers were allowed to determine these things at will, there would be 
no state-sanctioned governmentality in colonial space (which was indeed 
sometimes the case). Humanitarian regulation as a function of government – a 
way of being governmental – was thus as intrinsic to the project of Britain’s 
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colonisation of other lands as it was to the coeval emergence of a modern state 
system in Europe.54 
As this chapter will demonstrate, this imperative presented a paradox insofar as it also 
demanded the protection of settlers despite official knowledge that they often instigated 
frontier violence. 
 What shape humanitarian governmentality took brings Lester and Dussart to Arthur’s 
crucial role in developing and adapting strategies to protect non-European imperial subjects 
as a consequence of his life being “bound up in many of the most significant transitions 
reshaping the British Empire”.55 Of particular note was his implementation of amelioration 
policies to cater for the social and economic integration former slaves in the Caribbean during 
the 1820s following the abolition of slavery.56 Arthur’s role in developing and implementing 
humanitarian governance was further conferred by his movement through “British imperial 
space”, whereby he helped adapt amelioration in the Caribbean context to conciliation and 
protection during his governance of Van Diemen’s Land.57 The greater challenge this second 
imperial space which was not, after all, entirely ‘imperial’, was a matter of it consisting in 
“resilient sovereign peoples that British invaders had to fight for the land” at a point in time 
when humanitarian ideals were being negotiated in the very act of governance.58 In initially 
attempting to adapt amelioration into a form of conciliation towards both Aboriginal people 
and convicts, what amounted from Arthur’s efforts was the idea of protectionism that would 
subsequently be deployed elsewhere.59  
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In recognising the difficult role that he faced in the context of Van Diemen’s Land, 
Lester and Dussart also deploy Arthur to demonstrate that humanitarianism is “more than an 
abstracted set of ideals derived from European Enlightenment thought”.60 In an assertion 
relevant to Arthur and Robinson as much as the history of emotions more broadly, they argue 
that humanitarianism needs to be seen “as expressive of the deeply felt, emotive desire, to ‘do 
the right thing’ that motivates many people in positions of governmental authority”.61 This in 
many ways explains the importance of honour in understanding the prominence of chivalric 
discourse. The nexus of these sentiments and the pragmatic commercialism which 
humanitarianism continued to allow, not to mention the eventual failure of the protectorate 
system, of course asks important questions of the culpability of its practitioners for the 
resulting violence of settler colonialism. But this does not amount to a straightforward 
condemnation of humanitarianism. Drawing on the work of Ann Stoler, Lester and Dussart 
warn against the assumption that historical actors possess the same “two-dimensional interior 
spaces” that we hope to possess ourselves despite “our own fractious subjectivities.”62 
However we might hope to act in accordance with ideological purity in the present, historical 
actors likewise faced the difficulty of negotiating a combination of potentially conflicting 
thoughts and feelings in the pursuit of certain goals.   
 Just as Lester’s work on the role of newspapers in shaping settler subjectivity has 
provided a useful means of understanding the discursive flow of emotion in settler 
communities, so too does his collaboration with Dussart indicate the need to respect the 
emotional impulses of colonial agents as they sought to negotiate themselves as “components 
within social, and specifically governmental, assemblages and discourses.”63 As with the 
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emotional dialectic whereby colonists could posit themselves as white victims, colonial 
administrators such as Arthur and Robinson were engaged in a similar process of articulating 
their status as white saviours. Fear and compassion were the lodestars which respectively 
coordinated participation within these two oppositional emotional communities. In either case 
it is important to understand that while expressive of one’s inner-state, emotions must be 
understood in view of the dynamic cultural context that determines how historical actors 
negotiate individual and collective subjectivities.  
This blurs the line between what can be seen as constituting the self externally and 
what contribution the self makes to the cultural context surrounding it, an unresolved 
question in the field of biography. Rather than positing historical agents merely as “ghost-like 
ciphers for social processes”, Lester and Dussart propose the idea of “life geographies” as “a 
way of analysing the relationship between individuals’ continually reconstituted 
subjectivities, the places in which they dwell and the spaces through which they move.”64 The 
strength of this approach is how it takes into account the different challenges thrown up by 
specific locations and the characteristics of the people inhabiting them. Someone such as 
Arthur in the position of power that he was can thus be understood as an agent both 
influenced by, and with an increasing capacity to exert an influence upon, colonial 
governance and humanitarian discourse as he moved across British imperial space.65 As he 
incorporated humanitarian ideas and feelings into his own practice of governance at various 
points of colonial space, that very practice assisted the emotional and functional malleability 
of humanitarian governance. 
 It was his experience of the Black War and relationships with Robinson and Buxton 
which aided the particular movement of humanitarian discourse away from amelioration and 
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towards protectionism.66 Arriving in London in 1836 as the Select Committee met, Arthur 
appeased his crisis of conscience not by lamenting the results of ‘protecting’ Van Diemen’s 
Land Aborigines from “aberrant settlers” by exiling them to Flinders Island but by proposing 
a similar policy in other areas of settlement.67 This fitted well with the Select Committee’s 
overall goal of establishing a form of humane settlement which allowed for a trade-off 
between the bounty of Aboriginal land and the grace of European civilisation. This alignment 
of opinion in the metropole culminated in Glenelg accepting Arthur’s recommendation that 
Robinson be appointed Chief Protector based in Port Phillip alongside four assistants.68 
That the humanitarian movement was by no means suggesting an end to colonisation 
might suggest that when Robinson arrived in Sydney there would be far less animosity 
towards the idea of Aboriginal protection. In June 1838, however, the Gazette could “not 
apprehend any great benefit” that could be derived from the decision to appoint protectors in 
accordance with the Select Committee’s recommendations. The paper was particularly 
concerned with the “appointment of gentlemen in Britain, ignorant alike of the language and 
the habits of the Blacks”, “drones” whose “good fat salaries” could only be burden upon a 
colony already suffering from a revenue shortfall.69  
Fiscal concerns aside, as James Boyce has argued in his landmark study of the 
settlement of Port Phillip, what brought settlers into direct conflict with the humanitarian 
movement was its recognition that Aboriginal people had rights to land regardless of the 
practical utility they drew from it according to the “dominant settler discourse” which 
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necessitated farming.70 Even before the Select Committee released its report in 1837, settlers 
became aware of this political shift in following the first report of the Colonisation 
Commission of South Australia which indicated the new Whig government’s eagerness to 
take into account the rights of Aboriginal people.71 As well as guarding them “against 
personal outrage”, in aiming to protect their “undisturbed enjoyment of the propriety right to 
the soil” the report recommended that should such a right be ceded away that it be done so by 
way of “bargains and treaties” that would ensure their subsequent subsistence.72 It was with 
this understanding that Aboriginal interests would have to be taken into account for 
colonisation to be approved by the government that John Batman conducted a treaty between 
the Port Phillip Association and the Kulin people in June 1835.73 Although little about the 
treaty is accurately known, Boyce points out it is highly unlikely that the Kulin “consented to 
the incomprehensible concept of selling their land by signing a written treaty.”74 How the 
government reacted to this unique situation was perhaps as confusing to settlers as it is now 
to any evaluation of the premises of humanitarian governance, its apparent blindness to the 
cause it sought to advocate. 
Lester and Dussart point to the broader paradox of the historical intersection whereby 
an emergent humanitarianism coalesced with an unprecedented occupation of Aboriginal land 
such that a “British governmental responsibility to protect seems to have emerged at the same 
time and in the same spaces as that government assured the right to colonise.”75 Boyce is 
more specific in asking one of the more pressing questions of Australian history: “why at the 
apex of imperial concern for the rights of Indigenous people, an evangelical secretary of State 
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for the Colonies, Lord Glenelg, responded as he did to the challenge posed by the ambitious 
property speculators of Van Diemen’s Land”?76 An answer to Boyce’s question can be found 
in the way that the Select Committee eventually defined the specifics of humanitarian 
governance in their 1837 Report; colonisation could only be condemned when it was not 
accompanied by an adequate urgency to adapt Aboriginal people to western civilisation.77 
But this specific dilemma relates back to Bourke’s eventual legitimation of squatting by the 
introduction of licences for runs in 1836 beyond the limits of location following instructions 
from the metropole, a measure which precluded anyone who couldn’t front the 10 pound fee. 
Regulating trespass beyond the limits of location thus became a function of class.78  
Rather than being a surprise such a measure in fact fits well with the principles of 
humane governance, which as much as anything was concerned with regulating colonial 
space, a matter of maintaining law and order in the interests of private enterprise. The same 
can be said of Bourke’s despatch to Glenelg of 10 October 1835, which Boyce notes as being 
remarkable for its complete lack of reference to the impacts of colonising Port Phillip upon 
Aboriginal people.79 In concluding his justification for what amounted to an encouragement 
of this expansion beyond the limits of location, Bourke wrote, “The dispersion will go on, 
notwithstanding the discouragement, but accompanied by much evil that might be prevented 
by the guidance and control of authority opportunely introduced.”80 Boyce suggests that any 
tension between Glenelg’s enthusiastic approval of this policy the following April and the 
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rhetoric surrounding the settlement of South Australia in January can be reconciled in view of 
his belief in Bourke’s humanitarian credentials.81   
More pragmatically, what were the consequences of recognising the legitimacy of 
such a treaty for British sovereignty? Glenelg was “anxious that the Aborigines should be 
placed under a zealous and effective protection”, but fell short of advising a policy that would 
recognise the capacity of Aboriginal people to cede land to other parties as such a 
“concession would subvert the foundation on which all Proprietary rights in New South 
Wales at present rest”.82 Colonisation could thus proceed humanely so long as it did so under 
the auspices of colonial officialdom, instructed by a distant and humane overseer in the 
colonial office. To do otherwise risked exposing the lie of settlement at a time when much 
was being done to retrieve the lost honour attributed to the actions of the depraved element of 
settler society. As Boyce rightly points out this reflected the “prism of class” through which 
London viewed Aboriginal rights, which allowed the Select Committee to see Port Phillip as 
an opportunity to bring “civilisation, Christianity and law to the frontier.”83 Whatever this 
rhetoric hoped to achieve, between 1837 and 1842 the Aborigines in the vicinity of Port 
Phillip “were largely dispossessed of a territory bigger than England”.84 
The clashes which occurred between settlers and Aborigines in Port Phillip meant that 
by the time Gipps arrived in Sydney in 1838 his attention to violence radiated south as much 
as North. Far from being separate, how Gipps responded to both the Port Phillip and 
Liverpool Plains frontiers would jointly flow into the reception he received from settlers and 
the press. Despite things going their way even at a time of heightened humanitarian concern, 
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time and again settlers would complain of the apparent inability of extant administrative 
structures to protect the lives of their servants and the integrity of their property from 
Aborigines.  
Along with the controversy surrounding Nunn, and before he was prompted to assist 
settlers in the district of Port Phillip, there was another frontier matter Gipps had to address. 
He had to decide what action needed to be taken in relation to the ongoing saga following 
Surveyor General Thomas Mitchell’s fatal encounter with the Barkindji people at Lake 
Benanne near present-day Euston close to the junction of the Murray and Darling Rivers on 
26 May 1836, emerging from a similar encounter a year prior.  
In mentioning the impending release of the Select Committee’s Report and the overall 
need to consider Aborigines as “Subjects of the Queen”, Glenelg responded to the inquiry 
Bourke had already held into this incident by requesting that he further consult his legal 
advisers as to whether they had “any cause to doubt the lawfulness of Major Mitchell’s 
proceedings”.85 This ran counter to Bourke’s hopeful speculation in forwarding the matter to 
Glenelg in January that “no further explanation” on his part was required on account of the 
Executive Council ultimately finding no fault in Mitchell’s actions.86 Received by Snodgrass 
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just before Gipps arrived in February 1838, the new Governor was already well versed in 
Glenelg’s renewed instructions and forwarded the case to Attorney General Thomas Plunkett 
in March.87 As he would similarly advise later with respect to the case surrounding Nunn, in 
addition to pointing to the difficulty of conducting an investigation with Mitchell being in 
England and the lack of certainty with each witness could indicate that lives had been lost, 
Plunkett drew upon the potential “Public excitement” that a second inquiry might cause.88 
Other than indicating that he had done as instructed and attached Plunkett’s report, Gipps’s 
despatch to Glenelg reveals very little of the Governor’s humanitarian resolve. It neither 
explained the gist of the Attorney General’s findings nor suggested what feelings he may 
have held regarding the matter.89 In any event, in having a line so firmly drawn underneath 
whatever culpability he may have had, Milliss is apt in comparing Mitchell’s fate to that of 
Nathaniel Lowe on the Hunter more than a decade prior.90 Justice would be done for neither 
man’s victims.  
Whatever it may have lacked in political resolve, Plunkett’s assessment was correct 
when it came to the matter of public feeling. Unsatisfied by Mitchell’s justification of his 
actions on the grounds of self-preservation the Gazette was in fact in favour of some recourse 
                                                                                                                                                  
“instances of necessary chastisement” conducted by “benevolent, and sensible men” such as Governor 
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to justice: “we plainly tell Major Mitchell, that for this wholesale slaughter of so many souls, 
nothing short of the most public and full examination will satisfy us. This too is requisite to 
appease the public mind, as hundreds are exactly of our opinion.”91 Changing its tone from 
previous frontier skirmishes, the Australian likewise supported some form of inquiry, arguing 
that Mitchell’s actions were “unnecessary”, that his victims had been “harmless and well-
disposed.”92 Suggestive of the settler community’s active engagement of humanitarian 
sentiment, in contrast the Herald threw its whole weight behind Mitchell. In a taste of the 
paper’s reification of white victimhood during the Myall Creek saga, the Herald homed in on 
the hypocrisy of humanitarian “canters”. Targeting the Australian in particular, the Herald 
asked  
what are we to think of the tender-heartedness of those philanthropists who weep 
over the, perhaps, necessary shooting of a black, and yet remember the tragical 
[sic] fate of the unfortunate Mr. Cunningham, who was butchered by savages, 
when accompanying Major Mitchell on his previous expedition?93  
It had “become a fashion with a certain class of persons (some of them, no doubt, well-
meaning men) – theorists, and others desirous of acquiring a reputation for humanity”, the 
paper went on, “to sympathize with the aboriginal natives of all Colonies; and to lament over 
a slain savage, while they disregard the safety of the lives and property of the white 
inhabitants!”94 Emphasising the right of settlers to use a “strong hand” in the absence of such 
protection, the Herald drew upon a global frame of reference when it asked: “Did the 
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Americans trifle with their savage neighbours? – were they influenced by the denunciations 
of a set of canting hypocrites and imposters, to submit to savage aggression?” No, the 
“Americans” had not, and nor should they have disobeyed “the law of nature that civilized 
man shall drive the savage before him”. Yet, despite the apparent providential strength of the 
“civilized man”, the Herald couldn’t help but point to many other occasions of white 
victimhood; Cunningham again, Captain Logan at Moreton Bay, not to mention “the 
treatment of the savages of New Zealand.” Here was ressentiment clear as day. Somehow the 
right of “civilised man” to conquer could only be couched in terms which emphasised his 
suffering at the hands of “savages”, a phenomenon that continued well beyond the scope of 
this thesis into the second half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. The only way 
the Herald could reconcile the existence of “humbugging maniacs and hypocrites” was on the 
grounds of political expediency, that the “display of humanity in favour of the natives is 
nothing less than an attempt to injure Major Mitchell with the Home Government, who 
cannot do without the votes of the political "Saints."95  
The Monitor also tended to side with Mitchell, although with less invective, publishing 
his letter on 27 January through which he similarly justified his actions according to his own 
experience of the “hostile intentions” of Aborigines as well as the deaths of Cunningham and 
Logan.96 Fear of falling to such a fate indeed seems to have loomed large for Mitchell. “The 
fact is”, the Gazette proclaimed, “that Major Mitchell is, and always was, dreadfully 
frightened of the blacks. This is sufficiently manifested by his having shot them just in the 
same indiscriminate manner, on each of his former expeditions.” In comparison, explorers 
such as Charles Sturt and Hume had different experiences on account of their preference for 
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conciliation.97 In the journals of his expeditions, the publication of which in part explains his 
presence in London when Plunkett was deliberating, there are enough instances to suggest 
that, while he had many amicable encounters, fear of Aboriginal people was a factor in 
Mitchell’s movement through the bush. Shortly after Cunningham’s misfortune in April 
1835, Mitchell’s belief that the various Aboriginal groups along the Darling were of a 
peaceable disposition was shaken by an encounter with a group he called the “Spitting 
Tribe”, the Barkindji people, whose hostile reaction to a gun being fired led him to 
contemplate further “the painful necessity of making them acquainted with the superiority of 
our arms.”98 He likewise valued livestock for “the dread with which these animals inspired in 
the natives.”99  
The genesis of the drama that came to surround Mitchell was also presented in his 
journal in much the same language of imminent threat that would be heard by the inquiry.100 
Potentially contradicting the claims of the Gazette, Mitchell in fact framed his anticipation of 
being attacked around information that the Barkindji men he fell in with were in fact the same 
group who had previously threatened to kill Captain Sturt.101 But Mitchell would ultimately 
explain in his published account of the incident in May, at what he came to name 
triumphantly name Mount Dispersion, as resulting from an incident a year prior where his 
men had fired upon an Aboriginal group after being attacked.102 In reflection Mitchell 
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referred to this incident as sufficient justification for his subsequent decision to mount an 
attack.103  
With the case around Mitchell put to rest, Gipps’s attention was urgently drawn to the 
state of unrest brought about by the movement of large numbers of stock to Port Phillip. In 
June 1838 a letter from a settler on “The Route to Port Phillip” published in the Gazette 
indicated that 100 000 sheep had been settled in the new district since February, with 16 000 
more en route. The same letter reported the lack of success had by a party of mounted police 
sent out from Goulburn under Lieutenant Richard Waddy in search of “the Blacks who 
murdered Mr. Faithfull’s men.”104 This referred to an incident in April at Winding Swamp 
near the Ovens River, which became symbolic of the growing alarm of settlers. Not entirely 
convinced that this attack was unprovoked as reported by the Herald, acknowledging that at 
least seven of the 15 man party had been killed the Gazette observed “it has now become a 
matter of absolute necessity, that stockades, manned by an adequate military force, should be 
stationed at regular distances along the route; until that is done there can be no safety for the 
traveller”.105 Highlighting the awareness that these particular travellers probably had of 
Bourke’s earlier warning regarding the treatment of Aboriginal women, Milliss is doubtful 
that this edict would have been properly observed given the history of frontier relations.106  
This was not the only instance of violence on the Port Phillip frontier that excited settler 
feeling. In April 1837 the Australian was “grieved to hear a confirmation of the fears 
entertained for the safety of Messrs. GELLIBRAND and HESSE” following the discovery of 
their bodies covered in “wounds from the weapons of the Aborigines.”107 The Gazette was 
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more equivocal about the details of the death of the two men from Van Diemen’s Land, 
travelling near Barrabull Hills just north of Port Phillip, but was resigned to them having been 
“Murdered by the natives”, speculating that those responsible had also committed the murder 
of a settler named Franks.108 The paper made a connection between these two separate events 
and the killing of an Aboriginal man by a settler named Whitehead, who was tried but 
“unaccountably acquitted”109. Indicating a similar awareness of how such incidents tended to 
originate, the Australian at first excused “extermination” as a reasonable “measure of self-
protection”, but then asked: “Have not they also injuries to avenge and atrocities to 
retaliate?”110 Extending its ambivalence without suggesting any direct intervention the paper 
made a tentative gesture towards what official steps could be taken when it also asked, “are 
our countrymen to be slaughtered without help, and without any attempt to correct by terror 
or by severity the evil disposition towards them, of the Aborigines in that quarter?”111 A letter 
from M.D. published in the Colonist lamenting “the maudling[sic] humanity of The 
Australian” and “the empty mouthing verbosity of The Gazette”, asked “would not reasoned 
humanity urge that the most rational mode of preventing future slaughter and extermination, 
is a timely and salutary demonstration of our superiority?”112 In July 1837 A Settler wrote to 
the same paper suggesting a similar strategy of exile as had been deployed in Van Diemen’s 
Land.113  
But it was only after the murder of Faithfull’s men in 1838 that “terror” would be 
firmly suggested as a means of once more dealing with the unsettled frontier. Beyond 
Waddy’s unsuccessful expedition to the Ovens River, how Gipps was to respond to the 
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growing clamour from settlers for protection was complicated by the fact that he had been 
presiding over a government notice that sought to emphasise the legal rights of Aborigines, to 
resolve the long running existence of jurisdictional pluralism. Milliss follows minutely the 
progress of this document through its various iterations and makes the important observation 
that in order not “to exasperate the public mind against the Blacks” Gipps postponed its 
publication for two weeks from the 2 May and then for 12 months.114 However, there is a 
tension in Milliss’ argument that as a result of this measure “the colonists were to remain in 
happy ignorance of their obligations” to Aborigines on account of its main thrust being 
reported in the Gazette on 1 May.115 In what was indeed an important development in the 
history of New South Wales, settlers were ordered, in light of increasing “outrages committed 
by the natives,”  
to abstain from any hostile measures whatever against the aborigines; and 
especially not to use or threaten to use fire-arms; but to remember at all times 
that, the native population are under equal protection of the laws, and are to be 
regarded and treated, and are liable to the same punishment in all respects, as her 
Majesty's other subjects.116        
However much notice was payed to this publication, settlers were in no mood to abide by any 
protective measures for the benefit of anyone but themselves.  
In a memorial to Gipps dated 8 June, 82 settlers, including two members of the 
Legislative Council, expressed their “regret and alarm” at the growing “hostile attitude” of 
several tribes in the neighbourhood of Port Phillip. Once again properties sitting unprotected 
threatened to derail the colonial economy as many attendants had been “obliged to abandon 
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their stations, leaving in some cases their flocks and herds at the mercy of the hostile tribes.” 
Contrary to expectations that such hostility was in retaliation for wrongs against them, in 
carrying out their many “outrages” the Aborigines had been “stimulated by their own 
cupidity and ferocity”. While this language could have been lifted from previous documents 
of the same ilk penned in both New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, particularly 
striking is the petitioners’ acknowledgment of the measures previously deployed to manage 
frontier emotions, being of the opinion   
that these untutored savages, not comprehending or appreciating the motives 
which actuate us, attribute forbearance on our part solely to impotence or fear, 
and are thus rendered only more bold and sanguinary. This opinion, founded on 
past experience, will receive ample confirmation on reference to the history of 
this Colony, and the Acts of former Governments. It is undeniable that no district 
of the Colony has been settled without in the first instance suffering from the 
outrages of the Natives, and that these outrages continued, until put an end to by 
coercive measures. Conciliation was generally tried in the first instance, but 
invariably failed in producing any good effect, and coercion was ultimately found 
unavoidably necessary, which, if earlier adopted, would have saved much 
bloodshed on both sides. It is only when they have become experimentally 
acquainted with our power and determination to punish their aggressions, that 
they have become orderly, peaceable, and been brought within the reach of 
civilization. 
Whatever “energetic and effectual steps” Gipps would take to ameliorate this situation, in the 
euphemistic language of “power and determination” it was clear settlers’ hopes were that 
terror would once again be struck in the hearts of their frontier enemies. Perhaps indicating a 
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sensitivity to Gipps’s humanitarian stance, and that growing across the empire more broadly, 
the memorialists urged that only such a course would prove “humane and merciful.”117 
 Unlike his back down over the Government Notice in May, Gipps’s response to the 
memorial was a strong indication of his resolve to establish a firmer footing for humanitarian 
governance, setting a platform for the eventual prosecution of the men arrested for the Myall 
Creek Massacre. The Gazette’s publication of this response on 30 June was hardly a ringing 
endorsement, observing that “Sir George seems to have imbibed some queer notions touching 
the Blacks.” The paper was nonetheless pleased to note that “more certain means are about to 
be adopted to reduce the savages to order than the mere sending of Messrs. Stewart and 
Waddy to frighten them with dumb show.” Rather than acquiesce with settler demands, 
Gipps highlighted the measures he had already taken in response to the attack upon 
Faithfull’s party, that following Waddy’s deployment to the area 28 mounted police were 
operating in the district of Port Phillip. This was in addition to the 44 military personnel now 
in the area, who at the discretion of the local police magistrate could be ordered to “advance, 
if necessary, into the interior.” Gipps also advised that posts would be established along the 
route between Port Phillip and Yass, adding more numbers to the mounted Police.118  
 The show of force requested by the memorialists could not be justified given the 
recent development of the British public being “awakened to a knowledge of what is owing 
to these ignorant barbarians”. With reference to the establishment of the Select Committee in 
particular, Gipps remarked that “a deep feeling” now existed on the part of the Government 
and the public to incorporate this knowledge in a more conciliatory mode of frontier policy. 
Whatever logical obligation Gipps had in protecting settlers, and however successful previous 
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measures alluded to by the memorialists had been, these factors could not contradict recent 
instructions “to treat the aboriginal natives as subjects of Her Majesty”.119 Glenelg approved 
this approach once Gipps’s comprehensive despatch of July reached London in December. 
Gipps professed an understanding in the despatch that among the memorialists were men 
whose previous dissatisfaction with his response to calls for protection led them to address 
their petition to the “Governor and Executive Council instead of the Governor alone.”120 
 Suggestive of the broader contempt held towards Gipps, it was “not without a feeling 
of indignation” that ANTI-HUMBUG wrote to the Colonist upon learning the Governor had 
refused “to suppress the daily outrages of the Aborigines, and to protect the settlers from their 
violence” as law would not allow it. Allowing Gipps’s “need of praise for his unwillingness 
to proceed to extremities with these rapacious savages”, ANTI-HUMBUG argued that 
“humanity should keep even pace with justice, for it is only justice that the settlers should 
receive a share of the protection afforded by that government which awards it to the 
Aboriginal natives.” The alternative was to allow the “dusky ‘lords of the soil’” to drive the 
“pale faces from their territories” and bring about the equivalent of the Black War.121 This 
letter did not represent the position the Colonist would ultimately take in the increasingly 
divergent battleground of frontier politics, but it provides a clear reference to public feeling in 
response to Gipps’s stance.  
The Herald’s response on the other hand was typical of the campaign of white 
victimhood it would continue to mount as the government evinced more and more sympathy 
towards Aborigines. Warning that the “calamity” of vigilantism was becoming an increasing 
reality, the paper projected that “the enterprising settlers who have braved the dangers of the 
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Australian wilds, will appeal to posterity, that they were driven to extremities by the 
supineness or impotence of ‘liberal’ governments, whose sympathies and charities were 
exclusively excited by the possessors of an Ethiopian visage.”122 In a letter written before 
Gipps even received the memorial but published on 28 June, H.H. similarly warned that 
“settlers are now wound up to a pitch of exasperation, and it requires but little provocation to 
make them discharge their vengeance on the devoted heads of culprits.”123 The use of present 
tense in this instance of course suggesting that such “vengeance” was already taking place.  
 And of course it already had. News of events at Myall Creek on 10 June did not 
feature in the press until mid-July. When it did, the already stark emotional battle-lines of 
New South Wales came into glaring relief. On 17 July the Australian shared information 
regarding a “most barbarous murder, which has been committed in the north-west district; 
twenty-two aboriginal natives inhumanly shot by several stockmen, and their bodies were 
afterwards burnt.” The paper also reported that the Police magistrate at Muswellbrook, 
Edward Day, had been sent to the Liverpool Plains to investigate the murders.124 This 
information was also contained in Gipps’s despatch of 21 July along with his response to the 
Port Phillip memorial.125 That Gipps had responded so quickly to ascertain the circumstances 
of the report about Myall Creek, which he received in the form of a letter from Frederick Foot 
in the first week of July, indicates his enthusiasm for enacting the sentiment implicit in his 
response to the settlers of Port Phillip. Rather than jump at an opportunity to protect settlers, 
he instead sought to address the cause of what appeared to be unprovoked attack on at least 
22 Aborigines. A more accurate death toll of 28 would subsequently emerge.   
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 It is unclear how Foot, a settler from the Liverpool Plains, became the individual who 
would personally report news of the massacre to Gipps at the beginning of July. 126 His letter 
relied entirely upon the testimony of Foster, an overseer at a station nearby Dangar’s property 
at Myall Creek. It seems Foot’s motivation in travelling so far to convey this news was a 
simple matter of him holding residence in the neighbourhood of where such a “flagrant 
violation of the law took place” and his interest in “peace and safety of All Her Majesty’s 
subjects in that part of the Colony.” Milliss is right in claiming that Gipps’s response to the 
memorial amounted to the most “emphatic stand in defence of the blacks”, of attempting to 
enforce the legal equality so strongly sought by London. But the fact that someone such as 
Foot had acted upon the same desire to see “All His Majesty’s subjects” treated fairly either 
suggests his quick exposure to Gipps’s orders or his own feelings towards Aborigines. 
Perhaps it was both.  
At all events, as Milliss’ has noted, one of the curiosities of Foot’s letter is the 
information that the eventual victims of the massacre at Myall Creek arrived at Dangar’s 
property “on the premise that they would be protected.”127 It was thus clear that not only 
Foot, but potentially some of those responsible for the massacre itself, had made some level 
of emotional investment on the other side of the frontier. But more importantly, why was 
protection being sought by the Wererai? If the Bingara tradition holds some truth, how is that 
some frontiersmen could feel inspired to lead a “pogrom”, to borrow Milliss’s heavy phrase, 
while others felt it their duty to protect Aborigines from such violence?128  
 These questions strike to the complexity of emotion on the frontier, not just on the 
Liverpool Plains, but as suggested earlier by Russell on the Hunter, and elsewhere across 
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New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land. It wasn’t always as simple as a strict emotional 
dichotomy between colonial centre and colonial periphery, between compassion and fear. 
Indeed, it appears to be partly at the initiative of Charles Kilmeister, one of the seven men 
eventually hanged for the massacre, that prompted its victims to seek asylum where they did. 
While there is enough evidence to suggest that divisions between attitudes towards 
Aboriginal people were hardening at this time, telling the story of the Myall Creek massacre 
from Kilmeister’s perspective emphasises the difficultly some had in negotiating the 
emotional turmoil of the frontier.  
 In an observation that could just as well apply to other areas of out-settlement across 
New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, Milliss explains that fear, “real or imagined”, 
was a fact of life for stockkeepers at Myall Creek. Dangar’s overseer, William Hobbs, made a 
point of travelling with “a pair of pistols” and made the same allowance for servants such as 
Kilmeister.129 Yet when the Wererai at first sought protection on a neighbouring property, 
concerned for their ongoing safety its overseer Andrew Eaton felt comfortable enough to 
negotiate their sanctuary at Myall Creek with Kilmeister. Not discounting the likelihood that 
this arrangement was motivated by the possibility of sexual favours it offered, in Milliss’s 
estimate “something approaching real friendship” developed between the group of 40 to 50 
Wererai and the stockkeepers. Suggesting that a young servant named George Anderson may 
have fallen in love with a women of the group named  ‘Ipeta’, Milliss speculates that 
“perhaps even the buck-toothed, pock faced Bristol ropemaker Kilmeister got a faint glimmer 
of the same emotion as well before some poison deep in his system surfaced in its stead and 
he turned viciously against he people he had so warmly befriended.”130 
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 This turn refers to Kilmeister’s eventual complicity in the murder of 28 Wererai, 
mostly women and Children, when 11 men arrived at Myall Creek during the afternoon of 10 
June led by a squatter named James Henry Fleming. 131 The party had learned that Dangar’s 
was providing refuge to Aborigines when it congregated at Bell’s station a few days prior, 
where they may have also been able to glean that Hobbs was about to leave Myall Creek on a 
trip to a nearby station.132 Whatever “friendship” that may have been cultivated between 
Kilmeister and his unlikely companions vanished the moment he joined the party as it led the 
hand-tied Aborigines over a ridge away from the huts under the pre-tense of giving them a 
‘fright’.133 That a massacre occurred is beyond doubt, but how it transpired is difficult to infer 
in any detail on account of their being no eyewitness accounts. Milliss nonetheless speculates 
that the 28 victims were “hacked and slashed to death”, a blade being a “more efficient and 
emotionally satisfying implement.”134 
 However emotionally driven their actions may have been, fear and victimhood 
certainly provided the central narrative around which settlers and certain elements of the 
press explained the actions of the 11 men responsible for the Myall Creek massacre. In 
September the Gazette used the massacre as a vindication of its previous stream of warnings 
that given the government’s “strong disinclination to extend that protection to the settlers it is 
their bounden duty to afford”, settlers were bound “to take up arms in self-defence.” Not 
wishing to prejudice the fate of the 10 “unhappy men” Day had managed to bring into 
custody in the course of his inquiry, it was suffice to say “that reprisals of the kind” the 
Gazette anticipated had occurred and “twenty-eight individuals of the tribe domiciled on the 
banks of the Gwydir River, have been inhumanly massacred.” Only the squatter and party 
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leader James Henry Fleming remained at large. Showing a flicker of its humanitarian hand, 
the paper quickly pulled it away in explaining “the feeling on the subject” on the part of 
settlers as being reflected by the subscription of 200 guineas for the prisoners’ defence.135  
In the same issue the Gazette published a memorial recently delivered to Gipps 
following a meeting of settlers at Patricks Plains led by Robert Scott, potentially associated 
with the “Committee of the Disturbed state of the North Western Districts”, soon known as 
the “Black Association” through the press.136 The memorial is remarkable for two reasons. 
First and foremost is its familiar delineation of the correlation between fear and the absolute 
necessity of self-defence in the absence of sufficient government protection. The 
memorialists lamented “the extent to which the hostility between the Aboriginal Natives and 
the Europeans has arrived in the North Western district”, but urged Gipps to “be aware of the 
fearful consequences likely to result from men acting under exasperated feelings and subject 
to no control, but their hatred heightened by their fear, leading (even ourselves) to habits that 
must make every lover of good Government shudder.” An obscure reference to the potential 
of settlers to act in a similar violent capacity as their servants, this qualified concern as to 
what could result if aboriginal aggression was not appropriately checked speaks to the 
otherwise humane timbre the memorial hoped to achieve. The need for Gipps to check “this 
dreadful state of things” was particularly urgent given the settlers’ belief that following the 
removal of Day’s party of Mounted Police stationed in the district the “Blacks”, already 
“actuated by the most revengeful feelings”, would “renew their aggressions with increased 
fury.” Evoking as much providential righteousness on the part of the pastoral community as 
Robinson had in conjunction with his role in saving the Aborigines, the memorialists held 
“no fear of the ultimate result (even if left to our own unaided exertions)” but still looked 
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“with horror to the individual suffering, through which our deliverance must be accomplished 
– unless Your Excellency will humanely interpose and with your wisdom and aid, avert the 
necessity of our again having recourse to our own strength and courage.”137 It is hard not to 
read “deliverance” in this context as activating the eliminationist logic of settler colonialism. 
This mix of will-to-power and political sensitivity to humanitarian discourse furnishes 
the second remarkable aspect of the memorial. The first of two appendices accompanying the 
petition was essentially a chronology of the various incidents leading to white deaths on the 
Liverpool Plains, beginning with the murder of two men in Mitchell’s service in 1832 on the 
Gwydir and ending in April 1836 reporting the death of a hutkeeper on the same river. Far 
more striking was “Appendix B” consisting in “a plan by which to pay an Interior Police”. In 
essence this was a proposal that squatters pay an annual sum for every section of land they 
occupied on top of the existing 10-pound licence fee. This extra revenue would provide the 
combined means of maintaining an “efficient Police” and the Commissioners of Crown 
Lands. However, the corollary of this apparent benevolence was that not only would squatters 
now be safer from Aboriginal incursion but also “be protected from the intrusion of each 
other.” In a bid to secure more permanent tenure for squatters, the paying of an annual sum 
was to ensure that each parcel of land “remain in undisturbed possession until put up for sale 
and purchase.”138 Milliss infers from Gipps’s promise “to give the idea his earnest 
consideration”, when Scott presented the memorial on September 18 that the Governor may 
have shared information regarding his plan to amend the Crown Lands Occupation Act.139   
That the new Bill which passed through the Legislative Council on 28 September by 
no means reassured squatter concerns regarding security of tenure helps explain Scott’s 
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subsequent act of sending Gipps a document titled ‘Proposed heads of an Enactment for 
protecting all persons lawfully being, or depasturing Stock, Beyond the limits of location, in 
their persons and properties, and in their just rights and privileges’.140 This recalibrated 
Scott’s representation of squatter concerns squarely around the issue of permanence of 
tenure. It was becoming clearer and clearer how closely entwined the issues of white 
victimhood and ownership of land were becoming. On the other hand the negotiation of the 
Crown Lands Occupation Act revealed Gipps’s prioritisation of a more humane frontier 
policy, in accordance with Glenelg’s instructions, following his appointment in early October 
of Edward Mayne as the new Commissioner of Crown Lands with the de facto responsibility 
of Protector of Aborigines.141 This appointment of responsibilities tacitly acquiesced in 
Scott’s call for the protection of squatters and their property while ensuring that this 
obligation extended just as much towards Aboriginal people.142 In any event, owing to 
objections being lodged principally by Justice Burton on constitutional grounds, Gipps 
pushed discussion of the Crown Lands Act into the next year.143 Thus when Scott had the 
even greater temerity to send Gipps the complete draft of a proposed Bill along the lines of 
his previous suggestions, this time under the explicit auspices of the ‘Committee on the 
disturbed state of the North Western District’, the governor could advise that its contents 
would be considered during the next sitting of the Legislature. 144    
 Gipps was far less understanding when it came to the discovery that Scott had visited 
the Myall Creek prisoners in jail shortly after he had delivered the memorial to Gipps in 
September. As Gipps would later write to Glenelg, “In the presence of a Gaoler”, most likely 
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Henry Keck, Scott purportedly advised the 11 men “not to split among themselves,…that 
there was no direct evidence against them, and that, if they were only true to each other, they 
could not be convicted.”145 Yet it was not Scott’s acknowledgment that he had indeed 
provided this advice and expression of regret that he had, after reading the depositions against 
them, that earned him a reprimand. It was the fact that he continued to be so closely involved 
once the trial was taking place. By sitting next to their attorney even, “thus making himself a 
party in their defence”, on top of his visit to the prison, Gipps was of the opinion that Scott 
“did materially interfere with, and have in part prevented the due administration of justice.” 
Gipps chose not to renew Scott’s commission as Justice of the Peace in the new year.146  
This point in time was not just an important in terms of the hopeful political 
manoeuvrings of the ‘Black Association’ but also the Sydney humanitarian movement. Just 
as the Herald became more and more of an advocate for the squatting cause in the context of 
the Myall Creek massacre trial, so too were elements of the press consolidating their support 
behind a burgeoning humanitarian sentiment. Although with less certainty than the Herald, 
the Monitor reported on the memorial with an ear to the plight of settlers. It was clear that 
“the aggression of the Blacks have exasperated the whites, to that degree, that they do not 
hesitate to hint pretty broadly their intentions of sanguinary reprisal upon the whole race, 
unless protection be afforded to their lives and properties.”147 Meanwhile, the Herald’s 
readership proved broad enough to challenge a letter from ANTI-HYPOCRITE which 
asserted that any attempt to civilise Aborigines was “futile and vain”.148  
Directly quoting his fellow correspondent, AN AUSTRALIAN was aghast that a 
fellow countrymen such as ANTI-HYPOCRITE could so heartily endorse calls to “suppress 
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the violence, rapine, and bloodshed, perpetrated by these hordes of aboriginal cannibals, to 
whom the veriest reptile that crawls the earth holds out matter for emulation; and who are far, 
very far, below the meanest brute in rationality, and every feeling pertaining thereto".149 W.L. 
likewise wrote to the Herald in opposition to the “erroneous and dangerous opinions” of 
ANTI-HYPOCRITE, calculated, as they were “to excuse, or extenuate, certain deeds of 
brutal violence, which have been committed by some white savages in the interior, on 
defenceless blacks.”150  
While “very creditable to the feelings of the writer”, the Herald ultimately viewed AN 
AUSTRALIAN’S reply to ANTI-HYPOCRITE unfavourably. Preference for Europeans 
would always be a priority over “savage barbarians in whatever quarter of the globe the latter 
may be found.” “We have no patience with vagrant sympathy”, the paper exclaimed, “when 
we learn that our cattle and our servants have been speared by the unsophisticated blacks. No, 
we; the settlers must be protected - or we know what the result will be.”151 As it drew itself 
closer to the settler plight, the Herald dismissed the proposal of sending the Flinders Island 
Aborigines to the mainland. Ridiculing one of Robinson’s hopeful philanthropic measures, 
the paper cried,  
Let the Vandemonians keep their Alexanders, Napoleons, Achilleses, Ajaxes, 
Alfreds, Hannibals, Leonidases, Eugenes, King Georges, Tippoo Saibs, 
Washingtons, and Peter Pindars! - their Lallah Rookhs, Semiraurses, Sabinas, 
Matildas, Amelias, and Claras! – all to themselves. We want neither the classic 
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nor the romantic savages here. We have too many of the murderous wretches 
about us already.152 
 Meanwhile, although his chance to speak was postponed to a subsequent meeting, 
Robinson took part in the inauguration of the Sydney branch of the Aborigines Protection 
Society on 16 October, at which a resolution was passed to endorse the benevolent feeling 
contained within the Select Committee’s Report. According directly with the hopes of the 
Report, the editor of the Colonist Rev. John Dunmore Lang spoke to the essential 
philanthropy of colonisation “as one of the noblest works in which man was employed” and 
extolled the virtue of the new protectionist imperative necessitated by revelations of 
mistreatment of Aboriginal people. Similarly, George Windeyer, who was in fact soon to 
represent the Myall Creek men, disputed Aboriginal sovereignty outright considering the 
tyrannical character it imposed upon Europeans who occupied their land and the truism that 
“he who performed labour on the land, and brought it from a state of nature into 
productiveness, had the best title to it”. But this “did not mean to say that the Aborigines 
were not entitled to some care and protection at the hands of the whites.”153 Hiding the actual 
state of affairs on the frontier, this obligation was owing to the fact that they were unable to 
protect themselves.154  
Typically less ambivalent was Lancelot Threlkeld, a figure long involved in the 
controversies of colonial politics principally on account of his troubled relationship with the 
London Missionary Society while responsible for the Lake Macquarie mission established in 
1824.155 Perhaps more than any other humanitarian public figure, Threlkeld chose to 
unequivocally advocate for Aboriginal people against settler interests. In doing so he 
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alienated himself within the white community, even from other religious figures including 
Lang who held pastoral interests.156 Despite this antagonism Threlkeld still joined in the 
general spirit of the inaugural gathering, avidly proclaiming  
that the Editors of newspapers stood charged with criminality in the sight of God, 
by having in their writings inflamed the minds of the Europeans and induced 
them to exterminate the Aborigines. It might be very well to shelter themselves 
now under the omnipotent 'We', but that would avail little when they were 
individually called on to answer for blood on their hands before the Judge of 
all.157 
The honesty of this evaluation was not appreciated by the Gazette, which either through 
ignorance or dishonesty, claimed that it had ever “advocated the cause of the Aborigines”, 
and explained that Threlkeld was likewise aware that the paper’s editor, George Cavanagh, 
was in fact a member of the group then being addressed.158 Be that as it may, the Gazette had 
not always been the advocate for Aboriginal people that its present editor was now claiming.  
It was the indictment of the press by Baptist minister John Saunders at the adjourned 
meeting of the Aborigines Protection Society on 18 October which was to cause the biggest 
public stir. Robinson reflected in his journal upon observations in the press that he had 
spoken for three hours on this occasion. In seconding the resolution of the previous meeting, 
Robinson’s speech was more than anything a pitch for the prospects of his coming role as 
Chief Protector; an opportunity beyond his diaries to represent himself as the anxious 
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guardian of all Aborigines. In summarising his experiences during the Friendly Mission he 
took the opportunity to offer evidence for the advancement of the Flinders island Aborigines 
towards civilisation.159 But it was left to Saunders to truly capture the zeal of the gathering. 
“The exhibition of the feeling of the Meeting was so great”, reported the Gazette, “that it 
would be impossible to insert the notice of cheers at the points at which they occurred; in fact 
almost every word of the reverend gentleman's speech called forth plaudits.”  
 Saunders achieved this emotional response through his targeting of Ward Stephens 
and the Herald, specifically a recent article which essentially proposed martial law and called 
out the growing benevolent attitude towards Aborigines for its “cant and hypocrisy”.160 How 
else could such suggestions be understood other than as an encouragement “to slaughter 
human beings”?161 How else could one read the Herald and not believe that there was not “a 
murderous spirit abroad” as it so hoped to demonstrate? Saunders was confounded owing to 
his belief that opposition to the Society was largely attributable “to a few of the lowest and 
most degraded characters.” While every bit rhetorical, in identifying this discrepancy 
Saunders in fact mounts a compelling analysis of the imaginative dialectic between the public 
and the press.  If the “slander” expressed in the Herald in reality only reflected the sentiment 
of “degraded characters” there was a stark contradiction for any one who thought otherwise 
to continue its purchase. Aware that newspaper editors tended “to pander to a taste already 
formed”, Saunders labelled Ward a mercenary “seeking to please the vitiated tastes of a petty 
faction” which otherwise did not reflect those of “colonists at large”. Saunders’ insinuation 
that the Herald was siding expressly with the interests of squatters was not unmerited. By the 
same token it was becoming clearer that under the editorship of Lang, the paper through 
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which Saunders was conveying his opinions, the Colonist, was becoming more and more 
committed to the humanitarian cause.162   
 Saunders then went on to reverse the allegation of “cant and hypocrisy” directed at the 
humanitarian principles embodied in the Aborigines Protections Society. “There was the song 
of malevolence as well as the song of benevolence”, he declared, referring to “cant” in terms 
of “the usual strain of a party”.163 Accepting that canters existed among religious 
communities, although not genuine philanthropists, Saunders explained that “cant and 
hypocrisy were found everywhere, and more especially with those demons in human shape 
who would urge the extermination of a whole race if opposed to them.”164 More directly 
Saunders loaded the Herald with the baggage of slavery so recently cast off by the same 
people now so concerned with Aboriginal rights, the paper being “of a complexion with the 
song which has been for too long chanted in the West Indies.”165 Notwithstanding the height 
of this rhetoric, and although he would not perhaps accept being placed within it himself, 
Saunders in fact offers a particularly useful construction for describing the competing 
feelings towards Aboriginal people which had prefigured frontier politics across New South 
Wales and Van Diemen’s Land for many years. It is apt that such an allegory should emerge 
at a point where the discursive opposition between humanitarian “canters” and those who 
appeared as “demons in human shape” was at its height. 
The latter group reacted in predictable fashion. “Mr. Saunders and the ranting crew who 
applauded him, shall not come off scot-free”, promised the Herald. 166 “Had the editor of this 
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journal, in whose absence Mr. Saunders had the good taste and gentlemanly feeling to 
denounce as a hireling, been present, the Reverend gentleman would, most assuredly, have 
been taught better manners”, the paper menacingly observed.167 As it mocked the “furious 
partizan zeal” of the Aborigines Protection Society, AN AUSTRALIAN meanwhile wrote to 
the Colonist expressing “feelings of the liveliest interest” in the object of the recent meetings. 
Of his experiences with Aboriginal people AN AUSTRALIAN wrote,  
that their kindness and attention, and their feeling for you in any trouble has often 
struck me as being more sincere and more from the heart, than that often 
professed by the called Christian, the white man; as for honesty, I would trust 
most of them equally as soon as the white, and I have always, although 
sometimes roaming with two or three blacks in the woods until almost midnight, 
felt myself as safe as when a babe in the arms of my mother.168 
Once again disrupting the negative tenor of the frontier narrative, PHILANTHROPUS 
similarly challenged the Herald on the grounds of the potential amicability of frontier 
relations. “How is it”, PHILANTHROPUS addressed Ward Stephens,  
that while some persons complain of the robberies and murders committed by the 
blacks, the courageous, prudent, firm, patient, and conciliatory manners and 
conduct of Messrs Sturt, Imlay, Ryue, Robinson, Eyre, Hawdon, and others, have 
secured to these gentlemen uninjured and uninterrupted residence on journeys, 
and perfect safety among the Aborigines, for months or weeks together?169 
Mitchell being the obvious exclusion, this was a reasonable question to ask, and it spoke 
well of the Herald’s objectivity to publish it. But it did nothing to prompt any genuine 
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reflection on the part of the paper, nor its broader readership, on the eve of the Myall Creek 
murder trial. OBSERVER was particularly critical of a letter in the Colonist from Justitia, 
which in representing the interests of one side of the coming trial, failed to mention “the 
many, and even recent inhuman murders committed by the native tribes on defenceless 
shepherds and others – men, too, placed, AND NOT FROM CHOICE, at their mercy, and 
far, far in the lonely forests.” How were Robinson and his “band of Protectors” attempting to 
reconcile the “hostile parties” on the frontier other than spending their time idly and 
“speechifying” at public meetings?170 In taking the same “set of visionaries” to task, and in 
particular Saunders as a “clerical libeller”, the Herald attempted to square the ledger 
regarding the alleged “murderous spirit” driving settlers to atrocities.  
Most importantly the paper argued, it had never encouraged settlers to act in such a 
spirit.171 Yet in repudiating this allegation, in the same lengthy article the paper asserted that 
“in the name of the settlers… they WILL NOT allow the blacks to plunder the whites of their 
property or to murder them with impunity.” This was a clear evaluation of the relative worth 
of white and black lives. Given that “no exertions are made by the government, or by the 
canters, to bring the maurauders to justice-to hang them, as whites would be hanged,” the 
paper also asserted, “the law is unequal, and not one of the whining crew who infest the 
Colony…can prove the reverse.” Denying it ever inculcated a “murderous spirit” it was more 
than willing to now, in proclaiming:  
protect the whites as well as the blacks. Protect the white settler, his wife, and 
children, in remote places, from the filthy, brutal cannibals of New Holland. We 
say to the Colonists, since the Government makes no adequate exertion to protect 
you, protect yourselves; and if the ferocious savages endeavour to plunder or 
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destroy your property, or to murder yourselves, your families, or your servants, 
do to them as you would do to any white robbers or murderers-SHOOT THEM 
DEAD, if you can. 172 
The Herald could not allow Aborigines to be “magnified into martyrs, at the settlers 
expense”, to let “the free Colonists to be assailed by a gang of clerical traducers – the 
spouters of venomous libels”.173  
The following day, 15 November, the 11 men accused of the Myall Creek Murder 
were acquitted in the Supreme Court.174 In reporting this news, the Colonist also published a 
letter from Saunders addressing the Herald’s denial of its inculcation of a “murderous spirit” 
among settlers. To the contrary, and in a similar vein to Threlkeld, Saunders argued that 
Ward “had mistaken the tone of popular feeling”. It was only the editor of the Herald to 
whom Saunders attributed the sentiments printed in his paper and no other “respectable man”. 
This created a tension in Saunders’ overall argument to the extent that he previously 
insinuated that Ward published what he did for the “sake of hire”, essentially that he was 
pandering to the interests of settlers. It was never the case that settlers lacked any emotional 
agency other than that which they generated from a discourse of fear and white victimhood in 
the press. At best newspapers such as the Herald provided the scaffold of language and 
technology around which settler emotions could cohere, although clearly not without contest. 
While this was essentially Saunders’ point, his argument with Ward had since the beginning 
retained a personal aspect which ultimately guided his rhetorical purpose.175 To this extent 
both men can be respectively framed as the key agents contesting the expression of emotion 
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in terms of frontier victimhood, and how it informed representations of settler subjectivity, in 
the context of one of the more tumultuous periods of New South Wales history.176   
 Saunders may or may not have been aware of Scott’s particular involvement in the 
lead up to the trial through the body of the Black Association, a factor that would broaden his 
conception of which other “respectable” men harbouring a murderous spirit. In his 
prosecution of the Myall Creek men Attorney General John Hubert Plunkett made his 
concerns clear that the “three talented gentlemen” defending the Myall Creek men could only 
do so thanks at the behest of “many Gentlemen high in rank”. The shame that these men 
should have felt was not diminished by many of them being unaware of the ‘Black 
Association’s “real intent… which was virtually to protect the stockkeepers and shepherds in 
the extermination of the blacks.”177 Plunkett also took aim at the Herald, telling the jury that 
he hoped the paper did not reflect “public feeling”.178 That the court was so jubilant at the 
verdicts of not guilty for each prisoner foiled Plunkett’s hopes. As the Monitor reported the 
“aristocracy of the Colony, for once, joined heart and hand with the prison-population, in 
expressions of joy at the acquittal of these men.”179 The outrage following Plunkett’s request 
that the prisoners be kept in custody for the hearing of further indictments equally 
demonstrates how far frontier emotion had come to obscure class boundaries – however often 
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“lower orders” could be previously blamed for instigating violence – instilling the trope of 
white victimhood as a particularly cohesive social factor in colonial New South Wales.180  
 Fuelled by the government’s intent on pursuing the Myall Creek men, the Herald 
continued its attack upon Saunders, responding particularly strongly to the idea that they 
“were the hirelings of a despicable faction”. Picking up more on the “fanatic Priest’s” initial 
outburst at the Aborigines Protection Society, the paper did not deny the existence of such a 
faction but rather threatened that they were the “very men who will put down him and his 
canting crew.” Eliciting the power that came with holding the reigns to the colony’s 
prosperity the paper reified the emergent squattocracy. “They are the holders of the soil and 
of the wealth of the country”, it bellowed. “They are the holders of the public purse; who will 
have the expenditure of the public money, the making of the laws, and who will form the 
juries of the Colony.”  
Yet paradoxically it was all too clear that these same men, or at least their servants, 
were clearly the victims of not just black depredations but the intransigence of the 
government. Ressentiment in this case owed not to a “murderous spirit” but a “black fever 
abroad - a nasty epidemic black disease.” Alluding to the influence of humanitarian 
discourse, the Herald took Gipps to task for offering only 10 pounds for a “desperate villain” 
terrorising the district of Merton who had escaped from an “ironed gang” at Newcastle while 
it had previously offered 50 pounds for the apprehension of Fleming, the alleged ringleader 
of the Myall Creek Massacre. “Is the plunder of the lonely settlers' property - the possible 
deprivation of their lives - by a convict robber, to be estimated at just one-fifth part of the 
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value which is set upon the life of a black, who is merely supposed to have been murdered,” 
the paper asked.181 Perhaps “28 blacks” as opposed to “a black” was what the paper meant.  
The case for victimhood was more balanced in the Monitor’s reckoning. Not only had 
the 28 victims of the massacre not “rushed” any cattle in the area – an act often referred to 
throughout the trials in justifying the contempt with which stock keepers came to hold the 
Wererai – but “had become domesticated” in the company of one of the men who eventually 
led them to their slaughter under the guise of friendship. Yet the Monitor believed that this 
“deed of darkness” for which it could not find a “parallel for cold-blooded ferocity, even in 
the history of Cortez and the Mexicans, or of Pizarro and the Peruvians” had ultimately been 
the design of others. The paper was particularly scathing of the hiring of the three counsellors 
in the men’s defence leading to the “highly popular” verdict of not guilty. “We tremble to 
remain in a country where such feelings and principles prevail”, wrote the Monitor. Having 
“always dreaded an oligarchy” the paper saw the virtue of returning to “Old England” should 
a “new Act of Parliament take the government of this Colony out of the hands of the Queen, 
and place it in the hands of the illiterate Dutch money making aristocracy of this Colony”. 
Paying sufficient awareness to the rights of Aborigines, the paper forewarned that the recent 
verdict heralded a time whereby should a person “be sufficiently unpopular with the 
aristocracy” their murder would go unheeded. “Money, lucre, profit these are the guide. O 
Australia!” Yet, in backing up its previous call for the protection of settlers in Port Phillip, the 
Monitor attributed Gipps’s failure to do so rather than the Herald’s rhetoric for creating the 
“murderous spirit and wicked malignity generally prevalent among our graziers and 
settlers”182  
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 While it had definitely become an advocate for the humanitarian cause by the stage, in 
the lead up to the second trial the Colonist chose not to prejudice the guilt or otherwise of the 
Myall Creek men by not publishing the results of the first. However, like the Monitor it was 
particularly concerned that the association of squatters formed to fund the defence of the 
accused men may have had the more insidious “object to encourage a systematic slaughter of 
the blacks.” But given the “respectability” of the men involved in the association the Colonist 
was sure that once the “hideous deformity” of the massacre was revealed they would be “the 
first to wish the diabolical ruffians concerned in the massacre subjected to the well-merited 
behests of justice.”183 In a further demonstration of where its sympathies were coming to lie, 
the paper published a letter from M who purported to be insulted by the Herald “ascribing all 
the sympathy towards the blacks exclusively to the Rev. Mr. Saunders.” The Colonist added a 
comment which consolidated this point of view in denying “’the colony is deaf to the cry’ of 
our long neglected Aborigines” but had by and large responded to it in a “philanthropic 
manner”. A letter to the Monitor from A.N.C. showed great appreciation for the overall 
objectivity offered by both it and the Colonist, reading the reports of the trial with “a feeling 
of horror” and a suspicion that the excitement produced by the verdict alluded to the 
possibility that “others besides the actual murderers are implicated.”184  
 But, as Milliss has observed, only the Australian was truly “unequivocal” in its 
response to the trial, urging that the “secret ‘brotherhood’” formed in protection of the 
stockkeepers be prosecuted and not the men facing their second trial.185 Wishing that its 
contemporaries had done the same, only after the seven men who stood trial for the second 
time, Charles Kilmeister, John Russell, Edward Foley, John Johnstone, James Parry, James 
Oates and William Hawkins, were found guilty of five of the charges of murder brought 
                                                
183 Colonist, 21 November 1838.  
184 Monitor, 26 November 1838.  
185 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p. 520.  
  
249 
before the court was the Gazette comfortable in revealing its “feelings on the subject”, 
sensitive to the whole incident’s potential to make  “an impression detrimental to the interests 
of our community on the minds of the British public.”186 A similar concern for the 
“excitement” the massacre might cause “among the moral and Religious classes” was 
addressed by AN ENGLISH JURYMAN to the Australian. To answer the question as to what 
the “feelings of the people of New South Wales on the subject” were, the writer shared an 
excerpt from a juryman of the first trial, which indicated that he “knew well they were guilty 
of the murder, but… would never see a white man suffer for shooting a black."187 
Not feeling obliged to remark upon the fate of the “unfortunate men”, the Gazette was 
forthright in arguing that “the original cause of all these atrocities is traceable to the neglect 
of the Executive in not making due provision for the equal administration of justice between 
the black and white man.” “While the black man escapes with impunity from the law of the 
land, for the crime he has committed on the white man,” the paper warned, “so long will a 
feeling prevail, and very justly, that justice is not equally administered.”188  The following 
day Judge Burton, reportedly moved to tears in doing so, condemned the seven guilty men to 
death for the massacre at Myall Creek.189 “What man, whose heart is not dead to every 
feeling of humanity,” asked Burton, “can attempt to palliate the conduct of its diabolical 
perpetrators?”190  
Having made its point about legal equality, the Gazette raised a concern similar to that 
made by the Monitor, following the initial non-guilty verdict, regarding the reliability of the 
legal system. It now seemed possible that juries could come to different decisions on the one 
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matter “whenever political feelings or political interests are involved.”191 Perhaps on account 
of it being the arbiter of such interests, the Herald’s reaction to the death sentences was more 
squarely on the grounds of legal equality, not so much to dispute that the men were in fact 
guilty, but rather to ask the question: “Are blacks to be hanged for murder as well as whites?” 
The paper then went on to list the various white victims of Aboriginal violence since 1832 
recently given as evidence to the 'the Committee of the Legislative Council, on the 
Aborigines' Question’ led by Broughton.192 Once again even Captain Logan, murdered at 
Moreton Bay in 1831, was dredged up to emphasise the scale of white victimhood which 
would go unavenged. Rather than spending precious public money on the Protectors, Gipps 
should create a police force whose obligation it was to protect both black and white.193 
Cementing the martyrdom of the Myall Creek seven in the mythology of white victimhood, 
the argument of legal equality also provided the thrust of at least five memorials that Gipps 
received pleading that he grant the men clemency, two of which were signed by many of the 
jurors who sat both trials.194 Gipps and the Council did not see the need to uphold any of 
these reservations, and the guilty men were hanged on 18 December 1838.  
* 
The press response to the hangings was relatively muted. The Gazette took the 
opportunity to remind readers that whether or not the men acted under orders, their actions 
were subsequently validated as being in accordance with the interests of their masters. 
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Vaguely pointing to the culpability of squatters in the whole mess, the paper asked, “what 
must now be the feelings of the men whose conduct, however unintentionally on their part, 
has led to the perpetration of such an atrocious crime, and the consequent death of the 
murderers?“ The urgency of this question was sharpened by an anecdote divulged in the wake 
of the hangings that settlers had resorted to poisoning Aborigines, and another suggesting that 
“black shooting has become almost as much a matter of course there as kangaroo hunting.” 
195 
The previous day the Colonist’s only response to the hangings was to continue its 
publication of extracts from the evidence given by Scott and Threlkeld to Broughton’s 
Committee in October. Far from recommending any measure of protection towards them, 
Scott reinforced the opinion that Aboriginal violence would only subside “as they become 
better acquainted with our power to punish”. “Personal fear” was their “only control” he 
argued. Threlkeld on the other hand, while convinced that the role was too much for one man, 
commended the office of Protector “fully employed in investigating cases, which are so 
numerous and shocking to humanity”. One such case to Threlkeld’s recollection described a 
situation “in which some blacks were decoyed into a hut, and then permitted (one at a time) 
to come out, when they were butchered instantly, until all were destroyed.” He offered 
another harrowing example: “a party of blacks were cutting bark at a station, on, or near the 
Gwyder River; the overseer told them to go away, as a party were out after the blacks, and 
they might be killed”. When they failed to do so “a party of stockmen came upon them, and 
killed the whole of them, men, women, and children, reserving only two little girls”.196This 
formed part of the grim picture Threlkeld had already given in The Annual Report of the 
Mission to the Aborigines, Lake Macquarie of 1837, in which he speculated:  
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If Government were to institute an enquiry into the conduct of some of the 
Europeans in the interior towards the blacks, A War of extirpation would be 
found to have long existed, in which the ripping out of bellies of the Blacks alive; 
the roasting them in that state in triangularly made log fires, made for the very 
purpose; the dashing of infants upon the stones…together with many other 
atrocious acts of cruelty, which are but the sports of monsters boasting of superior 
to that possessed by the wretched Blacks!197  
 But it was clear from the beginning of 1839 that it would not be marked by the same 
humanitarian resolve to confront such alleged atrocities as the previous year. The role of 
Protector had become the prerogative of the new Commissioner of Crown Lands Edward 
Mayne as much as it directed Robinson’s posting to Port Phillip. After his meeting with 
Gipps at the end of October 1838, and in learning that the Flinders Island Aborigines were 
not to be moved, Robinson prepared immediately for his departure from the colony, leaving 
for Port Phillip by way of Hobart just before the first Myall Creek trial on 11 November.198 
Aside from a meeting on 7 November to discuss the decision regarding the Flinders Island 
Aborigines, Robinson’s involvement with the Sydney Aborigines Protection Society had 
ended.199 Nor had the Society itself conducted any public activities beyond its enthusiastic 
birth in October.200  
Early in the new year a letter from James Glennie prompted the press to report “the 
retaliatory war of the Aborigines in the north-western districts” raging since December.201 
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Many of Mr. Cobb’s sheep and cattle, plus two of his men had been killed reported the letter. 
Indicating the decreasing valence of humanitarian discourse in the colony, the Colonist 
maintained its belief that such events were the “natural consequences of the ill treatment 
which the Aborigines have met with at the hands of Englishmen” but could not “contemplate 
without horror and alarm their probable repetition in more aggravated forms.”  
So strong was this feeling, that the Colonist now joined with its “contemporaries in 
calling upon the Government, in the most emphatic terms of warning and entreaty, to adopt 
firm, decided, and prompt measures for their suppression.” In a stark turn around the paper 
claimed that it could not “look on with indifference while the property and lives of our 
country men are placed in such imminent jeopardy. No! the Aborigines must be made to 
understand, that whilst they are under the protection of English law, they are also amenable to 
that law.” Lamenting the fact that Robinson was not present on the north-western frontier, 
and fully re-calibrating his role as Protector, the paper looked to the government to “bestir 
themselves in the most resolute manner for the protection of whites from blacks, as well as of 
blacks from whites.”202 Either way, by the time Robinson arrived in Port Phillip at the 
beginning of March the same pressures to protect settlers as much as Aborigines were also in 
play. As the Port Phillip Gazette reported on 15 December 1838, “The greatest fear has taken 
possession of all the shepherds…who have announced their determination of giving 
themselves up to Government rather than attend sheep under the present circumstances.”203    
There was always a tension between Lang’s apparent enthusiasm for colonisation and 
concern for Aboriginal people, much like that inherent to the Aborigines Protection Society 
more broadly.204 Perhaps this played into the Colonist advocating a less sympathetic stance 
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towards Aboriginal people at the beginning of the New Year. A more likely explanation is the 
fact of his imminent departure from New South Wales on 12 January, from which time the 
Colonist came to lack the humanitarian drive it possessed at the end of 1838. With Robinson 
and Lang now absent, in spite of his fiery invective towards the Herald, Saunders also lapsed 
in his humanitarian interest.205 There was always the staunchness of Threlkeld, but without 
these three key figures there was very little to coordinate the sympathy of the Sydney 
humanitarian movement.  
Mayne at least seems to have taken to his task on the Gwydir with a certain eye for 
the suffering of Aboriginal people. There was much of this for him to discover. In February 
some of his troopers came across evidence of a massacre similar in method if not magnitude 
to the Myall Creek massacre on the property of a Gwydir settler named Crawford. An 
investigation of the partially burnt remains on the property suggested nine victims.206 
Mayne’s direct response was to issue an order that firearms would be confiscated in the event 
that they were used against Aborigines, which appears to have had some effect.207 The extent 
of his achievement was otherwise demonstrated by his arrest of not only two of the three 
Europeans responsible for the massacre but also five of the seven Aboriginal men involved in 
the murders at Cobb’s station. According to his reports he was also successful in gaining the 
confidence of many Wererai, convincing them of the need to cease their attacks.208 As far as 
the exact circumstances of the massacre are concerned, these are not well known on account 
of the accused men not finding their way to court. What evidence does exist suggests that it 
                                                
205 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p. 602 
206 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p. 580.  
207 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p. 581. 
208 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, p. 597.  
  
255 
may have motivated the murder of Cobb’s men. 209 For this offence the five Aboriginal men 
were eventually sentenced to 10 years on Cockatoo Island.210 
Despite what amounted to a lopsided management of justice, in the course of Mayne’s 
investigations there was a broad disenchantment with his activity in the press. Instead of 
rendering himself and his mounted force a protection to the settlers from the “outrages of the 
blacks,” complained the Monitor, “he seems rather to have assumed the office of a spy upon 
their actions, and by his injudicious promises of protection to the ignorant Aborigines, he has 
encouraged rather than checked them in their aggressions upon the property of the 
settlers.”211Given the difficulty of catching the perpetrators of such aggressions and bringing 
them to court, STAT UMBRA cited the difficulties experienced during the Black Line in a 
letter to the same paper to suggest that Mayne be given “discretionary power to shoot every 
black man or woman who many be detected in the net of spearing either men, cattle, or 
sheep.”212 Evincing a remnant of its humanitarian agenda, the Colonist described the 
suggestion of such summary justice as “revolting to every humane and Christian feeling”.213 
The paper also managed to continue to evoke the ire of the Herald once again in claiming 
that “sordid interest is the root of all anti-aborigine feeling.”214 A letter from 
ANTICIPATION in the Gazette also expressed disgust with a “professedly Christian Colony 
deluged with the gore of murdered victims, and a newspaper (savage and bloody as the 
murderers themselves) actually upholding the white savages in their hellish work! Oh, 
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horrible! most horrible!!!” What more could a nation responsible for such “sanguinary past 
times” anticipate than God’s “consuming fire.” 215 
But it was becoming clearer that humanitarianism was unravelling, particularly in 
light of the situation on the Liverpool Plains and how Gipps responded to it. The running 
theme of Milliss’ history of the Liverpool Plains is that Nunn’s involvement in the Waterloo 
Creek massacre was obscured by the frontier contingencies of Port Phillip and Myall Creek. 
Moreover, the latter of these two events could not be explained without reference to Nunn’s 
previous campaign.  Ironically, it was the final, and what proved to be ultimately misguided 
Nunn inquiry coming to a head in April 1839 which seems to have distracted Gipps from 
taking the same action regarding the massacre at Crawford’s as he had with respect to Myall 
Creek. This set of circumstances helps explain Gipps’s disappointment in Mayne’s 
unheralded arrival back in Sydney as much as the fact that the Commissioner had left his 
post.216 But in a broader sense it was clear that Gipps’s enthusiasm for enacting the principles 
that carried the humanitarian movement throughout 1838 was wavering.217 
 Gipps’s capitulation during the Nunn affair, leaving potentially hundreds of deaths 
unanswered, was one thing. The fact that the governor knew from June 1839 that he no 
longer had to accord with the principles of a colonial secretary so closely connected with the 
humanitarian movement also lessened his humanitarian obligations. But there were 
nevertheless moments throughout 1839 and beyond where Gipps maintained the interests of 
Aboriginal people in his policy and legislative agenda. As always, a restless settler 
community made this difficult. In the passing of the Crown Lands Occupation Act in March 
for instance, Gipps made it clear “that the Aborigines are entitled to protection as much as 
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any other class of persons”.  Gipps made his frustration equally clear with the accusation that 
he had shown “a greater concern for the lives of the Blacks than for those of the Whites.“218   
The depth of Gipps’s former resolve was also shown in his reinstatement of Mayne’s 
instructions in May through which he reinforced the Commissioner’s role under the banner of 
legal equality and instructed that an inquest be held into every Aboriginal death. Milliss in 
fact frames this measure as making up for the Crown Lands Act’s failure to truly challenge 
settler behaviour on the frontier, harking back to a governor “with all his ardour and resolve” 
219. A measure of this resolve was also demonstrated by Gipps’s refusal to act upon the 
petition of Heneage Finch who, exposed to the “ferocity and rapacity of the natives” during 
his service with the Surveyors Department under Mitchell, underlined the favourability of the 
law towards Aborigines.220 And while the governor initially only issued a warrant for the 
arrest of one of the perpetrators of the massacre at Crawford’s property still at large, Charles 
Eyles, he eventually offered the reward of 25 pounds to any free person and a conditional 
pardon to any convict for his capture.221 Although this amount was less than the amount he 
offered for the capture of Fleming. 
With Mayne being recalled back to the Gwydir in the middle of the year due to 
increasing violence in that district as well as around New England, Gipps could point to the 
soundness of his frontier policy on account of both districts eventually returning to a state of 
relative tranquility. With Port Phillip subject to the same policy, Gipps could point to 
Mayne’s success when petitioned by settlers from the west of the district for assistance given 
recent Aboriginal “outrages”.222 Whatever Gipps’s hopes were, the Herald was able to lift 
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extracts from the Port Phillip papers complaining that “the whites are indubitably greater 
objects of pity and commiseration; the settlers evidently require protection rather than the 
natives.”223 That the Herald could publish letters from settlers disparaging “the ravings of 
pseudo-philanthropists” and complain on its own part of the “canting nonsense” to which 
settlers were subject at the end of 1839 suggests that there was an ongoing sense that the 
colony was still being hamstrung by a humane agenda.224 
From this stage onwards, Milliss provides a thorough account of the oscillations in 
Gipps’s frontier approach, leading to the dismantling of his “three-tiered system of 
missionaries, Protectors and Border Police.”225 Going as far as September 1841, Gipps 
willingness to come down on settler violence was evinced by his cancellation of the licence 
of William Lee of Bathurst as a result of his superintendent’s leading role in killing nine 
Aborigines in an act of retaliation on the Bogan River. But Gipps’s failure to act upon a 
similar incident two months later defined his sanction of Lee as a final act in the service of 
Aboriginal interests. This was emphatically demonstrated by his reluctance to act upon 
reports of the Aboriginal death toll mounting on the Gippsland and Moreton Bay frontiers 
from 1842 other than report them to Lord Stanley. That the British Government took no 
action in this case was symptomatic of the decreasing concern Millis demonstrates on the part 
of the Colonial Office since Stanley’s predecessor Lord Russell took the role of Colonial 
Secretary from Glenelg in 1839. But while there was a distinct sense that Russell was 
distancing the home government from frontier issues, Milliss makes a lot of Gipps’s failure to 
make public Russell’s concern over the handling of the Nunn inquiry.226 Insofar that Gipps 
later demonstrated a clear sense of his humanitarian responsibilities in 1841, his back down 
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over Nunn was perhaps a matter of the direct pressures he faced at the time from his “alarmed 
advisors”.227 
 Either way Millis argues that from 1842 there was a complete restructure of frontier 
policy. From March 1844 no missionaries received funding and the protectorate system was 
rolled back in favour of more support for Land Commissioners and the border police as the 
means of regulating the frontier. By June 1846 this responsibility began to be transferred 
entirely to the mounted police.228 Yet with Gipps’s departure a month later, and his death the 
following year, his rollback of a more humanitarian policy to the frontier diminished in 
significance when the door he hoped to keep closed to settlers was opened in the form of the 
Australian Lands Act. Achieving permanence of tenure had long run parallel to settler anxiety 
over the need for legal equality and protection on the frontier. For squatters like Robert Scott, 
openness to negotiating a policy that would tranquilize the unsettled frontier was as much as 
anything a fulcrum by which to leverage land title. This strategy did not so much contest the 
possibility of Aboriginal land rights as intimate that such rights no longer existed, if they had 
ever existed at all. That the new Act disregarded Aboriginal people can be taken as a sign of 
the dominance of squatter interests on the eve of self-governance, at the heart of which was 
the maturation of a settler subjectivity guided by a sense of injustice engendered by the 
humanitarian priorities of frontier policy. In the words of Ann Curthoys and Jessie Mitchell, 
“Aboriginal issues had thus largely been resolved in favour of the pastoralists by the time 
responsible government became a serious possibility.”229  
                                                
227 Milliss. Waterloo Creek, p. 702.  
228 Milliss, Waterloo Creek, pp. 713 – 616.  
229 Ann Curthoys and Jessie Mitchell, ‘The Advent of Self-Government, 1840s – 90’, in Alison Bashford and 
Stuart McIntyre eds., The Cambridge History of Australia vol. 1 (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), p. 157. 
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 The period of Gipps’s governorship can thus be taken as a key point in New South 
Wales colonial history at which the strength of white victimhood in the negotiation of settler 
subjectivity was at its height. While this strength had been building for a long period, this 
analysis corresponds with Wood’s argument regarding the emergence of a distinct colonial 
identity during this era.230 As this chapter has shown, through figures such as Robinson, 
Threlkeld and Saunders, 1838 in particular can be equally understood in terms of the 
consolidation of an emotional community defined by an expression of compassion and 
sympathy towards Aboriginal people that deliberately challenged the unsettled feelings 
coordinating frontier conduct and policy. But as this sentiment gained administrative 
coherence in the shape of humanitarian governance, its guiding principles ultimately failed to 
disrupt the trajectory of settler colonialism. This should perhaps come as no surprise. The 
emotional investment of the humanitarian movement in the safety and rights of Aboriginal 
people did not amount to nothing, as attested by Robinson’s long involvement in shaping a 
less violent frontier. But by simply asserting the obligation of imposing religion and western 
civilisation upon Indigenous peoples, humanitarian governance did little more than offer 
further pretext for dispossession in the service of elite colonial emotional needs.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
230 Wood, ‘Frontier Violence and the Bush Legend’. 
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Conclusion  
The limit of what could be achieved by the Aborigines Protection Society is captured well in 
what Michael Barnett calls the “intrinsic ambiguity of the humanitarian act”: the “ever-
present possibility” that our needs can motivate actions intended to serve the needs of others.1 
Since the late eighteenth century, humanitarianism has been driven by “the need to 
demonstrate remorse for the past and repair our relations with the world around us”, 
particularly at moments when humanity is at its “most suspect.”2 Atonement drove the 
humanitarian agenda as much as protection. 
 The advent of British humane governance, which reached its peak in 1838, was also 
more arbitrary, a factor of consolidating the purchase of British sovereignty in colonies taking 
shape according to jurisdictional pluralism. The settler vigilantism this often comprised 
meant that, in the wake of the anti-slavery movement’s success, no more was the absence of 
humanity apparent than in colonies such as New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land. The 
Aborigines Protection Society’s goals of “freeing”, “protecting” and “civilising” all imperial 
subjects was an inheritance, “the essence of Britishness projected on to the wider world” in 
opposition to the activity of “aberrant Britons”.3  
 It is within this “rupture between bourgeois metropolitan Britishness and colonial 
Britishness”, as Alan Lester describes it, that this thesis has sought to make a contribution.4 It 
has brought the negotiation of colonial subjectivities into the realm of emotional life. How 
settlers and other colonial agents came to imagine their roles in the imperial enterprise was a 
result of how well individual emotional experience correlated with guiding discourses of 
                                                
1 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 
p. 15 
2 Barnett, Empire of Humanity, p. 15.  
3 Lester, ‘British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire’, pp. 26, 30, 44.  
4 Lester, ‘British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire’, pp. 44. 
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chivalry and victimhood. Aided by colonial newspapers, settler society could take shape in 
terms of “imagined communities” along such emotional lines. More than just allowing the 
negotiation of respective settler subjectivities through an overarching discourse of fear, the 
colonial press also facilitated the delineation of humanity itself. The emotive representation 
of Aboriginal people, which emphasised the plight of suffering settlers, was often couched in 
terms that denied their capacity for “human feeling”.  
 This discursive valence of emotion allowed settlers from New South Wales and Van 
Diemen’s Land to cohere across geographical boundaries. It also had the potential to 
penetrate divisions of class, with the everyday fears of Aboriginal violence experienced by 
servants coalescing with the growing economic anxiety of absentee landholders. Although 
they prioritised the dire prospects frontier violence posed to colonial prosperity over the 
physical safety of servants, memorials pleading for official protection reached the desks of 
colonial administrators in the language of whiteness. The validity of these expressions of 
white victimhood would be quickly realised by colonial administrators despite potentially 
conflicting instructions from the Colonial Office. 
 But this did not mean that class ceased to be a factor in how settler society was 
constituted with respect to frontier politics. An abiding sentiment of colonial elites during the 
first fifty years of Australian settlement was that frontier violence could be attributed to the 
depravity of convicts and servants. Want of “human feeling” among Europeans was at times 
as much a concern as it was with respect to Aboriginal people. Overriding any deeper 
reflection as to why Aboriginal people resisted the growing British presence, this sentiment 
embodied a chivalric discourse which made the violent consequences of colonisation and 
dispossession more “palatable”. The policy of “amity and kindness” to which early governors 
were to abide could thus be maintained. But as this thesis has shown, this mythology loses a 
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great deal of credibility in view of the harsh measures resorted to by successive governors as 
a means of arresting Aboriginal resistance.  
It must be remembered that the language of terror in which settlers requested 
assistance from various governors was first used by Arthur Phillip in 1789. The expectation 
that fear could only be overcome by fear came from above. This framework for the politics of 
recognition at the heart of white victimhood was a feature of settler cultural memory well 
before landholders penned their first memorial. By 1838, such was the strength of this sense 
of entitlement that no matter how sincerely Gipps sought to construct legal equality on the 
frontier, to uphold the rights of Aboriginal people, he was met with waves of settler 
resentment. To be sure he had the support of some members of the press and was part of the 
burgeoning British imperial humanitarian movement, but this only exacerbated the growing 
disparity which existed between metropolitan and peripheral priorities. The colonial elite had 
their consciences to appease, but settlers knew all too well that prosperity rested upon the 
security of their property. With the tragic irony of ressentiment, it was settlers’ ability to 
deploy their growing sense of victimhood at the hands of a bloodthirsty frontier enemy, 
during an era otherwise defined by the imperative of Aboriginal protection, which gave them 
strength. It was this priority of colonialism which ultimately prevailed.  
The reason this consolidation of settler subjectivity triumphed as it did was its 
essential compatibility with the qualified humanitarian reservations of the colonial elite. In its 
most precise iteration in the Aborigines Protection Society’s report, the possibility of humane 
colonisation was still predicated upon dispossessing Aboriginal people of their land, so long 
as it fulfilled the obligation of spreading civilisation and Christianity. Through this obligation 
atonement could be achieved. The conceit of this dream was its failure to arrest the European 
“acquisitive impulse”, the very root of Aboriginal resistance. Ultimately it took very little for 
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the “genocidal potential” inherent to settler demands to overcome subjectively held 
humanitarian beliefs given that they aligned much more clearly with the structure of settler 
colonialism. Underlining the political utility of white victimhood, along with stark domestic 
and international economic imperatives, it was fear which helped execute settler 
colonialism’s “eliminationist logic”. 
The integrity of the humanitarian emotional community was also complicated by the 
complicity of certain key members in accelerating the demise of Aboriginal society, 
highlighting the paradox of humane colonisation. As James Heartfield remarks, in striving to 
protect Aboriginal people humanitarians only “added to their demoralisation as a people”, a 
framework of good intentions he attributes to 20th century outcomes such as the Stolen 
Generations.5 A lack of foresight was thus a central flaw in the character of men like 
Robinson, in whom can nonetheless be detected an active effort to fashion a subjectivity in 
opposition to a hostile broader community. There can be little doubting the sincerity of the 
feelings which bound Robinson’s investment in the task of the Friendly Mission. At the same 
time it is impossible to decouple this task from the urge to create a “native-free” Van 
Diemen’s Land, the “success” of which led to his eventual custodianship of the protectorate 
system as Port Phillip’s Chief Protector of Aborigines from 1839.  
With alarm spreading across this district into the 1840s, settler interests would 
continue to calibrate Robinson’s duties. Reports of servants deserting their huts rather than 
face the increasing threat of Aboriginal “depredations”, along with the overall “troublesome 
state of the natives”, reached the desks of colonial administrators much as they had in New 
South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land.6 When Lieutenant Governor La Trobe circulated a 
                                                
5 Heartfield, The Aborigines Protection Society, p. 123.   
6 W. H. Pettit: requesting aid due to trouble with Aborigines in the area, 2 September 1840, PROV VPRS 10 
1840/903. 
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letter in 1853 asking after the early experience of settlement, settlers could recollect “great 
difficulties from the determined ferocity of the natives” and the “great loss of life” that 
ensued.7 John Robertson of Wando Valley described a massacre of 51 Aboriginal warriors by 
the Whyte Brothers soon after they arrived in the district in 1841: “the bones of the men and 
sheep lay mingled together bleaching in the sun at the Fighting Hills.”8 Such was the 
response to the theft of 50 sheep, a disturbing consequence whether or not it occurred at the 
height of the protectionist era.     
With the declining influence of humanitarianism from the 1840s, signified by the 
decision to abandon the Protectorate system, by the 1860s settlers had been able to displace 
sentimentalism as the dominant British political discourse with a representation of Britishness 
that grounded the right to civilise more around the notion of racial superiority.9 This 
development provides some insight to the notorious brutality of the Queensland frontier.10 It 
also helps us to understand the purchase of the “dying race myth” upon the settler imaginary, 
already germinating in the first half of the nineteenth century. That settler Australians were 
able to reconcile the ongoing demise of Aboriginal people on racial grounds well into the 
twentieth-century speaks to the durability of this myth. “There is no hope”, argued Daisy 
Bates in 1938, “of protecting the Stone Age from the twentieth century.”11 Even when settler 
Australians began to show some receptivity to Aboriginal culture from the mid-twentieth 
century on the grounds that it offered a more “authentic” national myth, this did not 
                                                
7 J.H. Patterson to C.J. La Trobe, 15 August 1853, Letters from Victorian Pioneers: Being a Series of Papers on 
the Early Occupation of the Colony, the Aborigines etc., Thomas Francis Bride eds. (Melbourne: Robt. S. Brain, 
1898), p. 5.  
8 John G. Robertson to C.J. La Trobe, 26 September 1853, Letters from Victorian Pioneers, p. 31.  
9 Lester, ‘British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire’, p. 44. 
10 See Raymond Evans, Kay Saunders and Kathryn Cronin, Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race 
Relations in Colonial Queensland (Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book Co., 1975); Alison Palmer, 
Colonial Genocide (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 2000); Timothy Bottoms, The Conspiracy of Silence: 
Queensland’s Frontier Killing Times (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2013).  
11 Daisy Bates, The Passing of the Aborigines: A Lifetime Spent Among the Natives of Australia (London: 
Murray, 1938), p. 65. 
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necessarily equate to increased acceptance of Aboriginal people.12 This is another great irony 
of Australian history. The very “savagery” which made Aboriginal people so fearsome in one 
century, the foil for a young colony yearning for civilisation, offered the perfect critique for a 
society struggling to come to terms with itself in the next.13 
A belief in the inherent incompatibility of Aboriginal people, if not elements of their 
culture, with modernity went hand in hand with what W.E.H Stanner referred to in 1968 as “a 
cult of forgetfulness practiced on a national scale”. There is an obvious attraction to 
obscuring such a past on account of the questions of legitimacy it asks of Australia’s 
founding myths. The appeal of white victimhood likewise consists in the way that it displaces 
any responsibility for past injustices emanating from the frontier while at once allowing 
reverence for the trials of suffering settlers. The triumph of Australian settlement can only be 
understood from a position of weakness. With the response to Mabo and “The Adam Goodes 
Fire” in such recent historical memory, the political purchase of white victimhood remains 
just as pressing today as it did at the height of Australia’s frontier wars. 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                
12 Russell McGregor, Indifferent Inclusion: Aboriginal People and the Australian Nation (Canberra: Aboriginal 
Studies Press, 2011), pp. 119 – 120.  
13 Michael Dodson, 'The end in the beginning: re(de)finding Aboriginality', in M. Crossman eds., Blacklines 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003), pp. 30, 33. See also T.G.H.Strehlow, The Sustaining ideals of 
Aboriginal Society (Melbourne: The Hawthorn Press, 1956); Barry Hill, Broken Song: T.G.H. Strehlow and 
Aboriginal Possession (Milsons Point: Vintage, 2003), pp. 488 – 489; Marcia Langton, Well, I heard it on the 
Radio and I saw it on the Television (Sydney: Australian Film Commission, 1993), p. 33.  
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